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This study argues that the exploration of Hegel and Spinoza’s philosophies of 
material Nature yields a more compelling critique of Spinoza’s thought than 
either Hegel himself or commentators have recognised. Rather than attempting a 
full comparison of Hegel and Spinoza’s accounts of material Nature, this study 
focuses on elaborating a critique of the deficiencies found, from a Hegelian 
standpoint, in Spinoza’s account of extended Nature. This study argues that the 
Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s theory of extended Nature takes at least two major 
interrelated forms. Firstly, this critique suggests that Spinoza does not adequately 
derive the necessity of Substance’s existence as Extension, as motion and rest, 
and as finite bodies. This is demonstrated in this study through an account of 
Hegel’s immanent development of Nature as such and its mechanical forms from 
the conclusion of the Science of Logic. Secondly, this critique suggests that 
Spinoza’s mechanical and quantitative conception of the broader picture of 
material Nature is inadequate. This is demonstrated through an account of 
Hegel’s critique of any purely mechanical conception of the natural world, 
arguing instead that Nature is necessarily driven through a series of qualitatively 
different stages including the chemical and organic. This study makes an original 
scholarly contribution through its investigation of the Hegel-Spinoza relationship 
in the specific context of their philosophies of material Nature, an aspect of this 
relationship previously unexplored. This study thereby makes the first step in the 
expansion of the scholarship of the Hegel-Spinoza relationship into this new 




Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
We find Hegel’s most detailed and wide-ranging discussion of Spinoza in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Here Hegel attempts to exhibit the 
development of philosophy as a rationally connected “organic, progressive 
whole”1, within which the series of philosophies, far from presenting to us only a 
series of mistakes to be superseded, in fact shows us the “absolutely necessary” 
and “essential”2 stages of the process by which thought gradually gains “further 
immersion in and a fuller grasp of the Idea itself”3 and eventually makes Hegel’s 
own standpoint of absolute idealism possible.  
However, even within the context of this progressive theory of the history 
of philosophy, which acknowledges a contribution to the overall progression by 
each thinker along the way, Spinoza receives special praise. Hegel goes so far as 
to remark that Spinoza’s theory of the unity of all reality in Substance is not only 
“in the main true and well-grounded”, but “the foundation of all true views.” 
Indeed, “to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all 
Philosophy” in the sense that the process of philosophical thinking must pass 
through Spinozism, liberating itself by “bathing in this ether of the One 
substance” into which all particularity disappears.4  
Hegel holds in highest esteem Spinoza’s ability to “renounce all that is 
determinate and particular, and restrict himself to the One, giving heed to this 
alone.”5 Indeed, Hegel identifies the thought of the One, the unity of all things in 
the Absolute, and the commitment to conceiving all things in the context of this 
unity, as the fundamental insight and key contribution of Spinoza’s philosophy. 
As Macherey points out, it is clear that “for Hegel … there is something 
exceptional and inescapable in Spinoza’s philosophy” in that Spinoza gives, for 
 
1 Hegel, G.W.F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Volume One Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. p.7 
2 Ibid. p.19 
3 Ibid. p.41 
4 Hegel, G.W.F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Volume Three. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. pp.257-258 
5 Ibid.  
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the first time, a fully developed expression of the unity of thought and the 
Absolute and “thus all philosophy, all of philosophy, becomes possible.”6  
However, while Hegel praises Spinoza’s commitment to a full-blooded 
philosophy of the Absolute, he also argues that Spinoza’s conception of the 
metaphysical architecture of Substance generates severe problems when it comes 
to developing determinations from this absolute unity. As we shall see in more 
detail in chapter two, Hegel argues that Spinoza’s philosophy serves to 
undermine the reality of everything but the Absolute, and identifies Spinoza’s 
lack of a Hegelian conception of negativity and dialectical movement as the cause 
of this central issue. 
Recent scholarly interest in the Hegel-Spinoza relationship has largely 
focused on forming a defence of Spinoza against Hegel’s critiques. Concerning 
the issue of determinacy, Melamed has played a prominent role, dedicating 
significant thought to arguing against the acosmist reading of Spinoza’s position 
suggested by Hegel.7 Della Rocca has similarly pushed back against Hegel’s 
reading of Spinoza as doing away with the reality of the finite and of the 
attributes as mere conceptions of the intellect.8 
Due to taking the form of individual articles, this recent work has been 
limited to a piecemeal response to Hegel, pointing out and disputing 
misinterpretations rather than forming a systematic Spinozist rejoinder to 
Hegel’s thought more broadly. This is one reason why Macherey’s Hegel or 
Spinoza9 (1979) remains the magnum opus of scholarship on the Hegel-Spinoza 
relationship. In Hegel or Spinoza, Macherey constructs a wide-ranging 
interpretation of Spinoza’s thought which aims not only to refute Hegel’s 
misinterpretations, but also to present Spinoza as “the true alternative to 
Hegelian philosophy.”10 Against the dialectic of Hegel’s Idea, moved forward in 
an (in Macherey’s reading) inescapable teleology through its internal negativity, 
 
6 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. p.13 
7 Melamed, Y. (2010) ‘Acosmism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the 
Finite’. Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 48, Number 1, January 2010, pp. 77-92; 
Melamed, Y. (2011) ‘Why Spinoza is not an Eleatic Monist (Or Why Diversity Exists)’. In Spinoza on 
Monism. Ed. Goff, P. Palgrave Macmillan Limited.; Melamed, Y. (2012) ‘“Omnis determinatio est 
negatio”: determination, negation, and self-negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel’. In Spinoza and 
German Idealism. Eds. Forster, E. & Melamed, Y. Cambridge University Press.  
8 Della Rocca, M. (2012) ‘Rationalism, idealism, monism, and beyond’. In Spinoza and German 
Idealism. Eds. Forster, E. & Melamed, Y. Cambridge University Press. 
9 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. 
10 Ibid. p.12 
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Macherey poses Spinoza’s Substance as an absolute and infinite causality, free of 
negativity or teleology. 
The challenge to Hegelianism posed by Hegel or Spinoza, in the form of 
both Macherey’s rebuttals of Hegel’s reading of Spinoza and the metaphysical 
alternative presented by Macherey’s portrait of Spinozism, still lacks a developed 
answer, and this lack has only gained renewed urgency from more recent work 
continuing to push back against Hegel’s interpretation of Spinoza. This study 
will begin to address this absence of a Hegelian response, but not through a 
direct reply to the work of Macherey or more recent scholars. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, Hegel pitches the problem of deriving determinacy from 
Substance at a general and highly abstract level. Significantly, the response to 
Hegel, whether from Macherey or more recent scholarship, has stuck to this 
abstract level of discussion chosen by Hegel. However, there is no need for the 
exploration of the Hegel-Spinoza relationship to be limited to the comparison of 
their conceptions of the Absolute and its relationship to determinacy taken in 
total abstraction. Rather than sticking to the ground occupied by the direct 
commentaries in Hegel’s Science of Logic and Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
this study will explore the Hegel-Spinoza relationship in the context of the 
developed Hegelian system, something not carried out in existing scholarship.  
Both Macherey’s work and more recent scholarship have made it clear 
that a Hegelian critique of Spinoza cannot rest solely on Hegel’s direct 
comments, particularly when it comes to his reconstruction of the detail of 
Spinoza’s philosophy. However, from a Hegelian perspective, regardless of the 
accuracy or otherwise of Hegel’s reading of Spinoza’s philosophy, the only true 
critique of Spinozism lies in the fully developed system of absolute idealism. 
That is, the demonstration that the Absolute is Idea, not Substance, can only 
consist in concretely showing that the Idea immanently produces all reality 
through the cyclical self-unfolding of its content, and not just in its abstract, 
purely logical form, but as the full richness of Nature and Spirit. It must be 
shown in detail how, in Hegel’s words, the world “is created, is now being 
created, and has eternally been created” by the eternal Idea.11 Hegel’s direct 
comments on Spinoza can thus at most serve to point to the central themes of the 
 




fully developed critique of Spinozism which is implicitly carried out through the 
course of the elaboration of the system of the Idea as a whole (and the same goes 
for every other philosophical standpoint). 
This study will not attempt to defend the detail of Hegel’s reading of 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Rather, it will make a first step toward the elaboration of a 
fully developed Hegelian critique of Spinozism which goes far beyond Hegel’s 
explicit comments, and as a result can be critical of Hegel’s misinterpretations 
while arguing forcefully for the absolute idealist position. Hegel’s work on the 
spheres of Nature and Spirit yields a wide array of possible avenues for a critique 
of Spinoza’s thought, including politics, the passions, the relationship of mind 
and body, and religion. However, this study aims to make an original 
contribution to scholarship by bringing Hegel’s account of material Nature into 
dialogue with Spinoza’s, and thereby developing a Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s 
philosophy of extended Nature.  
Hegel neglected to discuss Spinoza’s theory of extended Nature in any 
depth, curtly dismissing it in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy as a “weak 
point” appearing “at the extreme limit of Spinoza’s system”12 and mentioning 
Spinoza barely at all in the course of the Philosophy of Nature. However, it will be 
argued below that Hegel’s account of Nature provides the resources for a much 
more fruitful and compelling Hegelian critique of Spinoza than can be gained 
from the general remarks sketched in Hegel’s direct comments alone.  
Specifically, it will be argued that, from a Hegelian perspective, there are 
at least two major deficiencies in Spinoza’s account of extended Nature. Firstly, 
there is the issue of determinacy focused on in Hegel’s remarks in the Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy, namely the problem of deriving attributes and modes 
from the Substance. In the context of the philosophy of material Nature, this is 
the issue of deriving the existence of extended Nature as such and its most 
fundamental determinations from the Absolute. In chapters two to five we will 
set out the core metaphysical architecture of Spinoza’s system, along with 
Hegel’s critique of this, before constructing an interpretation of Spinoza’s account 
of Substance’s existence as Extension, as motion and rest, and as finite bodies, 
leaning heavily on the work of Macherey and Melamed among other scholars. In 
 
12 Hegel, G.W.F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Volume Three. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. p.273 
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the course of this, we will point out elements of Spinoza’s system misread by 
Hegel, but also aspects of Spinoza’s account of extended Nature which remain, 
from a Hegelian perspective, seriously inadequate. In chapters six to nine we will 
then develop a fuller Hegelian critique of the inadequacies of this Spinozist 
account through a demonstration of Hegel’s immanent derivation of the 
existence of the Idea as Nature and its fundamental determinations. 
Secondly, bringing Hegel’s philosophy of material Nature into dialogue 
with Spinoza’s highlights the importance in Hegel’s account of the 
metamorphosis of the forms of Nature through a series of stages, in comparison 
with the ‘uniform’ character of Spinoza’s view of extended Nature. As we will 
discuss in chapter four and then build on in chapter ten, Spinoza takes a strictly 
mechanical view of extended Nature, arguing that all bodies, from rocks to 
animals, are constituted by patterns of motion and rest, varying only in 
quantitative complexity. However, in chapter eleven it will be argued that Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature, through its demonstration of the necessary development of 
qualitatively distinct stages of Nature functioning through irreducibly different 
principles, such as the mechanical, chemical and organic, provides an implicit 
critique of what are, from a Hegelian point of view, deep deficiencies in 
Spinoza’s view of Nature. This Hegelian account of the structure of Nature 
includes the mechanistic concepts articulated by Spinoza, but ultimately shows 
these to necessarily sublate themselves, developing into physical, chemical and 
organic forms of being which are beyond the conceptual scope of Spinozism. 
From a Hegelian viewpoint, the Philosophy of Nature thus raises compelling 
questions as to the fitness of Spinoza’s quantitative and mechanical conception of 
Nature’s forms to account for the real qualitative development necessary to the 
natural world. 
The originality of this study’s contribution to scholarship will consist 
primarily in its using Hegel’s account of Nature to set out a previously neglected 
way of critiquing Spinoza from a Hegelian viewpoint. This is an original 
approach not carried out in previous scholarship. Indeed, the philosophy of 
material Nature is an aspect of the Hegel-Spinoza relationship scarcely touched 
upon in existing work on these thinkers.  
Secondarily, this study’s discussion of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature 
presents an opportunity to expand our understanding of Hegel’s work on 
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Nature. Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is a much-neglected text due to the historical 
unpopularity of Hegel’s work on Nature and the difficulty of interpretation faced 
by those who take this highly complex and conceptually demanding text 
seriously. Though scholars such as Hahn13 and Pinkard14 have discussed selected 
elements of the Philosophy of Nature in connection with other topics, in 
anglophone philosophy there have thus far been only a handful of essay 
collections and book-length studies focused on it.15 This study’s examination of 
the Philosophy of Nature will not be comprehensive or exhaustive, but will be 
more detailed than is the case in much of the existing secondary literature. 
Further, as will be explained in more detail in chapter six, this will be a strongly 
metaphysical reading, differentiated from those given in much existing work on 
this topic. Thus, as part of formulating a Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s 
philosophy of material Nature, this study will contribute to the expansion of the 
scholarship on what is arguably currently the least well-understood part of 
Hegel’s philosophy. 
Before concluding this introduction, some limitations to this study must 
be acknowledged and underlined. Most obviously, it is beyond the practical 
scope of a study of this length to conduct a comprehensive comparison of Hegel 
and Spinoza’s philosophies of material Nature. This has already been alluded to 
above in this study’s stated focus on developing a Hegelian critique of two major 
issues in Spinoza’s theory of extended Nature. However, the further limitation 
should be made explicit that this study will only be elaborating a Hegelian 
response to what are, from a Hegelian point of view, deficiencies in Spinoza’s 
thought. That is, this study should not at any point be understood to claim to 
show definitively where the deficiencies in Spinoza’s thought actually are, in the 
sense of pointing out flaws in a way which leaves no space for a Spinozist 
response. Rather, this study should only be understood as elaborating a 
 
13 Hahn, S. (2007). Contradiction in Motion: Hegel’s Organic Concept of Life and Value. Cornell 
University Press 
14 Pinkard, T. (2012). Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life. Oxford University 
Press. 
15 Houlgate, S. (ed.) (1998). Hegel and the philosophy of nature. Albany: State University of New York 
Press.; Cohen, R. and Wartofsky, M. (eds.) (1984) Hegel and the Sciences. Springer Netherlands.; 
Petry, M. (ed.) (1993) Hegel and Newtonianism. Kluver Academic Publishers.; Stone, A. (2005). 
Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy. State University of New York Press.; Burbidge, J. 




previously unexplored avenue for the Hegelian critique of Spinoza, setting out a 
fruitful and compelling way of critiquing Spinoza from a Hegelian standpoint. This 
study does not aim to present the last word in the Hegel-Spinoza debate on any 
of the issues discussed below, but to make a first step in the expansion of the 
scholarship of the Hegel-Spinoza relationship into the new territory of the 
philosophy of material Nature. A Spinozist reply, far from being ruled out, 
would be a natural expansion to this project, but one which must be left to future 
work. 
Importantly, Spinoza will not be reduced to a strawman or punching bag 
for Hegel. Indeed, effort will be made in chapters three to five to present a more 
powerful interpretation of Spinoza’s thought than that suggested by Hegel. 
However, Spinoza’s role will be comparable to that of a dialogue partner for 
Hegel, as opposed to being given equal footing, and the discussion of Spinoza 
will be limited to what is necessary to facilitate the articulation of a fair Hegelian 
critique of his position. 
It must also be acknowledged that there is a Hegelian shading to the 
framing of the concept of ‘Nature’ in this study. For Spinoza, Nature 
encompasses the whole content of philosophy. Substance, which can also be 
understood as God or Nature, exists in an infinity of ways, or attributes, which 
include both material Nature and thought, encompassing all reality. For Hegel, 
however, Nature is but one of the three major forms taken by the Idea’s self-
development, preceded by Logic and succeeded by Spirit. In order to provide a 
practical scope for this study, we will limit our discussion to Nature in a 
Hegelian sense, indicating a specific form of reality corresponding to Hegel’s 
Idea as Nature and Spinoza’s Substance as Extension. This study will not include 
what Spinoza places under the attribute of Thought, since this would require a 
substantial expansion of the thesis into Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit. However, in 
chapter four there will be justification for why the discussion can be limited to 
the attribute of Extension in a way which is philosophically coherent from a 
Spinozist perspective, and so does not render the discussion fatally incomplete or 
unduly stack the deck in Hegel’s favour from the start. 
To recapitulate, the aim of this study is not to provide a comprehensive 
comparison of the philosophies of Spinoza and Hegel; nor is it simply to defend 
Hegel’s explicit remarks on Spinoza, remarks that have been seriously challenged 
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by commentators on Spinoza. The aim of this study is to consider the relation 
between Hegel and Spinoza in a way that has hitherto been largely neglected. 
Specifically, it is to demonstrate that a richer and more fruitful Hegelian critique 
of Spinoza’s thought – in particular of his conception of extended Nature – can be 
found in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature than in his explicit remarks about Spinoza. 
This approach is original and, I believe, will open up a new avenue of research 




Chapter 2 – Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza 
 
 
The aim of this chapter will be to lay out the core metaphysical architecture of 
Spinoza’s system and the problem of determinacy which Hegel sees as springing 
from this foundation. As we will see, Hegel suggests Spinoza presents us with a 
‘dead’ Substance which, having begun with the Absolute, cannot actually 
progress to further determination as attribute and mode. Further, Hegel 
identifies the root cause of this problem in Spinoza’s view of negation. Although 
there is relevant material in the Science of Logic, we will be focusing on the 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy because it is here that Hegel gives the clearest 
and most developed expression of the problem of determinacy he sees in 
Spinoza’s thought. We will not be laying out Hegel’s analysis of Spinozism in the 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy in detail, since our purpose here is not to 
defend Hegel’s critique as he presents it there, but to have the core issue of 
determination in view for what follows.  
Importantly, we will not be attempting to explicate Spinoza’s 
demonstration of his core thesis of Substance monism in book one of Ethics, just 
as later on we will not attempt to lay out Hegel’s demonstration of the Science of 
Logic’s culmination in the Absolute Idea. To give a philosophically satisfactory 
account of Spinoza’s demonstration of Substance monism would take up 
significant space but would not add to the discussion below, given both that 
Hegel’s critique focuses elsewhere and that the core architecture of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics is comprehensible without this demonstration. Further, there are 
already a myriad of rich accounts of Spinoza’s demonstration of Substance 
monism in existing scholarship, and this study does not have anything original to 
add to these.  
Spinoza’s fundamental metaphysical concept is ‘Substance’, defined as 
“what is in itself and is conceived through itself.”1 Spinoza argues that no 
Substance can be produced by anything else, but by its very nature exists 
 
1 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EID3, p.408 
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necessarily2, and therefore also eternally, its essence and existence being one and 
the same.3 Further, there can only be one Substance4, which by virtue of this 
singularity is therefore fully self-determining5, there being nothing else to 
determine it but the laws of its own nature. Substance, being unique, is therefore 
also the only thing which exists without depending causally or conceptually on 
anything else, and so nothing can be or be conceived except in and through 
Substance.6 Spinoza thus argues that a single Substance constitutes the totality of 
what exists, referred to variously as absolute Substance, Substance, God, or 
Nature.  
Hegel suggests that the core of Spinoza’s philosophy is captured in this 
single thought: “The true is simply and solely the one substance … and only this 
absolute unity is reality, it alone is God.”7 However, Hegel also argues that the 
greatest difficulty in Spinoza’s philosophy lies in grasping the unity of all 
differences in Substance in such a way that these determinations are preserved 
and can be understood to proceed necessarily from Substance.8 The reason why 
will become clearer after looking at Spinoza’s concepts of attribute and mode. 
Spinoza argues that Substance is necessarily absolutely infinite9, 
expressing itself in an infinity of attributes10, or forms of being. Further, because 
there is only one Substance, every attribute belongs exclusively to and is an 
expression of the unique Substance’s absolutely infinite being. An attribute is 
defined as “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its 
essence”11 and we can conceive of two such attributes: Thought and Extension. 
An attribute is a basic quality of being which expresses and through which we 
conceive the essence of a thing, such that independently of its attribute a thing 
cannot be or be conceived as the thing it is at all. For example, we cannot 
conceive of the being of our body if it is divorced from its being extended. 
 
2 Ibid. EIp7, p.412; EIp11, p.417 
3 Ibid. EIp19, p.428 
4 Ibid. EIp14, p.420 
5 Ibid. EIp17, p.425 
6 Ibid. EIp15, p.420 
7 Hegel, G.W.F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Volume Three. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. P.256 
8 Ibid. pp.267-268, 281 
9 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EIp11, p.417 
10 Ibid. EId6, p.409 
11 Ibid. EId4, p.408 
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Equally, we cannot conceive of the being of our mind if it is divorced from its 
being a thinking thing. However, although attributes are distinct in the sense that 
they must be conceived independently of each other12, they are essences of 
Substance which express its infinite being in different ways and do not indicate 
different sets of things that are independent from each other or from Substance. 
Rather, Thought and Extension are two ways of conceiving, and two expressions 
of, the same Substance. 
The notion of ‘expression’, as Viljanen points out, is one which Spinoza 
nowhere defines. However, Viljanen argues that, in Spinoza’s usage of this 
concept, “if y expresses x, y is, of course, in some way different from x, but still in 
such a manner that y retains or preserves the basic character or nature of x.”13 
None of Substance’s infinite attributes are simply equivalent with Substance’s 
essence, but all are “faithful to that essence in their diverse ways of constituting 
it” and thus can be said to express it.14  
There is some ambiguity in Spinoza’s phrase, “constantem infinitis 
attributis”15, which could be interpreted as indicating either that Substance 
consists in an infinity of attributes or only that Substance consists in a number of 
attributes which are themselves infinite. Commentators have generally favoured 
the former reading, but Hegel takes the latter, arguing that Spinoza’s Substance 
has only two attributes and ’infinite’ “is not to be taken here in the sense of the 
indeterminate many, but positively, as a circle is perfect infinity in itself.”16 The 
reason why Hegel reads the definition of attribute in this way will become clear 
from his critique of this concept, which we will come to shortly. 
Spinoza’s third principal metaphysical concept is mode, defined as “the 
affections of substance, or that which is in another through which it is also 
conceived.”17 This is the reality Spinoza accords to the multiplicity of things we 
are commonly aware of, including our own minds and bodies: they are not 
independent things, but exist in the one Substance, and can only be and be 
 
12 Ibid. EIp10s, p.416 
13 Viljanen, V. (2011) Spinoza's Geometry of Power. Cambridge University Press. p.98 
14 Ibid. 
15 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EId6, p.409 
16 Hegel, G.W.F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Volume Three. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. p.263 
17 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EId5, p.409 
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conceived through it. As Bennett puts it, Substance’s modes are “properties or 
‘affections’ of it, or ways that it is.”18 Lord makes the point explicit that, though 
modes are the properties of the unique Substance, this should not be taken in the 
sense of them being “fixed properties attached to a static thing, but as the 
changes and interactions, or ‘affections’” of Substance.19 In the same vein, 
Melamed points out that though both the attributes and modes can be 
understood as qualities of Substance, “the attributes are the essential qualities of 
the substance, while the modes are nonessential qualities of the substance (i.e., 
qualities that the substance can gain and lose).”20 Spinoza argues that from the 
infinite essence of Substance, infinitely many modes follow under its infinite 
attributes, and in a necessary order.21  
To briefly situate within contemporary debate the reading of the meaning 
of Spinoza’s Substance monism taken by both Hegel and the interpretation we 
will be developing in chapters three to five, these both accord with the 
‘inherence’ interpretation articulated by, among others, Bennett22 and Nadler23. 
That is, the modes inhere in Substance as its propria, or particular ways in which 
Substance exists. This can be contrasted with the ‘causal dependency’ 
interpretation most famously argued for by Curley24, which, put very briefly, 
argues that only the attributes are truly ‘in’ God or Substance, whereas the 
modes, both infinite and finite, only follow from Substance and do not inhere in 
Substance as the properties or predicates of a singular being. Contrary to the 
reading taken by this study, Curley’s view proposes that modes are only ‘in’ and 
‘follow’ from Substance in the sense that they are causally determined by and 
dependent upon Substance, and are made intelligible by the universal laws 
which follow from its attributes.25 The interpretation suggested in this study 
concurs with Newlands’ assessment that Curley’s reading fails to adequately 
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capture “the unorthodox closeness in Spinoza’s system between God and 
everything else”, summed up by Newlands as the claim that “everything follows 
from God, is caused by God, and is in God.”26  
Moving on to Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s core metaphysical concepts in 
the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel brings our attention to the 
definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as 
constituting its essence”27, and suggests this has the consequence that although 
the intellect grasps the attributes as constituting the essence or reality of 
Substance, they are nonetheless only conceptions of reality through the lens of 
the intellect, which conceives Substance through the forms that it brings with it.28 
That is, the attributes of Extension and Thought and their distinction are merely 
forms of the intellect’s conception of reality, “a mere matter of the 
understanding,” and do not correspond to a real diversity of essences in 
Substance’s infinite reality, but rather have reality only from the perspective of a 
particular consciousness.29 Macherey remarks that, by following Spinoza’s 
definition of attribute to the letter, Hegel frames the attributes as mere “points of 
view about substance” that can afford only an external and incomplete 
representation of it and have no existence in themselves outside the intellect.30 
Hegel regards there as being only two infinite attributes rather than infinitely 
many for precisely this reason: attributes in his view are only forms of the 
intellect’s perception of reality and we only perceive reality through two 
attributes. 
Hegel further criticizes Spinoza for not demonstrating or even stating the 
manner of the development of the attributes from Substance31, asking how it is 
that an intellect now comes to appear beside Substance and apply the forms of 
Thought and Extension to it, and where these forms come from themselves32 
when “there is no necessity evident, why these are thought and extension in 
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particular.”33 Hegel argues that, far from adequately showing the development of 
attributes from Substance, we see the first concrete symptom here of the central 
malady of Spinoza’s metaphysics: the problem of determinacy. Hegel suggests 
that the way the attributes are set up means that “everything proceeds inwards, 
and not outwards; determinations are not developed from substance, it does not 
resolve itself into these attributes.”34 Since the attributes are found in the 
perceptions of the intellect alone, the concept of attribute does not explain the 
development of determinations from or within the absolute unity of Substance, 
but rather leads to the appearance of the determinations of Thought and 
Extension and their distinctions being dissolved within this unity. 35 
In other words, Hegel is suggesting that because the intellect that 
perceives Substance, and on which the nature of the attributes depends, is itself 
only a mode of Substance, the order of the system begins to collapse. The 
attributes, which are the essences of Substance, should precede the existence of 
modes, but an intellect, a mode, precedes the attributes in the sense that the 
attributes depend on the intellect. Because it is not shown concretely how 
Substance comes to express or determine itself in its attributes, these attributes 
are empty forms, merely external reflections of Substance’s content without 
necessity, while Substance itself remains, for Hegel, a wholly indeterminate 
abyss. Since Spinoza’s Substance does not determine its attributes itself, in 
Hegel’s view, an external intellect has to determine them for it. 
Hegel continues this line of critique when he turns to modes, arguing that 
rather than the modal reality of particular things being developed from 
Substance, the structure of Spinoza’s system actually deprives these 
determinations of reality. Since a mode is “that which is in another through 
which it is also conceived,”36 modes have no reality or even conceivability in 
themselves but only through and in something else, namely the one absolutely 
universal Substance which alone is the truly real for Spinoza, and of which all 
modes are mere modifications.37 Hegel suggests that this reduces individuality to 
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a “lower stage” or “warped and stunted” form of Substance38, ultimately 
rendering the mode “a false individuality” as it is only ever a determination of an 
other, Substance. Later we will see that Hegel makes what might appear to be 
similar claims in his own philosophy regarding the relation between natural 
objects and the Idea. However, from the Hegelian perspective, the key difference 
is that Substance’s modes do not receive the concrete derivation from Substance 
which would allow them to stand as real and necessary expressions of the 
Absolute’s self-particularization.39 Rather, Spinoza’s Substance remains a “rigid 
substantiality” because it does not concretely develop the particularity of the 
modes as an essential moment of its universal reality and so, as with the 
attributes, “determinateness continually vanishes from his thought.”40  
Hegel’s central critique of Spinozism thus concerns the fate of 
determinacy within the perspective of Substance. Spinoza not only does not 
provide a derivation of the determinacy of attributes or modes, that is, does not 
explain why “out of the simple universal the real, the opposed, itself becomes 
known”41, but the structure of the relationship between his core metaphysical 
concepts acts to undermine the reality of determinacy. Indeed, in one of his most 
scathing passages, Hegel goes so far as to claim that “as all differences and 
determinations of things … go back into the One substance, one may say that in 
the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast down into this abyss of 
annihilation.”42  
As Macherey puts Hegel’s point, the self-sufficiency of Substance’s 
immediate unity at the foundation of Spinoza’s metaphysics “gives its 
ontological guarantee to the system but at the same time prevents it from 
developing.”43 Substance “is the indeterminate that precedes and conditions all 
determination”, the foundational absolute being upon which all determinacy 
depends for its reality.44 However, the absolutely positive and immediate 
indeterminacy of Substance is such that it actually undermines the determinacy 
that depends on it, ‘casting it down into an abyss’, as Hegel puts it, because 
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determinacy, being necessarily constituted through its negative moment of 
opposition and otherness (a being can only be determinate if it is this and not 
that), cannot coincide with Substance’s positive, singular universality. In other 
words, the self-sufficiency of Substance’s absolute existence as causa sui, in the 
absence of any determinacy, makes the relation of this foundation to that which it 
grounds incomprehensible, in the sense that Substance’s determinations cannot 
be understood to develop immanently from it. Instead, Substance’s 
determinations exist arbitrarily, as “adjuncts to it without necessity and without 
reason.”45  
At his most radical, Hegel goes so far as to suggest that for Spinoza there 
is really “no such thing as finite reality” and thus Spinozism can be considered a 
form of acosmism, according to which God alone exists and all that we know as 
the world is “cast into the abyss of the one identity.”46 However, it is overall 
more representative of Hegel’s remarks taken as a whole and more productive 
for engaging in a dialogue with Spinoza to avoid reading Hegel’s position as 
being that there is strictly no such thing as particularity for Spinoza. Indeed, 
Melamed has argued convincingly that a strictly acosmist reading of Spinoza is 
implausible.47 Rather, a more philosophically interesting avenue of discussion is 
opened up by understanding Hegel’s claim as being that, in the philosophy of 
Substance, determinacy is deprived of necessary development from its basis in 
the Absolute, and thereby reduced to an arbitrary adjunct to Substance’s reality. 
As he sums up his critique of Spinoza in the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, Hegel identifies the lack of negativity and dialectical movement in 
Spinoza’s thought as a key factor behind this problem of determination. Hegel 
claims that “with Spinoza negation or privation is distinct from substance” 48, 
seen as only an imposition of external reflection not actually present in the 
Absolute, and argues that because Substance is conceived as purely positive, it 
“does not open itself out”49 in the movement of becoming which Hegel claims to 
exhibit in his own philosophy as the dialectic of being’s immanent negativity. 
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Instead, Substance is an empty, rigid universal in which “the heart, the 
independence is transfixed – the vital fire is wanting.”50 In holding Substance to 
be free of negation, Spinoza makes it impossible to find the process of the modes’ 
becoming in Substance. Indeed, because “negation is present only as Nothing” or 
a “vanishing moment”51, Substance’s only sense of activity is to divest all things 
of their particularity and determinacy, subsuming them back into itself.52  
Macherey suggests that Hegel understands Spinoza to hold the positive 
and negative in irreconcilable and irreducible opposition, belonging to two 
separate orders. Substance is given immediately in its absolutely positive self-
identity, thus eliminating all negativity and thereby all determinacy from its 
order. The negative, to the extent that it is recognized, is cast outside this, 
appearing only in the sphere of finite modes. Because Spinoza conceives the 
positive and negative in this abstractly restrictive way, as purely positive and 
negative, no passage can be established between the two which could initiate a 
form of conceptual movement of the kind Hegel seeks to show in his own 
philosophy.53 In the absence of this movement, we find only the stillness of a 
serene but dead Substance, in the indeterminate, immediate identity of which all 
contours are dissolved, producing, in Macherey’s words, an “inverse purity … 
formally equivalent to an absolute nothingness.”54  
In contrast, Hegel contends that his own conception of the Absolute, the 
Idea, has negation intrinsic to it and thus “essentially includes within itself 
motion and vitality.”55 Much more will be said below about Hegel’s Idea and its 
relationship with negativity, but provisionally the Idea can be understood, in 
contrast with the immediate all-inclusive totality of Substance, as a structure 
which, through an immanent negative process of developing and resolving 
internal contradictions, gradually develops into a richer and more inclusive 
unity, ultimately showing itself to be the Absolute. 
Negativity plays a key role in both the functioning of Hegelian dialectics, 
providing its self-propelling force, and in the architecture of the structure which 
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thereby unfolds itself. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, which precedes the Science of 
Logic and Philosophy of Nature in Hegel’s system, we already find Hegel arguing 
that the life of Spirit is not separated from death and negation, but lives precisely 
in it, and achieves its truth only by finding itself “in utter dismemberment”.56 A 
moment of self-separation and division is essential, because it is only insofar as it 
divides itself, breaking up its initial simple oneness, that content can be self-
moving. Hegel suggests, further, that in philosophical thinking negativity is part 
of the content, and indeed “is the positive”, due to providing the content’s 
immanent movement.57 Negativity is held to be intrinsic to the nature of the 
Absolute, which is necessarily a movement of “self-othering”, the splitting up of 
the simple into opposition, returning to unity in a “self-restoring sameness” 
which contains otherness within itself, neither an immediate simplicity nor an 
indifferent diversity.58 
Negation is once again made central in the Science of Logic, it being 
argued, in words very close to those used in the Phenomenology, that it is vital to 
recognize that “the negative is just as much positive.”59 In the Logic, Hegel places 
particular emphasis on the importance of internal contradiction, arguing that 
self-contradiction does not result in nullity, abstract nothingness, but the 
particular negation of the contradictory content, which is driven to resolve itself. 
This result, the specific or determinate negation, has a content, since it contains 
that from which it results, but also something more, being a new and richer 
Notion, “the unity of itself and its opposite.” Philosophy as a whole forms itself 
through a continuous progression of the emergence of contradiction and its 
negation (or negation and the negation of the negation), leading to a more 
developed state.60 Indeed, Hegel regards one of the most fundamental advances 
made by his study of logic to be the recognition that self-negation and 
contradiction belong to the very nature of rational thought, and so are not merely 
states of error, but necessary to the structure of both systematic philosophy and 
its content.61 
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In the course of this study it will become increasingly clear that, whether 
or not we agree with the conclusions of Hegel or even a revised Hegelian 
position, he was certainly right to see the question of negativity as a root issue in 
the relationship of his own and Spinoza’s thought. When we turn to consider 
Hegel’s account of Nature, we will see that the Idea’s immanent negativity plays 
a key role in the Hegelian critique of Spinoza developed in this study. This is 
because the immanent dialectical movement provided by this negativity is vital 
in Hegel’s explanation of both the derivation of material Nature’s existence and 
the further development of its forms. 
In this chapter we have laid out the core concepts of Spinoza’s thought, 
along with Hegel’s interpretation of these, his broad critique of the problem of 
determinacy in the philosophy of Substance, and the connection Hegel draws 
between this issue and the question of negativity. We will now proceed to lay out 
a counter-interpretation of Spinozism, borrowing heavily from the work of 
Melamed and Macherey, which positions determinacy as integral to the being of 
Substance, and will provide the basis for the account of Spinoza’s philosophy of 
extended Nature to follow. Importantly, it is not claimed that this is the best 
reading of Spinoza’s philosophy, a claim which there is not space to argue for 
here. However, this reading is reasonable and able both to push back against 
misinterpretations in Hegel’s reading and provide the framework for a 





Chapter 3 – The Alternative 
 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that Hegel’s interpretation of the concept of 
attribute, which renders the attributes dependent on the perception of the 
intellect, a mode, serves an important role in his unravelling of what he sees as 
the intended order of Spinoza’s system. However, Macherey argues that Hegel’s 
reading of the definition of attribute (“what the intellect perceives of a substance, 
as constituting its essence”1) improperly imports a Kantian framework of 
knowledge into Spinoza’s philosophy.2 Garrett makes a similar observation, 
noting that “the treatment of appearance and reality as opposing poles on an 
ontological scale is due not to Spinoza but to Leibniz and Kant.”3 Macherey 
draws attention to Spinoza’s use of the word ‘perceive’ (percipere) in this 
definition, a term given precise meaning later on in the explanation of EIId3. 
Distinguishing between his use of the words ‘concept’ and ‘perception’, Spinoza 
specifies here that “the word perception seems to indicate that the Mind is acted 
on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind.”4 Spinoza 
does not say in his definition of attribute that this is what the intellect ‘conceives’ 
of a substance, and Macherey argues deliberately so, because this would imply 
that the intellect here is active in imposing a form on an object.5 Rather, the 
attribute is specifically stated to be what the intellect ‘perceives’ of a substance 
because the intellect here is passive in relation to the substance it perceives, 
which, as Macherey puts it, “it accepts such as it is, in the essences that 
constitutes it, that is to say in its attributes.”6  
Thus, the term ‘intellect’ in the definition of attribute should not be 
interpreted in a Kantian sense but this is precisely what Hegel does, reading the 
intellect as, in Macherey’s words, “a kind of deforming, or informing mirror, 
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which impresses its own mark on the images that it produces.”7 Macherey 
suggests that, insofar as the intellect can be legitimately likened to a mirror at all, 
it is not a mirror which is active in shaping reality to its own measure, but one 
which is perfectly objective in its perception of Substance’s essences. However, 
Macherey’s deeper point does not concern so much the intellect but the attributes 
themselves, which he argues are neither active nor passive representations, since 
they are not images, ideas, or forms through which the intellect apprehends 
Substance, but are in Substance and constitute its essences.8  
As evidence, Macherey points to Spinoza’s statement that “by God’s 
attributes are to be understood what (by D4) expresses (exprimit) an essence of 
the Divine substance, i.e., what pertains (pertinet) to substance. The attributes 
themselves, I say, must involve (involvere) it itself.”9 Bringing out the significance 
of this passage, Macherey points out Spinoza’s writing here that the attributes 
‘express’ (exprimit) an essence of Substance, clearly excluding the idea that the 
attributes are mere representations or names of Substance; “rather, this means 
that they constitute it, in what one might call its concrete being.”10 Further, the 
attributes ‘pertain’ (pertinet) to Substance, indicating that they are contained in 
Substance and, equally, Substance is contained in them. Indeed, the attributes 
‘involve’ (involvere) the essence of Substance, meaning the attributes and 
Substance are inseparable and cannot be or be conceived without one another. 
Spinoza’s explanation of the nature of the attributes here makes no reference to 
the intellect and ties them in a real unity with Substance in such a way that it is 
untenable that they could be mere external reflections, dependent on the 
intellect’s own categories. Macherey suggests that much of the argument over the 
interpretation of the initial definition of the attributes might have been avoided if 
Spinoza had simply worded this slightly differently: “by attribute I understand 
that which constitutes the essence of substance, and it is thus that the intellect 
perceives it (such as it is),” thus eliminating any appearance of dependence of the 
attributes on the intellect.11  
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Melamed also rejects Hegel’s reading of the attributes, pointing out a 
wealth of textual evidence against the notion that the attributes are but images in 
the intellect. To pick out only a few examples of this evidence, Melamed firstly 
draws our attention to Spinoza’s rephrasing of the definition of attribute in 
E2p7s, as “whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an 
essence of substance.”12 Melamed points out that an infinite intellect, that of God, 
does not suffer misperceptions or illusions, and so the intellect’s perception of 
attributes is not a ‘distorted mirror’ that fails to represent Substance’s nature.13 
Indeed, as Spinoza asserts elsewhere, “what is contained objectively in the 
intellect must necessarily be in nature.”14 Further, Melamed points out that the 
definition of God as “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes”15 makes 
no qualification that God is only perceived as such, making it hard to square with 
the notion that the attributes are in the intellect alone. Finally, E1p4d states that 
“there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be 
distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by D4), 
their attributes, and their affections.”16 This not only indicates strongly that the 
attributes exist outside the perceptions of the intellect, but suggests a further key 
point about the attributes to which we will now turn, namely that the attributes 
are ‘the same’ as Substance.17 
This rejection of the reading of attributes as ideas of the intellect pushes 
back against a key aspect of Hegel’s interpretation of Spinoza, namely his 
presentation of the attributes as external and secondary to Substance. Contrary to 
Hegel’s interpretation, Macherey argues that Substance does not precede its 
attributes, but rather Spinoza holds these to be two aspects of an identity in 
which the same reality, Substance, exists both in the real diversity of its infinite 
attributes and in its absolute unity.18 Substance and its attributes are not 
sequential, with Substance producing the attributes from its indeterminate abyss, 
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but simultaneous and inseparable.19 This identity does not reduce the diversity of 
the infinite attributes in Substance to an indifferent unity. Rather, Macherey 
describes this as “a concrete identity, which is an identity in difference.”20 The 
attributes are not mere external images of Substance, but are themselves the 
concrete constitution and determination of its reality, which is absolutely infinite 
precisely because it comprises infinite attributes.21 Garrett similarly argues that 
the attributes “do not ‘arise from substance’ in Spinoza, as Hegel suggested. 
Rather, they are substance, in each of its manners of existing” or “the very 
existence of God itself in that dimension.”22  
Macherey argues that this identity-in-difference of Substance and its 
attributes, firstly, binds Substance to its attributes, without which Substance 
would be an empty being deprived of the maximum of reality that pertains to it; 
and secondly, binds the attributes to substance, outside which they would exist 
in irreconcilable mutual opposition. Macherey suggests that, if we wished to 
imitate a Hegelian style of discourse, we might say that the identity of Substance 
and its attributes is “that in which the absolute affirms itself as actual. And this 
process is that of the causa sui or … the return of substance to itself.”23  
Indeed, Macherey argues further that this interpretation gives the notion 
of causa sui its real significance in Spinozist philosophy. Substance is not causa sui 
in the sense that Hegel interprets it, that is, an immediate foundation, achieved 
and exhausted in a single stroke. Substance does not have its absolute reality 
through the abstract formality of an “initial gift”, or immediate givenness, which 
would render it an “empty form of the One, that would be nothing but the 
One.”24 Rather, Substance is causa sui due to the process of its self-engendering 
through the infinite essences that constitute it, a real movement through which 
Substance necessitates its own existence. God, as causa sui, is not without cause, 
but absolutely determined by himself, and the attributes are the forms of this 
determination, “its internal efficient cause,” making it clear that “substance is not 
an immediate absolute, because it must be deduced, even if from itself.”25 Wholly 
 
19 Ibid. pp.95-98 
20 Ibid. p.95 
21 Ibid, pp.95, 98 
22 Garrett, D. (2012). ‘A Reply on Spinoza’s Behalf’. In Spinoza and German Idealism. Eds. Förster, E. 
and Melamed, Y. Cambridge University Press. pp.257-258 
23 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. p.99 
24 Ibid. pp.98-99 
25 Ibid. p.91 
34 
 
contrary to Hegel’s talk of a ‘dead’ Substance lacking in real content, this is 
Substance as an immanent life and activity of self-affirmation.26 Substance is 
neither an absolute beginning from which the attributes must follow, nor is it a 
whole composed from the sum of all the attributes. Rather, a single and same 
necessity determines itself simultaneously as a unique, absolutely infinite unity 
and an infinite diversity of essences. 
While this way of understanding the nature of the Substance-attribute 
relationship delivers a strong rejection of Hegel’s attempt to undermine the basis 
of Spinozist metaphysics through a Kantian reading of the attributes, from a 
Hegelian perspective this does not silence Hegel’s most fundamental questions 
concerning the attributes and their derivation. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Hegel criticizes Spinoza for not providing a demonstration of the 
development of the attributes from Substance27 or why the attributes should be 
Thought or Extension in particular.28 In light of Macherey and Melamed’s 
account of the Substance-attribute relationship, we might prefer to emphasise the 
unity and simultaneity of Substance and attributes, rephrasing this question as 
one of why Substance necessarily exists in these ways in particular. However, the 
core issue remains of accounting for difference within the unity of Substance. 
Though convincing in its rejection of one aspect of Hegel’s interpretation of the 
attributes, namely their dependence on the intellect and consequent externality to 
Substance, Macherey and Melamed’s counter-interpretation does not address this 
central issue in a way satisfying from Hegel’s point of view. 
Garrett makes explicit his view that Spinoza does not need to “offer any 
further explanation of why there are the attributes there are; each attribute is self-
caused ( i.e., God as self-caused in that manner) and self-explanatory.”29 Insofar 
as there is a Spinozist response to this issue, it is likely of this kind, that is, it is 
simply in the nature of Substance, as an infinitely powerful and unique causality, 
to exist in infinite ways (attributes), indeed every possible way.30 However, while 
by no means incoherent as a way of understanding the architecture of Substance, 
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from the Hegelian perspective this does not provide an informative explanation. 
This difficulty in accounting for the necessity of Substance’s existence as 
Extension will come under further pressure from Hegel’s detailed and specific 
explication of the necessity of the Idea’s existence as material Nature in chapter 
seven. 
Moving on to discuss Substance’s modes, we saw in the previous chapter 
that Hegel suggests that Spinoza’s philosophy reduces the modes to a ‘false 
individuality’ in the sense that, although they are conceived as the 
determinations of Substance, their finitude is incompatible with the infinite unity 
of Substance and cannot be derived from the latter. Rather than being concretely 
developed as the Absolute’s self-particularization, the modes remain 
incommensurate with Substance’s positive and indeterminate infinitude and so 
are not shown to be a necessary expression of Substance.  
Having pushed back against Hegel’s reading of the attributes as external 
and secondary to an indeterminate Substance by bringing the determinacy of the 
attributes into the heart of Substance’s being, a similar interpretive move can be 
made against Hegel’s reading of the modes. In EIp16, Spinoza states that “from 
the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in 
infinitely many modes.”31 He goes on to argue that this is because from the 
essence of any thing a number of properties follow necessarily. Further, the more 
reality an essence involves, the more properties follow from it. In the case of 
Substance, “since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), each 
of which also expresses an infinite essence in its own kind, from its necessity 
there must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes.”32 Melamed points 
out that this necessary flow of Substance’s modes from its essence is clearly part 
of a different conception of the generation of particularity from the Absolute than 
the process of dialectical self-negation elaborated by Hegel.33 
In trying to flesh out the reason for Substance’s self-expression as modes, 
Melamed points to two further related claims by Spinoza:  
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“God’s power is nothing except God’s active essence. And so it is as 
impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as it is to conceive that 
he does not exist”34  
 
“God’s power is his essence itself”35 because “from the necessity alone of 
God’s essence it follows that God is the cause of himself (by P11) and (by 
P16 and P16C) of all things.”36  
 
Melamed argues that these passages stress the point that the modes do not just 
follow necessarily from Substance, but it is in the nature of Substance that it must 
be active in causing itself to exist as the modal universe. Substance necessarily 
generates its modes due to its nature as an active entity, and it is just as 
impossible for Substance not to be active as it is for it not to exist.37  
Arguing along similar lines, Macherey emphasises that determinacy 
pertains equally to Substance and its modes. As we saw above, the freedom of 
the causa sui is not the arbitrary activity of a being not determined to act 
according to any cause. Substance is no less determined to act than its modes, but 
is determined by the necessity of its own nature. Macherey suggests that the free 
act of Nature’s self-engendering as natura naturans, Substance and its attributes, 
is not a separate causality to that which produces and determines the activity of 
the modes, natura naturata. Rather, these are one and the same simultaneous (as 
opposed to successive) act, since Substance does not exist in some abstract state 
of indeterminacy apart from its modes, but exists nowhere except in its self-
determination as an infinity of modes in infinite attributes. Far from Hegel’s 
portrayal of Substance as an indeterminate void in juxtaposition to the 
unaccounted for determinacy of the modes, Macherey argues that if no 
determinations were given in Substance, both the existence of modes and 
Substance’s existence as such would be taken away.38  
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This way of conceiving the architecture of Substance’s relation to its 
determinations, both attributes and modes, binding an infinity of determinations 
into the very constitution of the Absolute, avoids Substance becoming the all-
engulfing abyss of indeterminacy Hegel views it as. Indeed, Macherey suggests 
this interpretation renders Hegel’s reading of Substance as harbouring an all-
consuming negativism, depriving determinacy of reality, “a fiction, literally 
incompatible with the (Spinozist) system.”39  
Melamed suggests that once it is understood that Spinoza derives the 
modes from the essence of Substance as its propria then Hegel’s complaints about 
the lack of proper derivation of the modes and their consequent unreality are 
shown to be unjustified.40 However, Macherey is wary of leaving the issue here, 
raising the question of whether, even if omnis determinatio est negatio is to be 
rejected, omnis determinatio est affirmatio would be any better. The latter 
formulation would, in a very shorthand manner, capture the counter-
interpretation of Spinozism we have been constructing from the work of 
Macherey and Melamed, according to which determination is integral to 
Substance as the necessary self-expression of its causal power. Macherey raises 
the concern that this position might in fact give Hegel’s line of critique renewed 
strength, since the purely positive, singular causality of Substance appears in 
danger of becoming a mere inversion of the empty Absolute Hegel paints, and 
reverting ultimately to the same thing.41 That is, to transpose Macherey’s worry 
more specifically into the concerns of this study, for all the talk of Substance’s 
causing itself to exist as an infinite diversity of determinations, if we cannot make 
good on actually explicating this causality’s self-articulation as modal Nature, we 
will be left, if not with an indeterminate abyss, then with the empty promise of 
an absolute causal power that cannot be understood to concretely cause anything 
but itself.  
Garrett rightly raises the question as to what degree of specificity is 
required from a Spinozist explanation of the derivation of the modes from 
Substance. Due to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Spinoza 
is certainly committed to there being an intelligible sufficient reason in the nature 
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of Substance for the existence of its modes. Garrett is sympathetic to the line of 
thought taken by Melamed above when it comes to accounting for the necessity 
of the existence of modes as such. However, Garrett points out that Spinoza is 
also committed by the PSR to there being an intelligible necessary entailment 
from the nature of Substance to a complete account of both the nature and 
history of every one of its modes.42 Macherey concurs with this strong reading of 
the determination of modes by Substance, reminding us of Spinoza’s claim that 
Substance is the cause of singular things not only insofar as they exist but also 
insofar as they produce effects43, which Macherey suggests indicates the 
complete determination of the infinite sequence of finite modes within Substance, 
which therefore has no contingency or indeterminacy within itself.44 
Importantly, though, as Garrett points out45, Spinoza does not claim to be 
able to provide the full explanation or causal history of any individual mode, this 
being ruled out by the limitations of the ability of our finite minds to trace the 
infinitude of the causal chains among finite modes.46 This is not a limitation 
Hegel would contest, as we will see later in chapter eight. However, there is a 
real need, acknowledged by both Macherey and Garrett, for a substantive 
explanation of the derivation of Substance’s modes, not just in their existence as 
such, but in their concrete forms and activity.  
To address this concern, the next chapter will investigate what such an 
explication might look like. Having spent this chapter pushing back against 
Hegel’s reading of the Substance-attribute-mode relationship, and setting out the 
case for a framework which binds determinacy intrinsically within the being of 
Substance, the work remains of actually showing, to an extent and in a manner 
appropriate and possible within a Spinozist perspective, what shape the self-
determination of Substance as extended Nature actually takes. We will see the 
extent to which extended modes, both infinite and finite, can be given a concrete 
derivation, in addition to the emergence of substantive theses on the nature of 
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these modes, their formations and their activity, forming the basis for the 




Chapter 4 - Modal Nature 
 
 
Our examination of Spinoza’s philosophy from this point on will be focused on 
modal Nature conceived under the attribute of Extension. The relationship 
between material Nature and the mind represents a significant point of 
contention between Hegel and Spinoza which is very much deserving of 
investigation. However, although later we will see the faint beginnings of 
subjectivity in Hegel’s account of organic life, the sphere of Nature in his view 
does not reach anything fairly comparable to the content of Spinoza’s attribute of 
Thought. A productive comparison of their positions on the nature of thought 
and the mind would require a substantial expansion of this study into Hegel’s 
philosophy of Spirit, and this is far better left to future work building on this 
study which can be squarely focused on this aspect of their philosophies.  
We might be concerned that side-lining the attribute of Thought to focus 
on extended Nature will serve to distort Spinoza’s system by leaving out a key 
part of its content. Fortunately, Spinoza’s theory of the ‘parallelism’ (a term 
Spinoza does not use himself) between attributes means that focusing attention 
on Nature as expressed in a single attribute does not of itself introduce a 
theoretical incoherence. Spinoza argues that just as there is only one Substance 
which determines itself through the attributes of Thought and Extension, equally 
there is only one set of modes which is expressed in these two ways of being. In 
Spinoza’s words, “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the 
same thing, but expressed in two ways.”1 Further, whether Nature is expressed 
through the attribute of Extension or Thought, the same necessary connection of 
causes between modes is found. Modes of Thought do not, therefore, have any 
effect on modes of Extension or vice versa, since these are parallel expressions of 
the same sequence of causes, not two different sets of things that could interact 
causally one with the other.  This means that the explication of Nature as 
Extension does not lack anything of itself for not being accompanied by its 
explication as Thought, since we are not leaving aside a set of things within 
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Spinoza’s Nature, only another way in which these same things are expressed. 
Indeed, Spinoza claims that, insofar as we conceive things as modes of Extension, 
“the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute of 
Extension alone,”2 and the same for every other attribute. In other words, not 
only is it permissible to explain Nature through a single attribute, but the 
explanation of Nature under any given attribute must be given independently of 
its conception under any other. 
Macherey lends further support to the legitimacy of focusing on a single 
attribute, arguing that, as a result of the reading of the Substance-attribute 
relationship laid out above, Substance’s reality is not a sum of all the attributes. 
Rather, Substance, being identical to each attribute, is also complete in each one.3 
The attributes do not limit one another as opposed spheres of reality, and to 
understand only one, following its order and connection, “is at the same time to 
know the nature of all the others.”4 Indeed, Macherey points out that it is because 
we understand that every attribute expresses the whole of Substance, and in the 
same necessary order and connection, that our perception of only two attributes 
does not render Substance incomprehensible to us.5 For the same reason, the 
focus on a single attribute does not introduce incoherency into the standpoint of 
absolute Substance. In fact, Macherey makes this move himself, restricting his 
discussion of the infinite modes in Hegel or Spinoza “to the case of extension, that 
is, to the strict problem of the physical, because it should hold for all the others.”6  
 
 
4.1 - The Modal System 
 
It will be useful to undertake a brief overview of the overall structure of the 
modal system before proceeding to look at its elements in detail. There are 
multiple ‘levels’ of mode comprising the modal system. Firstly, infinite modes 
follow from the “absolute nature” of their attribute and share in the eternity and 
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infinity of the attribute from which they follow.7 These are further distinguished 
into immediate and mediate infinite modes. It is important to understand that 
infinite modes are not particular objects, but eternal metaphysical structures of 
infinite extent. The immediate infinite modes are those forms of being which 
Substance, determining itself in a particular attribute, necessarily and 
immediately causes itself to take on simply in virtue of the very nature of this 
attribute. In the case of Extension, the attribute itself is just the very quality of 
Extension, irreducible to any other attribute or way of being, but ‘motion and 
rest’, as we shall see in more detail below, is identified by Spinoza as the 
immediate infinite mode of Extension. This identification amounts to the claim 
that motion and rest is intrinsic to and follows immanently from the ‘absolute 
nature’ of extended Substance as its most general and fundamental form of 
existence. Mediate infinite modes are eternal and infinite structures which follow 
from the immediate infinite mode.8 Sticking to the example of Extension, this 
would be the facies totius universi, the unchanging ‘form’ of the physical universe 
as a whole.  
Finally, there are finite modes, or “particular things.”9 Though 
individually finite, these are infinite in number and connected in infinite causal 
series.10 In Extension, these are bodies. Lord suggests the finite modes can be 
understood as “the ‘surface features’ which rise and fall” from the continua that 
are the infinite modes, like “waves on the ocean, which come into existence, last a 
certain amount of time and then fall back into the infinite continuum from which 
they came.”11 
Concerning the relationship between the infinite and finite modes, in the 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Spinoza discusses the “fixed and eternal 
things” and “the laws inscribed in these things … according to which all singular 
things come to be, and are ordered.” Indeed, in the same place he goes further in 
suggesting that the finite modes depend to such a degree on these fixed and 
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eternal things that “they can neither be nor be conceived without them.”12 This 
notion of laws governing the finite modes chimes with statements in the Ethics, 
such as “all things that happen, happen only through the laws of God’s infinite 
nature.”13  
However, Spinoza also claims in the Ethics that no finite thing can exist or 
act unless it is determined to do so by another finite thing, which similarly owes 
its existence and action to the causality of another finite thing, and so on ad 
infinitum.14 Spinoza here sets up a ‘horizontal’ causal sequence, consisting of the 
infinite causal chains among the finite modes, along with the ‘vertical’ 
dependence of the finite modes on the infinite emphasised in the Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect. 
Savan suggests these claims can be reconciled through the view that each 
finite mode is the result of the intersection of two ‘causal axes’.15 First, the 
absolute nature of Extension, expressed in the infinite modes, determines the 
fundamental nature of every finite mode, conditioning its being and the laws its 
existence and activity must conform to, simply in virtue of being the kind of 
thing it is. No mode can be or be conceived without this absolute nature of its 
attribute. Second, the particular way in which the mode exists and the course of 
its causal history, from generation to destruction, is shaped by the effects of other 
finite modes upon it, stretching back in infinite causal chains. Spinoza seems to 
suggest such a view when he writes, concerning finite modes, that “even if each 
one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the 
force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity 
of God’s nature.”16  
Bearing in mind the interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy discussed in 
the previous chapter, this notion of dual causal axes must be treated with care, 
lest we conceive there to be two separate forms or orders of causality at play. 
Macherey argues at length against the idea that the infinite, mediate infinite and 
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finite modes constitute a successive hierarchy of forms. Rather, he argues that 
Substance “expresses itself simultaneously and identically” as finite and 
infinite17, which “are nothing without each other”18, and are one continuous and 
indivisible reality, “determined by one unique law of causality.”19 Lord’s 
suggestion that we can understand the complete causal story of any finite mode’s 
existence as residing in both the metaphysical ‘depth’ of the universe in the 
infinite modes, as well as the metaphysical ‘breadth’ of the universe in the chains 
of causality among finite modes20 may thus be a more helpful way to picture this 
structure than Savan’s two ‘causal axes’. 
Explicating this point further, it is important to avoid falling into the 
conception that the infinite modes exist independently from the finite modes. 
Spinoza is not suggesting that there is a pseudo-Platonic realm in which, for 
example, Extension’s immediate infinite mode, motion and rest, exists in a plane 
of reality independent of the motion and rest of particular bodies. The laws of 
motion, the laws ‘inscribed’ in Extension’s immediate infinite mode in the 
language of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, are neither themselves 
motions, nor do they exist independently of the motion of finite modes. Rather, 
these are structures which condition the motion of anything, wholly immanent to 
particular motions. The laws of motion (infinite mode) are not reducible to 
particular motions, nor are particular motions (finite modes) reducible to the 
laws of motion. Each is an equal product of Substance’s singular causality, which 
expresses itself simultaneously as finite and as infinite in an infinity of attributes. 
 
 
4.2 - Extension’s Infinite Modes 
 
The notion of infinite modes is enigmatic in the Ethics, and Wolfson’s review of 
Spinoza’s corpus21 finds only two terms for Extension’s immediate infinite mode: 
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‘Motion’22 and ‘Motion and rest’23. About motion and rest as such Spinoza says 
little, leading Adler to suggest that ‘motion and rest’ is really intended as a 
placeholder for some set of primary qualities to be specified later. Instead of 
committing himself to a particular view on these primary qualities, Adler 
interprets Spinoza as simply putting forward what seems to him the most likely 
true theory as an aid to comprehension, rather than definitely asserting this to be 
true.24  
In support of this reading, Adler points to a similar move made by 
Spinoza in EIIp17s. Here Spinoza offers an explanation of how the mind can 
perceive as existing something which does not, and admits the possibility of 
alternative reasons for this. However, he regards it as “sufficient for me here to 
have shown one (cause) through which I can explain it as if I had shown it 
through its true cause.”25 In light of this, Adler argues that motion and rest 
should be understood as ‘motion and rest, or something of the sort’, and Spinoza 
does indeed seem to use this sort of formulation in EIIIp2: “the Body cannot 
determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to 
motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).”26 In Adler’s reading, 
if another physical phenomenon turns out to be similarly fundamental, this can 
simply be added to the list of primary qualities, and Spinoza is not committed to 
motion and rest being the sole such qualities.27  
Adler’s interpretation is not without merit and, as he points out himself, 
taking this more conservative approach to Spinoza’s position would appear to 
save Spinoza from the epistemic offence of unwarranted speculation over facts he 
cannot know. In this reading, Spinoza is certainly allied to the mechanical 
philosophy of his day, but not to the point of abandoning rigour.28 However, this 
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interpretation of ‘motion and rest’ and the concerns that motivate it are at odds 
with the way Spinoza attempts to ground our knowledge of material Nature, and 
indeed the possibility of our reasoning in general.  
In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza argues that the 
human understanding is incapable of properly grasping the multitude of 
particular things and the infinite chains of causes producing and affecting each 
one.29 This inability is no cause for despair, however, as the infinite series of 
causes of particular things can only supply us with their extrinsic characteristics, 
relations and circumstances, from which their essences cannot be derived. The 
essences of things are deduced solely from “fixed and eternal things” and “the 
laws inscribed in these things,” according to which all particular things occur, are 
arranged, and on which they essentially depend, it being impossible for them to 
either be or be conceived without them.30 These fixed and eternal things, due to 
“their presence everywhere, and most extensive power,” function as universals 
both metaphysically and for our process of reasoning, acting as “genera of the 
definitions of singular, changeable things, and the proximate causes of all 
things.”31  
There is some debate over exactly what Spinoza is referring to here by 
‘fixed and eternal things.’ Harris, for example, reads this as a broad indication of 
“the infinite and eternal essence of God, his attributes and their infinite modes,”32 
whereas Wolfson interprets Spinoza as referring more specifically to the infinite 
modes.33 In either case, Spinoza is certainly arguing that our comprehension of 
modal Nature depends on our understanding of the infinite modes. 
In the Ethics, Spinoza claims that we obtain ideas of these universal 
structures of Nature, upon which our investigation of Nature and our reasoning 
in general can be based, from our own embeddedness within Nature. In EIIp29s 
Spinoza argues that insofar as the mind’s perceptions are determined externally 
by its contingent encounters with singular things, it can only gain a “confused 
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and mutilated” knowledge of Nature.34 These singular impressions are rendered 
confused, firstly, by the fact that their content is determined just as much by the 
nature of our own bodies as by the nature of the bodies they perceive through 
contact, and secondly, because experience allows us to trace the infinite chains of 
cause and effect which determine the existence of finite things only to a certain 
extent, thus preventing full comprehension. However, when the mind is 
determined internally, bringing together its various perceptions and 
understanding their “agreements, differences, and oppositions”, it can 
understand this commonality clearly and distinctly, in contrast with the confused 
and mutilated knowledge yielded by our singular perceptions of things.35  
If the mind perceives something to be common to its body and an 
external body, then its idea of this commonality will not have the confused 
character which Spinoza attributes to sense perception. This is because the idea of 
‘something common’ does not rely on a knowledge of the general causality of 
Nature but requires only the mind’s ideas of my own and external bodies. The 
precise set of causes for my body existing the way it does may be unknown, and 
my ideas of it confused, and similarly I may not know the causes for an external 
object’s existence and imagine it confusedly. However, the idea of commonality 
or agreement between things speaks for itself in the sense that the idea of an 
affection of my body which indicates the nature of both my own and an external 
body allows, by itself, a clear perception of similarities between the two things.36 
Spinoza argues that in its joint awareness of its body and external ones 
the mind discovers that its body has many things in common with the things it 
interacts with. Indeed, if it had nothing in common with them, interaction would 
be impossible.37 Furthermore, there are features which the mind finds that its 
body shares with all other bodies. Most significantly for our purposes, the mind 
perceives clearly that all bodies are capable of motion and rest.38 Spinoza calls 
these clear and distinct ideas of features common to all things, “which are the 
foundations of our reasoning,” ‘common notions.’39 
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Yovel argues this theory of common notions amounts to the claim that 
our reason “must be anchored within nature,” belonging to “an embodied being 
that exists within nature and is interwoven with its causal network.”40 Contrary 
to Adler’s attempt to water down Spinoza’s commitment to motion and rest as 
Extension’s infinite mode, Yovel argues that, in its grasp of common notions, the 
intellect reflects truths which exist objectively in nature, “inscribed in the laws 
and infinite modes by which the universe works.”41 Common notions are 
“reflected from within nature, that is, read off the infinite modes by a mind whose 
organism shares in the general causality of nature.”42 Yovel thus identifies 
common notions as “the epistemological counterparts of fundamental laws of 
nature,” with their metaphysical basis in law-like uniformities in the structure of 
the world.43 
 Franck44, Kennington45 and Savan46 agree broadly with this interpretation 
of Spinoza as locating the foundations of our reasoning in common notions 
gained from our perception of universal commonalities among those things 
given by the senses. However, unlike these scholars, Yovel makes clear that 
Spinoza argues that the mind perceives these uniformities directly, without going 
through any process of induction or abstraction.47 Harris also emphasises that the 
infinite modes understood in our common notions, and serving as the first 
premises of our reasoning, are universal physical realities inherent in reality and 
“implicit in any experience whatsoever.”48 
Considering this, we must conclude that despite the brevity of Spinoza’s 
comments on motion and rest, he is committed to the specific identification of 
this as the immediate infinite mode of Extension, contrary to Adler’s suggested 
‘placeholder’ reading. In identifying motion and rest as Extension’s infinite 
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mode, Spinoza is committed to the claim that motion and rest is the quality 
universal to all extended things and necessary to both the existence and 
conceivability of all extended things. All extended things are necessarily 
explained through the dynamic relation of motion and rest because this is the 
fundamental way in which Substance produces itself as Extension, which, in 
Macherey’s words, “acts and affirms itself in this relationship, which represents it 
absolutely, that is, without intermediary and without restriction.”49 As Spinoza 
states in the early Short Treatise, “when we consider extension alone, we perceive 
nothing else in it except motion and rest, from which we find that all its effects 
derive. And such are these two modes in body, that there can be no other thing 
which can change them, except themselves.”50 The immanent dynamic relation of 
motion and rest constitutes not only the fundamental qualitative being of 
extended Nature, but also the sole form of its activity and its singular governing 
principle. 
Further, Spinoza is committed to the claim that the idea of motion and 
rest is a common notion necessarily and clearly perceived by the mind. 
Importantly, these are not dogmatic assertions on Spinoza’s part, but an attempt 
to give his deductive system of Nature a secure foundation in real metaphysical 
structures. Motion and rest cannot be read as a conjectural placeholder pending 
further investigation, but must be understood as the quality of motion and rest 
we are immediately and necessarily aware of in our physical situation within 
Nature. 
Even if we accept Spinoza’s commitment to motion and rest as 
Extension’s immediate infinite mode, however, Schliesser argues that there is in 
fact no obvious justification for the existence of motion at all in Spinoza’s system. 
This is because Spinoza makes clear in EIIL3c that, should matter be at rest, it will 
continue to be so until determined to motion by an external cause51, but also 
rejects Descartes’ theory that God begins the chain of motion.52 Because Spinoza’s 
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God is immanent53, this can provide no ‘external’ cause to set matter in motion, 
and so motion must be intrinsic to the extended universe in some sense. 
However, Schliesser finds no satisfying justification for this, suggesting Spinoza 
must either take motion and rest as axiomatic, as he appears to in EIIa1’54, or 
simply claim that this is one of the infinite things in infinite modes which follow 
from the divine nature, as indicated in EIp1655.56   
However, bringing out the full implications of the identification of motion 
and rest as Extension’s immediate infinite mode, Macherey makes clear that 
extended Substance expresses itself absolutely and immediately in a relation of 
motion and rest. That is, Spinoza does not reject the Cartesian conception of inert 
matter to which movement must be imparted externally only because he rejects 
divine intervention in the order of Nature, but because Extension cannot be or be 
conceived without the animating relation of motion and rest.57 Motion is 
fundamental to Spinoza’s intrinsically dynamic conception of materiality, which 
is why he can remark that “Descartes’ principles of natural things are useless, not 
to say absurd”58 and has no need of a prime mover. The worry that Spinoza lacks 
a justification for the existence of motion raises the question of the absolute 
nature of Extension through the lens of the nature of particular extended things. 
It is appropriate to ask what the cause of any particular thing’s motion is, but 
Spinoza locates the existence of motion as such at a more fundamental, 
qualitative level, such that to ask why materiality is in motion is much the same 
as asking why all thoughts have objects.  
Responding to Schliesser’s question as to why motion exists by pointing 
out that motion and rest is the immediate expression of the nature of Extension, 
however, only prompts us to ask what it is about Extension that necessitates it 
exist as motion and rest. As we will discuss in detail in chapter nine, Hegel 
addresses this question as part of his account of mechanics, but it is not clear that 
Spinoza has an answer which would be adequate from a Hegelian point of view. 
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The response most consistent with the interpretation of Extension and its infinite 
mode constructed above would be that motion and rest is irreducible, in the 
sense of being that which follows immediately and absolutely from Substance as 
extended. Macherey seems to support such a line of interpretation when he 
argues that the laws of Nature expressing this relationship of motion and rest 
“are irreducible insofar as they are derived immediately from substance.”59  
However, this claim of irreducibility is, to Hegelian eyes, an admission 
that Spinoza’s philosophy of extended Nature is haunted by the problem of 
deriving determinacy discussed above. Just as, from the Hegelian standpoint, it is 
not adequately explained why Substance necessarily exists as Extension, it is also 
not explained why Extension necessarily exists as motion and rest. Of course, it 
may be that Spinoza is correct that motion and rest follows absolutely and 
immediately from Extension, representing the bedrock of extended Nature 
incapable of any deeper explanation. However, this claim will have to stand up 
against Hegel’s account of mechanics. 
Extension’s mediate infinite mode will not have as significant a part to 
play in the context of this study but should nonetheless be outlined briefly. 
Though the distinction between immediate and mediate infinite modes is 
referred to in the Ethics, no mediate infinite mode is named for either Extension 
or Thought. However, in a letter to Schuller Spinoza does name one mediate 
infinite mode as facies totius universi60, most literally translated as ‘the face of the 
whole universe’, though Macherey suggests it can be read as “corporeal nature 
taken in its entirety.”61 Spinoza describes this as that “which, although varying in 
infinite ways, yet remains always the same”62 and refers Schuller to EIIL7s, which 
contains the claim that we can conceive the whole of Nature as a single 
individual, “whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any 
change of the whole Individual.”63 
The simplest and clearest interpretation of what Spinoza intended to 
indicate by the facies totius universi is that argued for by Lord, who suggests that, 
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when expressed under the attribute of Extension, this is the whole of Nature as 
one infinite physical individual, or “a single, infinite continuum of physicality.”64 
We can add to this Macherey’s suggestion that Spinoza sought to indicate that 
corporeal Nature, in its infinite variety of determinations, nonetheless maintains 
an identical form governed by the same unchanging laws of motion and rest65, as 
well as Garrett’s point that this ‘infinite individual’, composed of every body in 
corporeal Nature, eternally pervades the causal history of the generation and 
destruction of finite bodies.66  
Summing up our examination of Extension’s infinite modes, thus far we 
have established, firstly, that though Spinoza’s direct comments on ‘motion and 
rest’ as such are few, he is committed to the identification of this as the 
immediate infinite mode of Extension, contrary to a deflationary reading of 
‘motion and rest’ such as that argued for by Adler. Secondly, as Extension’s 
immediate infinite mode, the relation of motion and rest is the fundamental way 
Substance produces itself as Extension. As a result, extended Nature cannot be 
conceived apart from motion and rest, extended Nature is essentially dynamic, 
and all extended Nature is explained through motion and rest. 
As Macherey points out, Spinoza’s theory of infinite modes shows clearly 
that he does not hold an infinite, indeterminate Substance on one side and the 
finite, determinate sphere of modes on the other. Contra Hegel’s interpretation, 
Spinoza does not hold that determination is “a deprivation, a negation of the 
indeterminate,” nor is it “necessarily and exclusively finite,” but instead flows 
from the absolute nature of Substance in a given attribute.67 However, in a 
repetition of the pattern we saw above in examining the lack of a concrete 
derivation of the attributes from Substance, we have seen that, from a Hegelian 
standpoint, there are significant deficiencies in the Spinozist framework’s ability 
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4.3 - Extension’s Finite Modes 
 
To briefly situate what follows in the context of the preceding discussion of 
infinite modes, it is important to avoid conceiving Substance’s determinations as 
forming a sequential hierarchy, just as we saw in the previous chapter in the case 
of the Substance-attribute relationship. As discussed above in section 4.1, 
Macherey argues that the infinite, mediate infinite and finite modes do not 
constitute a successive hierarchy of forms. Rather, Substance “expresses itself 
simultaneously and identically” as finite and infinite68, which “are nothing 
without each other”69, and are one continuous and indivisible reality, 
“determined by one unique law of causality.”70 It is not that extended Substance 
first necessitates its existence as motion and rest, with motion and rest then 
necessitating the existence of an infinity of bodies. Motion and rest does not of 
itself directly necessitate an infinity of bodies, but rather the infinite causal power 
of extended Substance necessitates both that it exist as motion and rest (infinite 
mode) and as an infinity of bodies (finite modes).  
Concerning the question of why extended Substance necessarily 
expresses itself in an infinity of finite modes, or bodies, it is not clear that Spinoza 
offers any more specific or developed reasons than those discussed in chapter 
three. Recapitulated very briefly, these reasons were, firstly, that from the infinity 
of Substance’s essence infinite modes must follow71, modes thus being derived 
from Substance as its infinite necessary propria, and secondly, that it is in the 
nature of Substance that it must be active in causing itself to exist as the modal 
universe.72 This, of course, leaves unaddressed the concerns brought up at the 
conclusion of chapter three regarding the insufficiency of these points to 
satisfactorily explain the necessity of Substance’s expression in an infinity of 
modes. From the Hegelian standpoint, this continues the pattern of explanatory 
deficiency we have seen so far in the lack of explanation as to why Substance 
must necessarily express itself as Extension, and why extended Substance must 
necessarily exist as motion and rest.  
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Spinoza’s account of Extension’s finite modes does, however, flesh out the 
mechanical account of extended Nature begun with motion and rest’s 
identification as the immediate infinite mode. As we shall see, motion is not only 
fundamental to the being of extended things in the sense that it is the qualitative 
form of being apart from which extended things cannot be or be conceived at all, 
but also provides the basis for the constitution of all formations of extended 
modes. Motion is the sole form of activity found among extended finite modes, 
and stable patterns of motion and rest provide the individuation and nature of 
bodies. Further, the quantitative differences in the complexity of these patterns of 
motion and rest provide the basis of all the variation we find among the 
formations of extended Nature. 
This mechanical view is of great importance in understanding the 
divergence of Spinoza and Hegel’s views of the broader structure of Nature, the 
second major area of Hegelian critique this study will explore. As will be 
elaborated in chapters nine and eleven, motion certainly has a key role in Hegel’s 
philosophy of Nature, and this mechanical element will never be left behind in 
Nature’s progression. However, it is a core Hegelian claim that Nature both 
necessarily develops through stages, such as the chemical and organic, which are 
qualitatively differentiated from and sublate its purely mechanical existence, and 
that these stages yield forms and activity which manifest qualitative 
determinations not reducible to the quantitative determinations of motion and 
rest. By ‘sublate’ Hegel means that Nature’s mechanical element is not simply 
negated, but is taken up into a higher, more comprehensive unity. 
By far Spinoza’s most detailed discussion of Extension’s finite modes 
takes place in a relatively brief digression from his account of the mind in the 
second part of the Ethics, sometimes called the ‘physical interlude’ or ‘physical 
digression’ by commentators. Spinoza himself acknowledges in the physical 
interlude that “if it had been my intention to deal expressly with body, I ought to 
have explained and demonstrated these things more fully”73, leading 
commentators such as Schliesser74 and Peterman75 to suggest that Spinoza’s 
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comments on finite bodies and motion in the physical interlude should not be 
taken as a serious attempt at formulating a physics. Although neither of these 
scholars makes mention of Hegel, their interpretation can be seen as in sympathy 
with Hegel’s comment with regard to the finite modes, already mentioned above, 
that “here we are at the extreme limit of Spinoza’s system, and it is here that his 
weak point appears.”76 However, while Hegel considers the skeletal nature of 
Spinoza’s account of finite modes as a major issue, these scholars take the 
interpretive strategy of avoiding problems for Spinoza by deflating the 
significance of his statements on mechanics, similarly to the way we saw above 
that Adler sought to save Spinoza from unwarranted claims by deflating the 
significance of motion’s identification as Extension’s immediate infinite mode.  
While it must be recognised that Spinoza’s account of matter in motion in 
the physical interlude is far from complete, and that it was not his intention there 
to provide a fully fleshed out physics, it will be shown in what follows, contrary 
to these commentators (Hegel included), that Spinoza’s account nonetheless has 
an elegance, explanatory power and systematic connection with his broader 
metaphysics which demands serious attention.   
Spinoza begins his highly condensed account of finite extended bodies 
with two brief axioms: “all bodies either move or are at rest”77 and “each body 
moves now more slowly, now more quickly.”78 These axioms are clearly built on 
the identification of motion and rest as the immediate infinite mode of Extension 
discussed above. Expanding on this, Spinoza proceeds to claim that “bodies are 
distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and 
slowness, and not by reason of substance.”79 The second part of this follows quite 
obviously from Spinoza’s core position of Substance monism: since there exists 
only one Substance, of which all bodies are modes, these bodies cannot be 
distinguished in virtue of their being or being modes of different substances. The 
assertion that bodies are distinguished through motion and rest again follows 
naturally from Spinoza’s identification of motion and rest as the immediate 
infinite mode of Extension. Motion and rest is the form of being which follows 
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immediately from the essence of Substance conceived as extended, and so is 
universal to all modes of Extension and absolutely fundamental to any 
conception of a mode as extended. Extended bodies must ultimately be 
distinguished by motion and rest and not in any other way, because any other 
proposed way of distinguishing them will be reducible to a comparison of their 
states of motion and rest.    
Spinoza further elaborates that any body’s state of motion or rest is 
determined by the motion or rest of another body, which is in turn determined 
by another, and so on, in an infinite causal series.80 This is simply the application 
of the infinite transitive causal series among finite modes already established in 
EIp2881 to the case of finite extended modes. Further, the way in which a body is 
affected by another is co-determined by the nature of the affecting and the 
affected bodies, with the result that one and the same body can be moved in 
many different ways due to differences in the bodies affecting it, and conversely 
different bodies may be moved in different ways by one and the same body.82 
In a move which follows less obviously from his already established 
positions, Spinoza distinguishes between the “simplest bodies,” which “are 
distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness,” 
and “composite bodies”83 or ‘individuals’, which he introduces in a very 
significant unnumbered definition:  
 
“When a number of bodies … are so constrained by other bodies that they 
lie upon one another, or if they so move … that they communicate their 
motions to each other in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those 
bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose 
one body or Individual, which is distinguished from the others by this 
union of bodies.”84  
 
Spinoza’s claim here that a compound body “is distinguished from the others by 
this union of bodies” suggests that compound bodies are not distinguished from 
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other simple or compound bodies only by their motion and rest as such, but by 
the specific pattern of motion and rest among their elements. Compound bodies 
are constituted by the particular structural arrangement and composition of the 
union which they are, or the fact that “they communicate their motions to each 
other in a certain fixed manner”, as Spinoza puts it. Spinoza goes on to offer the 
example of hardness and softness, which he explains arise insofar as the parts of 
a composite body “lie upon one another over a larger or smaller surface,” making 
changing their position more or less difficult.85 
Adler cautions against the temptation to give an overly specific 
interpretation to the notion of a ‘simple body’, such as viewing these as infinitely 
small particles, corpuscles or some other elementary body, suggesting instead 
that the concept of a simple body is intended as a placeholder to be filled in later 
by the advancement of physical science. In a move similar to his argument 
concerning motion, Adler suggests that a commitment on Spinoza’s part to a 
specific candidate for these simplest bodies would only undermine his position 
by making it dependent on facts he cannot be certain of.86  
Macherey, on the other hand, takes the position that simple bodies cannot 
be interpreted as really existing absolutely simple and indivisible bodies, since 
Spinoza rejects such an atomistic understanding of extended things in EIp15s.87 
Here Spinoza argues that Extension is infinite but not composed of finite parts, in 
the sense that it cannot be divided in such a way that its parts are really distinct. 
Indeed, “it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of 
bodies, or parts, than that a body is composed of surfaces, the surfaces of lines, 
and the lines, finally, of points.”88 He goes on to explain that we are inclined to 
conceive Extension as divided because we most commonly conceive it abstractly 
through the imagination, and so find it to be finite, divisible, and composed of 
parts. But when we conceive it through the intellect, which is much more 
difficult, we understand Extension as it is in Substance, and find it to be infinite, 
unique and indivisible. As understood by the intellect, ‘parts’ of Extension are 
only distinguished “insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different 
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ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really.”89 
Unpacking this claim that Extension’s ‘parts’ are distinguished ‘only modally, 
but not really’, Spinoza is making the point that Extension, as an attribute of 
Substance, is not an aggregate of separate parts, but a specific way or quality of 
being. Finite bodies are modes of the indivisible, singular extended Substance, 
that is, ways in which Substance exists, not parts of it. 
Macherey expresses concerns over how Spinoza’s denial of truly distinct 
parts can be reconciled with simple bodies, and interprets extended Nature as 
being comprised only of composite bodies, that is, complex realities irreducible to 
isolated elements. Macherey suggests that the notion of a simple body aids us in 
constructing our discourse on reality, enabling us to grasp the essential 
properties of finite modes, and this is why Spinoza makes use of this concept in 
the physical interlude, but nonetheless simple bodies do not actually exist in 
Nature.90 
However, Garrett gives a more elegant interpretation of simple bodies 
which reconciles them with the denial of Extension’s having separate parts in a 
way which fits more naturally with Spinoza’s remarks in the Ethics, which give 
no clear indication that the notion of a simple body is only an aid to 
comprehension, while also avoiding having to regard this notion as a mere 
placeholder. Garrett suggests that we can understand simple bodies, 
‘distinguished from one another only by motion and rest’, to be constituted by 
those regions of Extension which are, at a given moment, entirely homogeneous 
with respect to the quantitative distribution of motion and rest. Indeed, simple 
bodies “might, in effect, be such homogeneities.”91 This reading of simple bodies 
avoids any conflict with the denial of distinct parts within Extension, while also 
giving simple bodies a great deal of flexibility. Garrett points out that, 
understood in this way, the quantity of motion and rest constituting a simple 
body “need not remain the same throughout its spatiotemporal path” as long as 
the path is “continuous and that distribution of quantity of motion … remain 
homogeneous throughout the body.” Further, a simple body conceived this way 
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can change in size, as well as it being possible for different simple bodies to be 
different sizes.92  
Spinoza concludes the physical interlude with a series of lemmas 
concerning the identity of composite bodies through change, arguing, firstly, that 
if some of the bodies composing a compound body are removed, but the same 
number of bodies of the same nature take their place, then the compound body 
will retain its nature.93 This, Spinoza reasons, is because what constitutes the 
nature of a compound body is only a union of bodies, i.e. a compound body is 
defined by the set of simple bodies that constitute it, and more specifically by 
their particular arrangement and the fixed proportion of motion and rest 
maintained between them. As a result, even if the set of bodies composing the 
compound body is continually changing, this in itself poses no challenge to its 
retaining its nature. This is because the nature of the compound body is 
constituted by a particular relationship of motion and rest between its parts, 
changes to the membership of which are irrelevant as long as the bodies being 
lost and replaced are of the same ‘nature’, that is, their motion and rest is the 
same and they are thereby incorporated into the system of motion and rest that is 
the compound body.94 
 Having set out this most simple case of a compound body maintaining its 
nature through change, Spinoza argues additionally that if the number of parts 
composing a compound body becomes greater or less, but in a proportion such 
that the same ratio of motion and rest is maintained as before, then the 
compound body will retain the same nature as before.95 In his demonstration of 
this claim, Spinoza simply refers us back to the previous lemma. Spinoza might 
seem to be in contradiction here of his previous argument for the persistence of 
compound bodies through change, in which he had posited the same number of 
simple bodies as being lost and replaced. However, rather than thinking Spinoza 
would miss such an obvious conflict, it is more plausible to regard the 
maintenance of the same number of bodies in the case of EIIL4 as a way for 
Spinoza to aid comprehension of his point by intentionally simplifying the 
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example. That the particular number of bodies at any stage was never the core 
point is made explicit by EIIL5, which precisely indicates that the nature of a 
compound body only ever depends on the ratio of motion and rest among its 
parts, regardless of their number. Additionally, although Spinoza does not make 
this explicit, we can add a qualification that as we ascend to progressively more 
complex structures of motion and rest, it may be that these require a minimum 
number of parts in order to exist. However, this does nothing to damage 
Spinoza’s point, since what indicates any such threshold will always be the point 
at which a certain ratio of motion and rest can exist, rather than the nature of a 
thing being directly dependent on a particular number of bodies, which, if 
exceeded or fallen short of, will destroy the thing. 
 The scholium to EIIL7 expands the scope of the theory of simple and 
compound bodies to explicitly encompass the whole of corporeal Nature. 
Remarking that thus far we have considered only those compound bodies 
constituted by simple bodies, seeing that such compound bodies can alter in 
many ways without losing their nature, Spinoza moves to suggest that we may 
now consider a second kind of compound body, itself composed of many 
compound bodies. Drawing on the same reasons we considered above in the case 
of the first kind of compound body, we can see that this second kind of 
compound body is capable of sustaining its nature through an even greater 
breadth of change, since each of its parts, themselves composed of a number of 
bodies, can move with different speeds, in different directions, can change their 
constituents, and communicate their motion differently to the other composite 
parts of the body. Going further, we can of course extend this reasoning to a third 
kind of compound body, itself composed of compound bodies of this second 
kind, which will similarly be able to undergo an even greater degree of change 
while sustaining its nature. Indeed, Spinoza makes explicit that, “if we proceed in 
this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one 
Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change 
of the whole Individual.”96 
 At no point does Spinoza make clear exactly what he means by a ‘ratio’ of 
motion and rest, the concept upon which he rests the nature of compound 
 
96 Ibid. EIIL7s, p.462 
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bodies. Is this a mathematical ratio of two quantities, or is ‘ratio’ used here in a 
more general sense, meaning something like ‘pattern’ or ‘relationship’? Garrett97 
and Adler98 both point out that the Latin word ratio in ratio motus et quietis has a 
wide range of potential meanings, including quantitative ratio, definition, pattern 
and relation. Indeed, Adler argues that no individual use of the term by Spinoza 
points definitively to one interpretation, and neither does the original Dutch 
translation of the Ethics, the translator of which may have consulted with 
Spinoza, decide the issue.99  
As a result, we must look to the theoretical implications of these 
interpretations. Adler suggests that the most reasonable way of understanding 
‘ratio of motion and rest’, if meant in a primarily mathematical sense as a relation 
of two quantities, would be to take a body’s quantity of motion as its momentum 
and its quantity of rest as its inertial mass. An object’s essential ratio of motion 
and rest would then be arrived at by dividing the sum of the momenta of all its 
parts by the sum of their mass.100 Garrett points out a number of difficulties with 
a mathematical interpretation of ratio, the most obvious of which is the difficulty 
in clearly explaining how an individual can retain its nature through changes 
such as acceleration and warming when these would seem to change an 
individual’s ratio of motion and rest if this is understood mathematically.101 
Both Garrett and Adler favour a more flexible interpretation of ‘ratio of 
motion and rest’ as referring to a certain pattern of motion and rest, though this 
does not at all preclude this pattern from being put into mathematical terms.102 
Bennett also argues for this reading, interpreting ‘ratio of motion and rest’ as 
indicating a “coherence of organization.”103 Giving more detail to this route of 
interpretation, Garrett suggests that this understanding of ratio imposes at least 
two minimal conditions on individuals which have such a ratio of motion and 
rest: First, the individual’s parts must not vary in motion completely 
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independently of the motion of the other parts. Second, the way in which the 
motion of the individual’s parts is interrelated must conform to an enduring 
pattern, “even though the identity, size, number, position, direction, and motion 
of the parts playing these roles may change.”104 
This second interpretation is indeed more promising, since the broader 
understanding of ‘ratio’ as indicating a pattern fits better with the way Spinoza 
describes the principles governing finite bodies and allows a stronger, more 
flexible, and more philosophically interesting reading of his mechanics. In 
particular, when we consider very complex compound bodies, such as our own, 
it is both much more plausible and more informative for Spinoza to claim that 
the human body’s nature consists in a pattern of motion and rest among its many 
organs and systems, rather than that the human body consists in a certain 
relationship of its total inertial mass and momentum. 
Also taking this reading of the ‘ratio’ of motion and rest, Macherey 
suggests that, for Spinoza, an individual natural object is no more than “a ‘being’ 
in which distinct existences coexist.”105 Referring us to Spinoza’s definition of an 
‘individual’ quoted above, Macherey argues that an individual is only a 
circumstantial union of bodies, “a certain assemblage of elements of the same 
nature that agree among themselves.”106 Further, Macherey suggests that 
“individuals do not exist absolutely but relatively, according to circumstances or 
a point of view”107, as Spinoza indicates in EIId7: 
 
“By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a 
determinate existence. And if a number of Individuals so concur in one 
action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, 
to that extent, as one singular thing.”108 
 
Macherey draws our attention to Spinoza’s qualifying that this unity only exists 
‘to that extent’, meaning that “the unity that constitutes an individual … depends 
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on conditions that make and unmake it.”109 This unity does not come from the 
intrinsic reason of an internal principle of assembly, according to which the parts 
would complete each other in an immanent harmony. Rather, the individual is 
composed in the encounter and coexistence of bodies without this indicating a 
privileged relationship of internal order. The singular bodies composing an 
individual are unified only through the mechanical actions of mutual external 
constraint and the pressure of ambient forces applied by other bodies in the 
environment.110  
Taking the human body as an example, Spinoza states that: 
 
“The parts composing the human Body pertain to the essence of the Body 
itself only insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a 
certain fixed manner (certa ratione), and not insofar as they can be 
considered as Individuals, without relation to the human Body.”111  
 
Spinoza clearly presents the parts of the human body as themselves being 
individuals here, just as he does also in the first postulate following the physical 
interlude where he states that “the human body is composed of a great many 
individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite.”112 Spinoza 
makes clear that the human body’s parts are themselves complex individuals, 
each of which can be separated from the human body without taking away the 
nature of either that part or the human body, and can establish relationships of 
motion and rest with other bodies.113 
The human body’s parts are elements that coexist in and together form its 
total organization but also remain independently existing things, complete in 
themselves, which only circumstantially belong to this overall ensemble. 
Macherey argues that, from a Spinozist perspective, it is illusory to attempt to 
blend these two aspects, considering each part as constituted in itself in such a 
way as to form a harmonious totality with the others. This would be to abstractly 
summarize “an infinite sequence of determinations in the fiction of a unique 
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intention.”114 Rather, Spinoza calls for a strictly causal and mechanistic 
understanding of the formations of extended Nature, no matter how complex, 
according to which the reason for the harmony of the human body’s parts is 
found only “in the transitive relationship of determination that constrains them, 
provisionally, to associate.”115 Each part of the human body belongs to this 
overall form only due to the transitive causality that has brought about this 
liaison and continues to constrain its elements, holding them together only until 
these causal conditions change, following which the assemblage unravels and 
other associations emerge.116  
Carriero, arguing for a similar picture of the nature of individuals in 
Spinoza’s philosophy, suggests “there is a fine line between what an individual is 
and its activity.”117 Carriero points out that we find it intuitive to conceive of a 
hurricane, for example, as being its motive activity, without some prior subject 
being invoked in which this activity exists. Spinoza can be understood as 
universalising this intuition into a way of conceiving bodies generally.118 In 
chapter eleven we will see Hegel arguing directly contrary to this view of bodies 
in his account of the internal formative principle of ‘Shape’. 
Connecting this view of individual bodies to the broad picture of the 
whole of corporal Nature brought into view by Spinoza in the scholium to EIIL7, 
Newlands reads Spinoza’s position as one according to which things are 
individuals or parts depending on the perspective they are conceived from and 
its greater or lesser scale. Extension is internally structured by a distribution of 
motion and rest, and individuals are constructed from this distribution insofar as 
motion and rest form stable patterns. However, the individuation of these stable 
patterns depends in part on how the distribution is conceived. In a maximally 
broad conception, a single quantity and pattern of motion and rest is conserved 
through the whole of extended Nature in a global distribution composing a 
single individual. This is the all-encompassing infinite individual of EIIL7s. But 
in a narrower conception of the distribution of motion and rest, “discrete, stable, 
and more localized patterns of activity persist and compose discrete individuals, 
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or composite bodies.”119 Similarly, Carriero has suggested that we can 
understand Spinoza’s conception of physical Nature as consisting “in a fluid-like 
matter in motion, a plenum,”120 which is, however, “not some chaotic flux” but 
“populated by relatively stable physical individuals.”121 
While there is not room here for an exhaustive examination of the many 
avenues for further thought opened up by the subtle reading of Spinoza’s 
physical philosophy traced above in the work of Macherey, Carriero, Garrett and 
Adler, it should nonetheless be evident that Spinoza’s view of extended Nature, 
though committed to purely mechanical explanation, is far from simplistic, and is 
certainly not the glaringly deficient weak point of Spinozist thought which Hegel 
dismisses it as. We will discuss Spinoza’s theory of finite modes in further detail 
in chapter ten, particularly regarding the issue of qualitative and quantitative 
differences in Nature, what a Spinozist philosophy of Nature has to say about the 
organic, and the role of Spinoza’s theory of the Conatus. To facilitate the dialogue 
with Hegel in chapters seven to nine it is sufficient for the moment to have 
followed Spinoza’s view of Substance and its infinite modes to its most 
fundamental consequences in finite material Nature, namely the centrality of 
motion and rest and its patterns as the reality of all that is found in extended 
Nature. Before moving on to consider Hegel’s philosophy, we will more 
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Chapter 5 – Nature without Negation 
 
 
Having followed through Spinoza’s view of the modal universe, we are now in a 
position to consider, firstly, the ways in which the interpretation of Spinoza’s 
philosophy of Nature constructed over the last two chapters pushes back against 
Hegel’s reading of Spinoza’s thought and, contrary to Hegel’s dismissal of 
Spinoza’s physical philosophy, carves out an account of the natural world which 
demands a proper answer from the Hegelian position. We will then point out the 
key ways in which the Spinozist framework set out above, despite being 
bolstered through the interpretive work of scholars such as Macherey and 
Melamed, struggles from a Hegelian perspective to provide an adequate 
derivation of extended Nature’s determinacy from Substance’s unity. 
We can begin by spelling out with greater clarity what it means to 
conceive of extended Nature as Substance’s affirmative self-expression, without 
contradiction or negation, as well as how Spinoza’s view of the Absolute gives 
shape to his account of material Nature. Having focused in the previous chapter 
on the detail of Spinoza’s view of modal Nature, the issue of negativity has taken 
a back seat. However, Macherey has a keen eye for the intertwining of these 
strands. 
In Metaphysical Thoughts, Spinoza writes: 
 
“From the fact that we compare things with one another certain notions 
arise which nevertheless are nothing outside the things themselves but 
modes of thinking … These are such notions as Opposition, Order, 
Agreement, Difference, Subject, Adjunct, and whatever others are like 
these.”1 
 
Order, agreement and opposition represent only relations between things, and 
depend on our comparison of them in our thought, these being abstract, formal 
notions which do not correspond to real content. Macherey suggests that 
 
1 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
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negativity, likewise, is only an abstract representation of something according to 
its limits, in contrast to the positive, concrete representation of a thing in its 
physical reality.2 Macherey argues that in Spinoza’s Nature everything is “in a 
relationship of immutable and unlimited coexistence; in this sense, its ‘order’ 
excludes all contradiction.”3 That is, contradiction only presents itself insofar as 
we engage in the external comparison of things and there is neither negativity 
nor contradiction in or between things in Nature, the only real relations between 
things being their transitive causal chains.4  
It is one of the first axioms of the Ethics that “knowledge of an effect 
depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.”5 Although modes present 
themselves to the imagination as a discontinuous succession, mutually opposed 
and separated, Macherey points out that this perspective does not understand 
the modes through their cause, namely, the infinite and undivided Substance 
which expresses itself in an infinity of modes absolutely continuously.6 In light of 
the discussion in the previous two chapters, we can see that Hegel’s reading of 
Spinoza’s account of modes falsely conceives the architecture of his system in at 
least two major ways. Firstly, it falsely conceives the modes as a sequential 
production by Substance, which supposedly generates a finite world in addition 
to its infinite, indeterminate nature, rather than modes being recognised as a 
simultaneous and integral expression of Substance’s infinitely rich determinacy. 
To be clear, what is rejected is the notion that Spinoza understands Substance, its 
attributes, infinite modes and finite modes to form a sequence, beginning with 
the first and ending with the latter. Instead, it has been argued above that 
Substance exists in and as the modal system. This, however, is not to deny that the 
finite modes form infinite transitive causal sequences among themselves.  
 Secondly, this view falsely views modal Nature as an aggregate of 
separable and mutually opposed parts. As Macherey points out, to attempt to 
understand finite bodies in this way, “from the point of view of their reciprocal 
limitation,” is to conceive them “independently of the effective order of nature.”7 
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To understand the finite modes we must not conceive them strictly in terms of 
their finitude, but also “in terms of the infinity on which they are dependent.”8  
As we saw in the previous chapter in our discussion of compound bodies, 
the being of a compound body consists purely in the stable ratio of motion and 
rest among its constituent bodies. Its parts are not held in union by any other 
force, nor do they have a relationship of internal tension or contradiction. When a 
compound body comes into contact with another body, it will always either 
maintain its ratio of motion and rest or lose it, preserving its existence or being 
destroyed in binary fashion as determined by the results of the mechanical 
collision of bodies. These bodies do not enter into a contradiction which must be 
resolved, nor do they have any relation of opposition. Everything that occurs is 
an affirmation of the being of Substance as an infinity of finite modes in infinite 
causal chains.  
Unlike in Hegel’s view, which we will turn to in detail shortly, of internal 
contradiction as a structuring principle in both the structure of reality as such 
and the constitution of bodies in Nature, Macherey suggests that Spinoza 
displaces the notion of contradiction outside the essence of things altogether, 
demoting it to a formal principle of external comparison. Spinoza eliminates 
contradiction from Nature, not by claiming to follow through its resolution, but 
by making reality an affirmation of Substance, outside all negativity or 
contradiction.9 Thus, Macherey contends that Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s 
thought as ‘lacking’ negativity improperly applies an alien concept to it. 
Spinozism does not ‘lack’ negativity, but rather operates on an entirely different 
basis.10 Indeed, Macherey asserts that it is essential to Spinozist philosophy that it 
‘constitutes a refutation in advance’ of the Hegelian dialectic.11 Rather than 
Spinoza’s thought being hamstrung by its neglect of the negative, Macherey 
suggests that Hegel’s conception of dialectical reason, negativity and 
contradiction is precisely the form of thought “that Spinoza’s reasoning 
definitively excludes.”12 Spinoza’s philosophy cannot be understood as an 
embryonic form or anticipation of Hegel’s position, sadly crippled by Spinoza’s 
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lack of insight into the true nature of the negative, as Hegel seeks to paint it. 
Rather, Spinoza’s thought represents an alternative vision of philosophical 
thought, of the Absolute, and of material Nature which demands to be answered. 
The last two chapters have developed an interpretation of Spinoza’s 
philosophy which challenges significant aspects of Hegel’s critique. Contrary to 
Hegel’s reading of the indeterminate abyss of Substance alongside which the 
modal world is left a disconnected and estranged shell, the work of Macherey 
and Melamed brings determinacy into the heart of the Absolute, conceiving 
Substance’s singular unity and its infinity of modes in infinite attributes as two 
inseparable aspects of its affirmative self-determination. Against Hegel’s 
dismissal of Spinoza’s thought on the natural world, we have followed extended 
Substance from its immediate expression as motion and rest through to the 
elaboration of a compelling mechanical account of physical Nature, woven 
entirely from the patterns in this immanent dynamic relation. 
Despite this, however, from a Hegelian perspective the core contention of 
the critique from Hegel with which we began, that Spinoza fails to show the 
necessity of determinacy within the infinite unity of Substance, retains its teeth. 
Firstly, as we saw in chapter three, it is difficult for Spinozism to give a satisfying 
explanation as to why Substance should necessarily exist as the attribute of 
Extension at all, or in other words, why material Nature should necessarily exist. 
As it has been interpreted here, the best the Spinozist framework can do is to 
argue that it is in the nature of Substance, as an infinitely powerful and unique 
causality, to exist in infinite attributes, and indeed every possible attribute. 
Secondly, Spinoza has not explained why Extension should intrinsically and 
necessarily exist as motion and rest, giving no further explanation beyond the 
claim that motion and rest follows absolutely and immediately from Extension. 
Thirdly, Spinoza has not explained why infinite Substance should necessarily 
express itself in an infinity of finite modes, other than through an appeal to the 
infinity of Substance’s essence. In short, from a Hegelian standpoint it still seems 
entirely legitimate for Hegel to pose the question to Spinoza of why the 
determinacy of material Nature exists at all, and why it exists in the way Spinoza 
claims that it does. 
As Macherey remarks, Spinozism seems to be faced with a problem when 
it comes to explaining exactly how Substance comes to “express itself absolutely, 
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immediately, in a determination.”13 As he also points out, though, even if “it is 
not clear that Spinozist concepts allow us to resolve this difficulty … they do 
allow us to confront it.”14 It is not enough for the Hegelian standpoint to merely 
point out a limit to the derivation of determination possible within the Spinozist 
framework. In itself, the acknowledgement of a limit to Spinozist philosophy, 
whether this is owed to the need for more research or the bounds of 
philosophical thought as such, does not constitute a critique. Hegel and Spinoza 
alike acknowledge limitations to possible philosophical knowledge concerning 
particular natural objects, for example. The Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s 
philosophy of extended Nature must show that it is possible to go beyond the 
limit-point of the Spinozist framework, and this must consist in concretely 
demonstrating that Hegel can offer a more fruitful account of Nature.  
In the next chapter we will begin to examine Hegel’s philosophy and his 
account of the derivation of material Nature from the absolute Idea, seeing how 
Hegel avoids the deficiencies of the Spinozist account indicated above. This will 
occupy us until the end of chapter nine. Chapters ten and eleven will then turn 
from this first major issue of the derivation of Nature to the second major issue of 
the broader picture of the natural world, and in particular the question of the 











Chapter 6 – Hegel’s Philosophy 
 
 
Before directly discussing the conclusion to the Science of Logic and the derivation 
of the Idea as Nature, it will first be necessary to discuss Hegel’s 
presuppositionless and immanent dialectical ‘method.’ This is because, due to the 
close union of Hegel’s manner of presentation and the content of his philosophy, 
it is not possible to understand his account of Nature without a clear view of this. 
The discussion of these topics will also provide opportunity to contextualise the 
interpretive position on Hegel’s philosophy taken by this study in relation to 
previous scholarship. 
In his Science of Logic Hegel argues that if philosophy is to be fully self-
critical and scientific then it cannot make presuppositions about its method or 
object. Philosophy cannot rest on a set of presupposed axioms, as in mathematics, 
nor can it defer to intuitive truths or the findings of experience, however suitable 
such starting points might be for ‘subordinate’ sciences. Rather, Hegel proposes 
“an altogether new concept of scientific procedure”, according to which the 
content is allowed to show its spontaneous development, immanently working 
itself through without the imposition of external presuppositions as to its nature 
or how it ‘should’ progress.1 
Hegel’s commitment to purifying philosophy of presuppositions leads 
him to explicitly reject the presupposition of even the most basic and seemingly 
obvious logical principles, such as the distinction of infinity and finitude or 
mediation and immediacy. The presupposition of any of these would not only be 
technically unjustifiable but would indicate an ignorance of the purpose of logic 
itself, which Hegel conceives as the inquiry into the truth of these very concepts.2 
The exposition Hegel demands of logic is such that at no stage can any concept 
be introduced which does not immanently emerge from the one preceding it. 
Likewise, no conceptual relation, such as the oppositions just mentioned, may be 
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assumed unless they are shown to develop from the nature of the concepts 
themselves.3 
This rejection of presuppositions requires at the same time a new 
conception of what ‘truth’ consists in. Hegel comments in the Encyclopaedia Logic 
that we ordinarily consider truth to be a form of agreement between an object 
and our representation of it, and thereby presuppose an object with which our 
representation should conform. However, Hegel suggests that, in its 
philosophical sense, truth means the agreement of a thought with itself.4 This 
conception of truth becomes much clearer in light of Hegel’s dialectical ‘method’, 
which Hegel characterizes as an effort to “sink myself in the matter” and “let 
thought follow its own course,” as opposed to applying a methodology 
externally onto thought.5 As Althusser remarks, against the externality of method 
to a given content, “Hegel counterposes a vision of philosophy deeply immersed 
in the life of its object.”6 
To take a simple example from the very beginning of the Logic, the 
concepts of being and nothing are usually taken to be direct opposites, each 
isolated cleanly from the other. Being is simply not nothing and vice versa. 
However, Hegel suggests that when we resist importing any presuppositions 
into the content of these concepts, however minimal, and allow them to follow 
their own logic through, these supposed immediate, self-subsistent opposites in 
fact show themselves to immanently resolve themselves into one another. Pure 
being, conceived without further determination of any kind, qualitative or 
quantitative, is in fact nothing. But the resulting pure nothingness nonetheless is 
nothing, or a pure being without any determinacy. The concepts of pure being 
and pure nothing, without any interference or imposition by the philosopher, 
have this dialectical movement immanent in themselves, and the flux of their 
continual ‘vanishing’ into one another, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, is itself a 
third concept, becoming, generated by the dialectical relation of being and nothing 
as the truth of their intrinsic relation. This is what Hegel has in mind when he 
suggests that philosophical truth consists in the agreement of a thought or 
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concept with itself. Concepts are not static, but show themselves to be 
dialectically mediated with one another, and through their self-development 
unfold and display their full content, or truth. This truth does not consist in or 
need verification through agreement with something else, but instead “in 
philosophy, ‘proving’ amounts to exhibiting how the ob-ject makes itself what it 
is through and of itself.”7 
Insofar as dialectical thinking is a method, it is one that is “self-
construing” and “at the same time … the immanent soul of the content itself.”8 
As shall be argued below, Logic ultimately shows itself to be the first part of the 
self-actualisation of the Idea, the second being Nature, and so the unity of 
method and content in dialectics is not just the necessary form of scientific 
exposition, but at the same time the necessary form of what exists.9 
However, this approach of taking Hegel at face value when he seems to 
indicate that the Logic, and indeed his philosophy in general, is a metaphysical 
project would not go unchallenged in Hegel scholarship. A fundamental issue 
which has taken up much attention in this field is whether it is Hegel’s intention, 
in a neo-Kantian vein, to provide only an account of the concepts necessary to 
rational thought, or whether Hegel intends his derivation of these categories to 
be, at the same time, an explication of the structures necessary to being as such. In 
other words, is Hegel giving a category theory only, or is he developing a full-
blooded metaphysics? For those few scholars who have taken Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Nature seriously, a further core issue of interpretation, intertwined with the 
first, presents itself; namely, the balance accorded to empirical and a priori 
elements in Hegel’s account of Nature. In contextualizing the reading argued for 
in this study, it will be useful to briefly consider the interpretations of Hahn, 
Burbidge, Maker and Stone as a representation of the spectrum of positions taken 
by scholars who have engaged in detail with the Philosophy of Nature.  
Hahn offers an interpretation which emphasises the importance of 
Goethe’s critical empiricism to Hegel’s intellectual formation, particularly the 
former’s insight into the identity of concepts and objects and his directive to ‘stay 
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with the object’ and work from life. Hahn’s ‘naturalistic’ reading, as she describes 
it10, argues that Hegel is neither an uncritical empiricist nor a dogmatic 
rationalist, neither seeking to debunk a priori claims, nor putting in place a 
metaphysical dualism dividing the conceptual and empirical worlds. Instead, in 
Hegel’s thought the line between the empirical and logical becomes necessarily 
blurred.11  
Hahn argues that Hegel thinks through the concepts of the Logic 
synthetically, making the bold claim that “the truth of the logical categories lies 
in their application to empirical instances” and that the purpose of the various 
empirical examples found in Hegel’s work on logic is not merely to provide 
minor illustrations and aids to comprehension. Rather, the logical concepts only 
have meaning and justification in their correspondence to the objects of possible 
experience in these empirical examples.12 Hahn goes so far as to read the 
dialectic, even at the most abstract level of pure being, nothing and becoming, as 
naturalistic, conceived “synthetically through continuous contact with empirical 
instantiations of Being.”13 Indeed, Hahn argues that the principle of the dialectic’s 
negative self-development is derived from the self-contradictory structure of 
development Hegel observed in organisms.14  
In Hahn’s reading, Hegel intends his dialectical principles and concepts to 
have a “developmental structure continuous with the self-developing, self-
correcting power of nature” and “fashions them out of the tendencies he 
observes still from a position inside nature, in a way that tries to impose onto 
nature the least amount of conceptual revision from the outside.”15 Hegel first 
establishes contradictions empirically, accepting Nature’s “basic, prerational 
structure,” and then, “from a position immanent in nature,” conceptualizes this 
natural dynamic movement into rational dialectical principles.16 Hegel does not 
impose animistic concepts onto Nature, but shows contradiction’s presence as a 
force in Nature which drives forwards its self-corrective development. Further, 
 
10 Hahn, S. (2007). Contradiction in Motion: Hegel’s Organic Concept of Life and Value. Cornell 
University Press. p.33 
11 Ibid. pp.18-19 
12 Ibid. pp.17-18 
13 Ibid. p.19 
14 Ibid. pp.26-27 
15 Ibid. p.33 
16 Ibid.  
75 
 
he derives the content of his dialectical principles from their being emanations of 
the rationality implicit in Nature itself, independently of human consciousness.17 
However, Hahn recognises that Hegel does not leave Nature simply ‘as 
is.’ Since Nature has no awareness of its latent rationality, it requires a “higher-
order commentary … from a self-conscious standpoint of human reason” to give 
this explicit logical form. Nature already has an immanent rationality with an 
affinity for human reason, but it takes the mediation of rational reflection “to 
read thought processes out of (not into) nature.”18 Hahn  suggests that Hegel 
attempts to reproduce the structure of contradiction he finds empirically present 
in Nature in the form of dialectical principles which “make explicit nature’s blind 
goal to eliminate contradictions.”19 Hegel thus goes beyond unthinking Nature, 
and thereby avoids uncritical empiricism, by “completing and fully realizing at a 
conscious interpretive level what nature has really achieved,” while 
simultaneously using the naturalistic basis of his analysis to ground his account 
of Logic.20  
Hahn acknowledges that Logic’s preceding Nature in Hegel’s system 
indicates that its concepts have some form of atemporal existence ‘prior’ to their 
appearance in Nature.21 However, she argues that these concepts are not 
‘timeless’ in a Platonic sense of standing purely a priori and eternal, since this 
would make everything settled from the start, with no room for revision, and 
thereby mistakenly cast the concepts of Logic in isolation from the way they 
unfold dynamically in Nature and history. Hahn suggests rather that logical 
concepts are atemporal in the sense that, at the highest level of generality which 
Logic is concerned with, the accidental contingencies introduced by temporality 
cease to have relevance.22  
Burbidge adopts a less radical reading of Hegel’s Logic than Hahn, 
arguing that the Logic is a non-metaphysical but wholly a priori and non-
empirical explication of thought’s consciously thinking through its own 
operations and thereby exploring the nature of reasoning.23 However, similarly to 
 
17 Ibid. pp.33-34 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. p.35 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. p.51 
22 Ibid. p.52 
23 Burbidge, J. (1996). Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry Combine in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. 
University of Toronto Press. p.9 
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Hahn, he emphasises the importance of empirical investigation to Hegel’s 
account of Nature. The Philosophy of Nature, as Burbidge interprets it, emerges 
when thought, having reasoned through the implications of its own concepts, 
finds it must come to terms with “the givens of the natural order.”24 Indeed, in 
order “to do justice to nature, thought must abandon its own pretensions. It must 
let nature be itself. It must decide to be thoroughly empirical.”25 Burbidge thus 
makes a sharp distinction between the explication of purely theoretical principles 
of knowing found in the Science of Logic and thought’s being confronted by the 
contingency and finitude of sensible experience in the Philosophy of Nature.26 
Burbidge stresses that Hegel does not externally impose rational categories from 
the Logic onto experience, instead allowing Nature to ‘go its own way.’27 Indeed, 
it is fundamental that Nature is not inherently logical, but rather explicitly other 
than and external to thought. Logic does not find direct instantiation in Nature, 
and the natural world’s rational patterns are found implicit, dispersed and often 
incompletely manifested in the range of contingent bodies and processes yielded 
by observation.28  
Burbidge sees Hegel’s procedure in approaching the philosophical study 
of Nature as following in the mould of Aristotle, in the sense that he gathers 
together observations, taking all their determinations together and carefully 
noting their relations, and in this way synthetically ‘constructs’ natural concepts 
without appeal to anticipations or pre-judgements. As Burbidge reads him, 
Hegel’s conception of philosophy of Nature demands we reflect on its givens, 
analysing their most abstract features first and gradually progressing to more 
complex structures.29 When it comes to think about the natural world, thought 
learns that it must accommodate its givens in conceiving them in particular ways, 
then considers every experience relevant to this perspective, and “finally discerns 
in the synthesis of all the resulting descriptions patterns that point forward to the 
next plateau.”30 At each stage in the philosophy of Nature, it’s setting has been 
derived from reflection on what experience has indicated in the previous stage.31  
 
24 Ibid. p.186 
25 Ibid. p.206 
26 Ibid. p.23 
27 Ibid. p.201 
28 Ibid. p.162 
29 Ibid. p.207 
30 Ibid. p.203 
31 Ibid. p.201 
77 
 
Maker similarly adopts a non-metaphysical reading of the Logic, raising 
the concern that if Hegel is read as a metaphysical idealist, making his system 
wholly autonomous, self-contained and free of all given determinacies, this 
would seem to make it difficult for Hegel to make any claims about reality. That 
is, “unless the real is taken to be identical to, or a product of, or is otherwise 
derivative from and dependent upon, philosophical thought”32, a position Maker 
takes to be obviously unattractive. However, Maker does recognize that Hegel is 
a ‘methodological idealist’, meaning that he regards self-determining, 
autonomous reason to be the only form of philosophically justifiable cognition, as 
well as a ‘critical idealist’, meaning that he thinks that this autonomous reason 
can articulate the truth about reality. In line with this, Maker argues that Hegel 
acknowledges the radical otherness of Nature to thought but maintains his 
‘methodological idealism’ in preserving the autonomy and systematicity of 
reason in the philosophical investigation of Nature. In this reading, the Philosophy 
of Nature does not require input from empirical observation and proceeds as 
systematic and a priori, but details only the various ways in which rational 
thought must conceive of this existence radically exterior to it, and does not 
constitute a metaphysics of the forms Nature must necessarily exist in.33 Maker’s 
interpretation thus combines a non-metaphysical reading of the Logic with a 
similarly non-metaphysical but nonetheless a priori interpretation of the 
Philosophy of Nature. 
Unlike Hahn, Burbidge and Maker, Stone takes a metaphysical reading of 
Hegel’s Logic and system generally, seeing the project of his philosophy as the 
description of “the forms of thought—collectively called the ‘idea’—which 
structure the world as a whole.”34 In Stone’s reading, the forms of thought which 
make up the Idea are not only subjective categories, but “primarily exist as 
objective structures embodied in both nature and mind.”35 Though at a certain 
point in the development of the mind its thinking will give subjective guise to 
these objective forms of thought, this subjectivity is a development from 
 
32 Maker, W. ‘The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel Is Not an Idealist’ in Houlgate, S. 
(ed.) (1998). Hegel and the philosophy of nature. Albany: State University of New York Press. p.2 
33 Ibid. pp.3-4 
34 Stone, A. (2005). Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy. State University of New York 
Press. p.53 
35 Ibid. p.24 
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thought’s fundamentally non-subjective structures.36 Stone argues that Hegel’s 
Logic describes these forms in abstraction, deriving the most general structures 
manifest in any form of reality, and the Philosophy of Nature traces how these 
structures are instantiated in the natural world, giving a sui generis and a priori 
account of Nature’s forms.37 
Stone develops an interpretation she calls ‘strong a priorism’ to describe 
Hegel’s method in the study of Nature. According to this Hegel first works out 
wholly a priori what forms Nature contains by following the dialectic of Nature’s 
necessary rational development, and only subsequently incorporates empirical 
scientific terms and claims which can be interpreted as corresponding to the 
forms which have been derived a priori. Importantly, this incorporation of 
empirical claims is done on a strictly interpretive and provisional basis, and this 
has the considerable virtue of not only preserving the strictly systematic and a 
priori nature of Hegel’s account, but also allowing Hegel to avoid absolutizing 
the fallible claims of contemporary natural science.38  
In relation to the spectrum of positions just set out, the interpretation 
argued for in this study is closest to that of Stone but can also be seen as an 
inversion of Hahn’s position. The reading of Hegel’s thought argued for here is 
strongly metaphysical, holding that though the Logic is articulated in pure 
thought and consists in thought thinking through its own determinations, the 
determinations so derived are not merely those of thought specifically but those 
of being as such. In other words, the Logic concerns the being of thought, not just 
the thought of being, unfolding the structures rationally necessary to any being 
whatsoever, and not just regulatory structures for thought or conditions of the 
being specific to thought.  
Whereas usually we take the objects of our ideas to be the ‘real’ content to 
which our thoughts are related, Hegel argues that “it is not logical thoughts … 
that are ‘only’ so-and-so, in comparison with all other content; on the contrary, it 
is all other content that is an ‘only’ in comparison with them. Logical thoughts 
are the ground that is in and for itself of everything.”39 Indeed, relating this point 
 
36 Ibid. pp.24-25 
37 Ibid. p.53 
38 Ibid. pp.xviii, 12 
39 Hegel, G.W.F., Geraets, T.F., Suchting, W.A., & Harris, H.S. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I 
of the Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences with the Zusätze. Indianapolis: Hackett. §24, Zusatz 2 
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specifically to natural things, Hegel claims that the nature, permanence and 
substantiality of the objects of Nature in fact resides in “the notion of the thing, 
the immanent universal,” and the basis of “everything natural” is “the pure Notion 
which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse.”40  
Stone stands apart from the other commentators whose positions we have 
outlined in adopting a fully metaphysical and a priori reading of Hegel’s account 
of both Logic and Nature. She does suggest, though, that Hegel makes the 
“metaphilosophical assumption” that thought and matter, or concept and reality, 
are “intrinsically opposed to one another”41, and further, that this informs 
Hegel’s conception of Nature (as Stone explicates it) as initially constituted by the 
division of its two elements of thought and matter, and progressing through a 
process of the gradual unification of this opposition.42 Thus we find a common 
thread in Burbidge, Maker and Stone in their identifying a division or exteriority 
of some form between thought and matter, or the conceptual and the real, as 
fundamental to Hegel’s account of Nature and its relationship to the rest of his 
system. Although Stone, by virtue of her metaphysical idealist interpretation, 
casts this division as much weaker and more subtle than the sheer alien otherness 
of Logic and Nature found in Burbidge and Maker, this residual non-idealist 
element sets her position apart from that which will be argued for below.  
Whereas Stone interprets the Idea as a set of “forms of thought that 
organize reality,” which in the course of Nature’s development are “instantiated 
in, or combined with, matter in increasingly harmonious ways”43, this study will 
argue that Hegel’s absolute idealism does not indicate only that the Idea’s forms 
find necessary instantiation in matter, but that the Idea has no ‘other’ except that 
which it itself produces in its self-particularization, and matter is only a way in 
which the Idea exists. This position can be seen as the inverse of Hahn’s fully 
naturalistic reading in the sense that whereas Hahn attempts to remove the 
dualism of the natural and conceptual domains by grounding everything in the 
natural, here it is suggested that the Idea is the One that produces Logic and 
 
40 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. 
Preface to the Second Edition, pp.36-37 
41 Stone, A. (2005). Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy. State University of New York 
Press. p.100 
42 Ibid. pp. xviii, 52, 100 
43 Ibid. p.58 
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Nature as modes of its existence and for which there are no natural ‘givens’ 
except that which it gives itself. 
These commentators consistently describe the content of the Idea as Logic 
as ‘thought’, conceived in a way which distinguishes this from ‘reality.’ Maker 
and Burbidge’s interpretations particularly, which emphasise the radical 
otherness of Nature to thought and the Idea, put forward a conception of the 
Idea comparable to that which Hegel regards as the Kantian understanding of 
the Notion44, that is, the Notion as not giving content to itself, but ‘finding’ it 
outside itself. However, as we will see below, Hegel describes the Idea as Logic 
as “the absolute, self-subsistent object, the logos, the reason of that which is, the 
truth of what we call things”45, the movement of which is the absolutely 
universal activity of reality’s self-determination and self-realization.46 The Idea is 
not limited to a domain of ‘thought’ distinguished from ‘reality’, and the move to 
Nature does not involve the Idea’s need to come to terms with or give scope to a 
reality outside itself. Rather, Hegel claims in the Logic that “logic exhibits the 
elevation of the Idea to that level from which it becomes the creator of nature”47, 
and again in the Philosophy of Nature that “creating is the activity of the absolute 
Idea.”48 
This study began by pointing out the special place Spinoza holds in 
Hegel’s conception of the history of philosophy, describing Spinoza’s theory of 
the unity of all reality in Substance as “the foundation of all true views” and “the 
essential commencement of all Philosophy.”49 In the context of the strongly 
metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy argued for here, the reasons 
for this high esteem of Spinoza are clear. As Macherey expresses particularly 
well, despite the disagreements between Hegel and Spinoza, “it is incontestable 
that Hegel and Spinoza met one another,” and even if they do not travel the same 
path, “it remains a fact that their paths crossed, connecting at certain moments in 
order to separate in strongly opposing directions. … It is these that explain the 
 
44 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. 
p.593 
45 Ibid. Preface to the Second Edition, pp.38-39 
46 Ibid. p.826 
47 Ibid. p.592 
48 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. §247, 
Zusatz 
49 Hegel, G.W.F. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy: Volume Three. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. pp.257-258 
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strange feeling of familiarity all Hegelian readers of Spinoza experience, as do all 
Spinozist readers of Hegel.”50 
However, as Macherey emphasises repeatedly in Hegel or Spinoza, the 
meeting point of Hegel and Spinoza is also the site of their confrontation and 
opposition, presenting us with “a real alternative” at precisely the points at 
which these philosophies intertwine.51 Having focused in chapters two to five on 
the core architecture of Spinoza’s system and how this is reflected in Substance’s 
expression as extended Nature, we are now in a position to flesh out the 
Hegelian side of this ‘real alternative’ in the context of the philosophy of Nature. 
The next three chapters will develop a fuller Hegelian critique of the deficiencies 
of Spinoza’s account of extended Nature, as summarised at the conclusion of 
chapter five, by giving a detailed interpretation of Hegel’s derivation of the 
existence of Nature, its fundamental structural distinction from the Idea’s 
existence as Logic, and the further immanent development of the concepts of 
mechanics from this. 
 
 
50 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. p.10 
51 Ibid. p.73 
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7.1 - Preparatory remark 
 
The systematic character of Hegel’s philosophy is such that no subject matter can 
come up for consideration without having been derived as the necessary 
development of the preceding stage of the system. Hegel does not give an 
account of Nature because he finds it given to him in experience; rather, he 
argues that Nature follows necessarily from the culmination of Logic. This 
presents an issue for anyone seeking to write about Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, 
in that the full justification for the existence of Nature and its first form, space, 
from which the rest of the account of Nature will develop, lies in the several 
hundred pages of Hegel’s Science of Logic. The multitude of logical categories 
traversed in this work ultimately develop into a single category, ‘absolute Idea’, 
which contains them all and has no other content than the totality of these 
categories. Nature emerges from this absolute Idea, and so the absolute Idea 
must be understood in order to grasp this transition. However, a full grasp of the 
absolute Idea relies upon a complete account of Hegel’s Science of Logic, a work 
not only of considerable length and complexity, but concerning which there is 
much continuing debate over even its most basic aspects.  
In the face of this, one option would be to lay down the condition that any 
study of Hegel’s philosophy of Nature must be preceded by a full account of the 
Logic. However, this would effectively preclude any writing on his philosophy of 
Nature not underpinned by what would likely amount to thousands of pages of 
commentary, and rule out any comprehension of the philosophy of Nature 
without years of preparatory study of the Logic. Thankfully, although a fully 
systematic understanding of Hegel’s philosophy would indeed demand this, it is 
possible, for the sake of practicality and making available Hegel’s rich thought on 
the natural universe, to forego a comprehensive study of the Science of Logic with 
a modest and acceptable cost to philosophical rigour.  
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The chief thesis that will need to be granted to Hegel in order to make 
such an entrance into his philosophy of Nature possible is that a full 
understanding of the structure of Logic reveals it to develop into the absolute 
Idea. Importantly, it is not necessary for us to take for granted that his account of 
Logic up to the absolute Idea is completely without error. What is required, 
rather, is that Hegel be correct with regard to certain key structural claims, as will 
be laid out below. This is not to say that the course of the Logic up to this point is 
a matter of contingency, for Hegel will in fact draw on multiple findings from the 
Logic in his account of Nature. The point, rather, is that the study of Hegel’s 
philosophy of Nature does not commit us to blind orthodoxy in our view of the 
Logic. We can have a great many points of disagreement with the details of 
Hegel’s Logic without at all rendering his thought on Nature untenable. Further, 
although an account of why Logic develops into the absolute Idea is beyond the 
bounds practically available to this study, this does not mean that it is not 
possible to explain what the absolute Idea is. This can fairly be called a modest 
cost to philosophical rigour because although the explanation for why the system 
has led to this point is lacking, one is not being asked to have faith in the 
existence of something thereby made incomprehensible.  
 
 
7.2 - Absolute Idea 
 
The Notion comprises the third and final major conceptual structure of Logic, 
preceded by Being and Essence. However, though the Notion can be said to 
result from the development of Being and Essence, the Notion is nonetheless 
“their foundation and truth as the identity in which they are submerged and 
contained.”1 The Notion is absolutely universal, purely self-related and has no 
exteriority, but it is nonetheless not a “trivial, empty identity.”2 Rather it is a 
negative self-relation, and this moment of negativity gives it internal determinacy 
and differentiation.3 Though Hegel makes clear that we are still in the sphere of 
pure thought and not yet physical objects, nonetheless he calls the Notion “the 
 
1 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. p.577 
2 Ibid. p.592 
3 Ibid. pp.582-583 
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absolute, self-subsistent object, the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of 
what we call things.”4 
However, the apprehension of this totality as such, an “absolute form” 
that “has in its own self its content or reality”, is as yet only a formal or abstract 
truth, which must be made actual by showing concretely how the Notion 
produces this reality, or determinate being, “from its own resources.”5 The 
exposition of this derivation of determinacy from the Notion constitutes the final 
part of the Logic, and the ‘Idea’ is the term Hegel gives this union of the Notion 
with the reality demonstrated as its own.6 ‘Absolute Idea’ in turn signifies the 
culmination of this process of bringing the Notion from its first emergence as the 
all-embracing totality ‘in-itself’ or in principle to its full and explicit actuality.  
As the absolute Idea, the Notion encapsulates the totality of being, in the 
sense that it “is everything (der Begriff alles … ist)” and its movement (Bewegung) 
is the absolutely universal activity (Tätigkeit) of reality’s self-determination and 
self-realization.7 The content of the absolute Idea, the particularity into which this 
negative universality determines itself, is the full system of concepts articulated 
in the course of Logic, which can now be seen to all fold back into the unity of the 
one Idea. Further, it becomes explicit at this point that the whole series of 
categories leading up to the Idea has, from the start, been implicitly the 
development of this absolute. Each stage traversed in the development of Logic 
has been “an image of the Absolute (ein Bild des Absoluten)”8, a manifestation of 
it which was not fully developed. In the progress of the immanent derivation of 
the categories which has led from the absolutely minimal and indeterminate 
thought of pure being to the Idea, it was not at all clear that what was being 
considered were the particular forms of one universal. However, having reached 
this universal, we can see that this unity was the true nature of the categories all 
along, only now made explicit and actual.  
From the perspective of the end, it can be seen that the indeterminacy of 
pure being with which the Logic began was not a bare abstraction, but actually 
 
4 Ibid. Preface to the Second Edition, pp.38-39 
5 Ibid. pp.591-592 
6 Ibid. p.587 
7 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. 
p.826; Hegel, G.W.F. (1970). Werke 6. Suhrkamp Verlag. p.551 
8 Hegel, G.W.F., Geraets, T.F., Suchting, W.A., & Harris, H.S. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of 
the Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences with the Zusätze. Indianapolis: Hackett. §237, Zusatz; Hegel, 
G.W.F. (1970). Werke 8. Suhrkamp Verlag. p.389 
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the full concrete totality in an undeveloped, implicit form yet to be unfolded into 
its complete actuality. Pure being has proved itself logically to develop 
immanently into the full system of concepts which comprises the absolute Idea, 
and having reached the absolute Idea we can now see that the immediacy with 
which we began is in fact a being-in-itself yet to acquire its being-for-itself. The 
beginning and the end are the same, with the exception that the latter has its 
content fully articulated and developed. Insofar as we have been dealing with the 
in-itself of the Notion, every stage and advance has been the exposition of the 
absolute with which we unknowingly began.9 
One way in which it may be helpful to picture the architecture Hegel is 
suggesting is as a fourfold inclusion eliding into one: firstly, all determinations of 
the Idea are immanently contained within the absolute simplicity of the 
beginning of logic; secondly, all the determinations of the Idea are further 
determinations of this absolute beginning, thereby themselves containing this 
and carrying it forward; thirdly, the ultimate totality contains and unifies all 
preceding determinations; and fourthly, the totality is also itself contained in 
undeveloped form in all of these determinations. But what would seem to be the 
two poles of this structure, the initial simplicity further determining itself 
outward and the final totality gathering all the determinations back inward, are 
in fact one, unified as the in-itself and for-itself of one absolute Idea. 
This interpretation is supported by many of Hegel’s comments, but 
particularly his claim that Logic’s advance is, in fact, “a retreat into the ground ... 
with which the beginning is made” and it is essential “that the whole of the 
science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also 
the first.”10 The notion of cross-inclusions forming a circle is also suggested by 
Hegel’s remarks in the Encyclopaedia Logic that each part of philosophy is itself a 
whole, “a circle that closes upon itself,” in which the Idea is “in a particular 
determinacy or element,” but each circle ultimately breaks beyond this restriction 
of particularity because “it is inwardly [the] totality” and becomes the ground for 
the next circle in the Idea’s development. The whole is described as a circle of 
 
9 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. p.829 
10 Ibid. p.71 
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circles, each a necessary moment, together constituting the Idea which, 
conversely, also appears in all of them.11  
Although the absolute Idea is the universal, it is not so in an abstract form 
which stands over against the differentiation of its particular content. Rather, it is 
a concrete, negative universal which ‘sublates’ its internal differences, meaning 
that they no longer have the character of standing opposed to and separate from 
one another, but are now configured as differentiated moments of a single whole. 
The course of the Logic has constituted a dialectic whereby the categories have 
shown themselves to come into necessary relations with one other of 
progressively more complex kinds, ultimately leading to their unity as the 
diverse moments of the absolute Idea.12 
The absolute Idea has an immediate, singular self-identity, an 
“impenetrable atomic subjectivity (undurchdringliche, atome Subjektivität)”13, 
since it is the totality of all determinations and these are emphatically its 
moments. But, at the same time, it contains internal opposition and 
differentiation, for its status as ‘absolute’ depends precisely on its containing and 
bringing to unity the full series of determinations developed in the Logic, each of 
which maintains its full content.14 However, although the particular categories 
have a dynamic structure of differentiation and transition into each other, the 
absolute Idea itself does not undergo transition. This is because, as the totality of 
all determinations, no determinacy arises for it which is not part of itself.15  
Halper points out that this structure is key to understanding the 
emergence of the concept of Nature and describes it through a distinction 
between the form and content of the absolute Idea. He identifies its content as the 
totality of Logic’s categories and its form as its determinate character as this 
totality. The union of form and content in the absolute Idea is crucial to its 
qualifying as the final category of logic, since its individuality is just the totality 
of the transformations of all preceding categories. Importantly, though, it is also 
different from any other category, being a ‘single universal’, as Halper describes 
 
11 Hegel, G.W.F., Geraets, T.F., Suchting, W.A., & Harris, H.S. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I 
of the Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences with the Zusätze. Indianapolis: Hackett. §15 
12 Ibid. §213, Remark 
13 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. 
p.824; Hegel, G.W.F. (1970). Werke 6. Suhrkamp Verlag. p.549 
14 Ibid. 
15 Hegel, G.W.F., Geraets, T.F., Suchting, W.A., & Harris, H.S. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I 
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it, distinguished from the categories contained within it and their conceptual 
transformations. Unlike the other categories encountered thus far, the absolute 
Idea does not transform itself into a new concept, and this is because it already 
contains its own transformation. Transformation does not affect it, because it is 
itself transformation, in the sense that the absolute Idea is the self-unfolding of all 
the categories of logic. In this respect, Halper claims the absolute Idea is in fact 
indifferent and external to the process of transformation that logic is, and it is 
alone among the logical categories in not developing. Indeed, it is this externality 
of the form of the absolute Idea from its content, the fact that the absolute Idea, in 
Halper’s words, “in being just what it is, is also something else”, that Halper 
suggests releases the concept of Nature out of the closure of Logic, as we shall 
examine below. 16  
 
 
7.3 - Absolute Method 
 
From the perspective of the absolute Idea it is also possible to lay out an ‘absolute 
method’, Hegel’s description of which will prove useful in understanding his 
sparse account of the movement from Logic to Nature. As already discussed 
above, the ‘method’ of Hegel’s Logic is one of simple immanence, avoiding 
presuppositions about the nature, relationships or progression of the categories 
of thought. Strictly speaking, pure being was not, from the perspective of that 
stage, the ‘beginning’ of Logic, as it was yet to be determined what, if anything, 
this category might immanently develop into. However, from the perspective 
reached at Absolute Idea it is possible to look back on the path traversed and see 
the developmental structure that has been cyclically working itself through, and 
it is this general structure that Hegel calls absolute method. 
The absolute method gives only a general characterisation of the way in 
which concepts come to immanently transform their content and cannot be taken 
as a structure to be laid on top of the content being examined. As has already 
been established, the method is simply the necessary movement of the content 
itself, and the general structure of the absolute method is simply what, looking 
 
16 Halper, E. ‘The Logic of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Nature, Space and Time’ in Houlgate, S. 
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back retrospectively, the path of development of the Idea through its various 
determinations has proved to be through the course of the Logic. The proof that 
this structure obtains in any individual case is wholly reliant on the close 
examination of the way in which the particular concepts immanently determine 
themselves, and it is entirely illegitimate to appeal to the general structure of the 
absolute method as laid out at the end of the Logic as evidence for its own 
applicability in any individual example. At the end of the Logic it is possible to 
look back and observe that this is the structure that has been taken by the 
progress of the Idea, but the progress of the Idea has not been guided by this 
structure as if it existed beforehand as the blueprint of Logic.17 
Concerning the beginning of the absolute method, Hegel tells us this is an 
immediacy, and specifically an immediacy of pure thought, a notion which is 
simple and universal.18 But this determinateness of the beginning as simple and 
universal “is itself the determinateness by reason of which it is deficient 
(mangelhaft).”19 Simple universality is but a one-sided moment of the Notion 
which does not represent it as it is ‘for itself’, or in its full actuality. Importantly, 
the concept is not driven beyond this immediacy by an external impetus or 
imposition. Rather, the immediacy of the beginning is deficient in its own self, in 
its own conceptual structure, and thus itself has the “urge (Triebe) to carry itself 
further.”20 Again, though, this ‘urge’ should be understood as a purely immanent 
movement in the concept itself and not implying a teleological trajectory formally 
dictating its development from the start. 
Describing the movement from the first stage of immediate simplicity, 
Hegel tells us the universal “shows itself to be the other of itself”21, meaning that 
when its content is fully thought through, the immediate actually turns out to be 
mediated, that is, to be intrinsically related to an other, and the universal is found 
to be a particular alongside another particularity. What appears at the beginning 
as an abstract affirmation of being is in fact “negation (Negation), positedness 
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(Gesetztsein), mediatedness (Vermitteltsein) in general.”22 As the dialectic 
progresses, it becomes explicit that what appeared as a simple immediacy is not 
really so at all, but one moment taken or ‘posited’ in abstraction when in truth it 
is intrinsically interrelated with other concepts. 
This second term to the initial immediacy is its negative, in the sense that 
it is particular and mediated rather than immediate and universal. It may appear 
as a result that the first, immediate determination has been wiped away 
altogether in this transition. Our usual way of thinking finds it obvious that, 
upon finding something to be particular, its status as a universal is simply lost, 
revealed as a mistake. Contrary to this, Hegel maintains that the negative of 
immediacy is not empty negativity or nothingness, but instead a determinate 
negation, the negation of immediacy, and is therefore a mediation, containing the 
first determination of immediacy within itself. As a result, the beginning is 
preserved even through its transition, though in a sublated form now brought 
into relation with its opposite. This structure of holding the positive and negative 
together and not allowing one to simply destroy the other is described by Hegel 
as “the most important feature in rational cognition.”23 In the progression from 
the beginning, its immediacy and universality are reduced to a moment in 
relation to the other negative moment of particularity and mediation that arises 
in it. Hegel calls this relation of distinct, opposed determinacies “the moment of 
reflection (Moment der Reflexion).”24  
In the third stage of the absolute method, the opposition of these contrary 
particular determinations is sublated and they become related as ideal moments 
of one unity. The content of each moment is preserved, but made ‘ideal’ in the 
sense that they are now understood to have no real independent reality of each 
other, instead being intrinsically interrelated as moments of one whole.25  
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7.4 - From Logic to Nature 
 
We can now approach the question of why the absolute Idea gives rise to Nature, 
described in the introduction to the Philosophy of Nature as “the Idea in the form 
of otherness (Andersseins)” or the Idea that is “the negative of itself (das Negative 
ihrer selbst), or is external to itself (sich äuβerlich).”26 The first step in this 
development is that, in reaching the absolute Idea, Logic withdraws back into the 
simple unity with which it began in pure being. This is because, as the Idea that 
relates itself only to itself, that holds together within itself all the determinations 
of Logic and is all of these determinations, “it is therefore the simple self-relation 
that is being (die einfache Beziehung auf sich, welche Sein ist).”27 It would be wrong 
to say that the absolute Idea has become identical once again with the total 
indeterminacy of pure being, because it is now in fact maximally determinate, 
possessing all possible logical determinations in a concrete totality. The key 
point, though, is that despite now possessing this completeness of internal 
content, the absolute Idea folds back down into a simple immediacy, one Idea 
that is all that there is.28 Hegel comments earlier in the Science of Logic that in 
Logic the internal differences of the Idea are “not yet otherness (Anderssein)” but 
remain perfectly ‘transparent’ (durchsichtig) and self-integrated.29 In light of this, 
it becomes more apparent why the absolute Idea should contract into simple 
being. Having reached the absolute Idea we can see that, from the perspective of 
this totality, the differentiated logical categories in fact lack Anderssein, other-
being, and are but different aspects of one being in ‘simple self-relation’, the 
absolute Idea.  
But how does a conceptual structure lacking otherness progress to one 
defined by its otherness? Hegel’s descriptions of the progression from the 
absolute Idea as simple being to the Idea as Nature are infamously condensed 
and cryptic. Indeed, by themselves the handful of paragraphs directly devoted to 
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this development provide but the skeleton of an account. However, if read 
closely and in tandem with the account of the absolute method immediately 
preceding them, Hegel’s remarks strongly suggest a particular structure of 
explanation for which it is possible for us to provide the missing detail.  
Turning first, then, to the structure that can be ascertained from Hegel’s 
descriptions, his first claim in the Science of Logic concerning the development 
from this new immediacy is that despite having achieved systematic totality as 
absolute Idea, the Idea is at this point purely logical, “enclosed within pure 
thought”, and is now the “urge (Trieb) to sublate this.”30 As we saw earlier, when 
describing the immediate beginning of the absolute method Hegel claimed this 
was logically deficient in its own self and had the “urge (Triebe) to carry itself 
further.”31 This pattern in Hegel’s use of ‘Trieb’ gives us our first piece of 
evidence that he conceives the emergence of Nature from absolute Idea to be a 
further instantiation of the dialectical pattern of absolute method. Specifically, as 
we will see in more detail as we proceed below, if this interpretation is correct, 
the simple, universal immediacy which the absolute Idea collapses into will show 
itself to be the negative of the absolute Idea.  
The Encyclopaedia Logic provides strong further evidence for this way of 
thinking about the general structure of the development from absolute Idea. 
Hegel tells us in the principal section on this point, §244, that as simple being 
“the Idea is posited (gesetzt) in the one-sided determination of immediacy or 
negation.”32 The description here of the Idea as ‘posited’ (gesetzt) in this 
determination links up well with Hegel’s description, six sections earlier in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, of the absolute method’s movement from the initial stage of 
immediacy. As we saw above, in this movement what initially appears as the 
abstract affirmation of being comes to be understood as “negation, positedness 
(Gestztsein), mediatedness in general”33, that is, one moment posited in 
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abstraction from its necessary relation with other concepts. We can see this 
dynamic being played out in §244 in Hegel’s claim that the determination of the 
Idea as immediate is one-sided, indicating there is in fact another ‘side’ of the 
logical determination at hand which the simple being of the Idea is actually, 
when properly understood, in mediation with.  
This of course raises the question as to what this other determination is 
which must be thought alongside the Idea’s simple immediacy. The brevity of 
Hegel’s account here is frustrating, but there is evidence, both textual and from 
reasoning through the dialectic, to suggest we should identify the absolute Idea’s 
simple immediacy as its universality and the other determination as its 
particularity or otherness. Hegel ends §244 with the claim that “in the absolute 
truth of itself” the absolute Idea “resolves to release (entlassen) out of itself into 
freedom the moment of its particularity or of the initial determining and 
otherness.”34 When taken in conjunction with the claim, earlier in the same 
paragraph, that “the Idea is posited (gesetzt) in the one-sided determination of 
immediacy or negation”35, the most logical way to read these remarks is to take 
the moment of particularity or otherness as the opposing moment to the moment 
of immediacy, or simple universality.  
Further textual evidence in support of this interpretation comes from the 
introduction to the Philosophy of Nature, where Hegel claims that “The totality of 
the disjunction of the Notion exists in Nature as a tetrad because the first term is 
the universal as such, and the second, or the difference (Unterscheid), appears 
itself as a duality.”36 Leaving aside for the moment the significance of Hegel’s 
characterising Nature as a tetrad, it is clear that he regards the general conceptual 
structure of Nature as having two major terms: the universal and the difference, 
otherness or particularity. In order for Nature to have these determinations in 
disjunction, this arrangement must arise immanently from the logic of the 
preceding concept, absolute Idea, and interpreting the absolute Idea as 
contracting into a simple universality confronted by an opposing moment of 
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particularity clearly paves the road for this, though a full account of the dialectic 
is still forthcoming.  
In addition to this textual evidence as to Hegel’s line of thought, thinking 
through the dialectic for ourselves (something we should, of course, always be 
doing) gives us good reason to identify the terms issuing from the absolute Idea 
as the universal and the particular. Given the nature of the absolute Idea as the 
universal harmonizing all the particular determinations of Logic, the contraction 
of the absolute Idea into simple universality necessarily leaves particularity as 
the other determination set against it. As noted above, the development of 
concepts does not result in the negation of their previous content, but in its being 
brought into new arrangements. The Idea progressively becomes more concrete 
and determinate with each development, rather than being demolished and built 
anew at every step. Thus, the moment of particularity, which was essential to the 
absolute Idea’s nature as the concrete unity of all particularity in one universal, 
does not vanish but now stands in opposition to the contracted form of the Idea 
as simple being. The structure of absolute Idea is such that it collapses into 
simple immediacy, apparently eschewing Anderssein from itself. However, 
otherness (sublated otherness, but otherness nonetheless) played a key role in 
making the absolute Idea absolute, that is, the unification of all the particular 
logical determinations into one. The contraction of the absolute Idea into simple 
being does not smother out this particularity or otherness, but releases it, or 
uncouples it from its unity with the universal. 
Hegel ends §244 with the claim that “in the absolute truth of itself” the 
absolute Idea “resolves to release (entlassen) out of itself into freedom the moment of 
its particularity or of the initial determining and otherness, [i.e.,] the immediate 
Idea as its reflexion (Widerschein), or itself as Nature.”37 This passage indicates a 
number of points worth bringing into view before we attempt to tie everything 
together. It is notable here that in the Geraets, Suchting and Harris translation of 
the Encyclopaedia Logic they translate Hegel’s term ‘Reflection’, referring as 
discussed above to the moment of opposition emerging from an initial 
immediacy, simply as ‘reflection’. But they translate Hegel’s use of ‘Widerschein’ 
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as ‘reflexion’, a potentially questionable choice since in English there is no 
generally established distinction between ‘reflection’ and ‘reflexion’. 
‘Widerschein’ is a compound of ‘wider’, meaning ‘contra’, ‘anti’, ‘versus’ or 
‘opposed to’, and ‘Schein’, best understood here as meaning ‘appearance’. Thus 
the immediate Idea is characterized here by Hegel as the ‘opposing appearance’ 
of the absolute Idea. Minimally, we can interpret this as indicating the immediate 
Idea is the negation of the absolute Idea, and, given its origin, therefore the 
absolute Idea’s self-negation. Further, this immediate Idea is clearly identified 
here as Nature. Indeed, as we find in the addition to §244, Hegel is reported to 
have emphasised this point, claiming “now we have the Idea as being; and this 
Idea that is, is Nature (die Idee als Sein; diese seiende Idee aber ist die Natur).”38 
This is significant in making more explicit the specific arrangement Hegel 
has in mind for the concepts of (1) absolute Idea, (2) the simple, immediate 
universality of absolute Idea, and (3) its particularity. Hegel’s suggestion is not 
that the absolute Idea becomes simple being and then Nature is the particularity 
opposed to it. Rather, the absolute Idea freely releases itself into simple being and 
particularity, allowing these sides to fall apart. In doing so, the absolute Idea 
becomes the negative of itself, Nature. Further, in describing the emergence of 
Nature as the ‘absolute truth’ of the absolute Idea in §244, Hegel makes clear that 
Nature results from and is made necessary by the structure of absolute Idea itself. 
Nature is what absolute Idea proves to be. The negation of the simple being of 
the absolute Idea into particularity and otherness is precisely what Nature is, 
namely the Idea in the form of otherness spoken of at the beginning of the 
Philosophy of Nature.  
Hegel’s talk of ‘freedom’ here may come across as puzzling. Indeed, 
Welchman has suggested it is not obvious that the Idea’s act of positing Nature is 
in fact free.39 However, this claim is made clearer in the Science of Logic in the 
course of his explaining the related point that the absolute Idea has not become a 
simple being nor transitioned into it, since the nature of the absolute Idea is such 
that there is no longer any determination that is not already part of its totality. 
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Rather, Hegel describes this as “an absolute liberation (absolute Befreiung)” in the 
“freedom (Freiheit)” of which “no transition takes place.”40 The notion of 
freedom here should not be interpreted as suggesting the absolute Idea has a 
personified form of free choice or whim, but rather as a metaphorical way of 
expressing the fact that since the absolute Idea is all that there is, there is no 
possible other to determine it, and so it is perfectly free in the sense of being 
completely and explicitly self-determining. The logical process is one of 
necessity, not contingency or caprice, but it is the necessity of the absolute Idea 
itself. In determining itself as simple being, the Idea does not meet with an other 
to itself in any sense and “abides with itself (bei sich selbst bleibende)” in this 
determination.41 Rather than a becoming or a transition, Hegel suggests we 
should understand the determination of absolute Idea as being as the Idea ‘freely 
releasing’ itself “in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise (ihrer absolut 
sicher und in sich ruhend).”42 Further, this makes clear that the emergence of the 
concept of Nature does not involve the absolute Idea ‘encountering’ an other 
from outside it, such as the givenness of an externally existing material universe, 
but rather involves a self-determination of the absolute Idea alone.  
The basic structure Hegel has in mind for the way Nature emerges from 
absolute Idea can thus be made out reasonably clearly, constituting a 
continuation of the general dialectical pattern that has worked itself through in 
various forms up to this point at the end of the Logic. The structure of this next 
dialectical movement will of course be different to any seen thus far since we are 
dealing, firstly, with the self-determination of an absolute totality, and secondly, 
therefore, with an absolutely free determination. But nonetheless we can see an 
already familiar pattern cycling round again in the sense that immediacy is 
revealed to be in necessary mediation with particularity.  
 However, no matter how clear this framework might be, without the 
support of a detailed account of the reason why the simple being of absolute Idea 
necessarily develops in this way, it demonstrates nothing whatsoever. If the 
Hegelian standpoint is to present a compelling critique of Spinoza as failing to 
properly show the derivation of material Nature from the Substance, then this is 
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a vital point in the Hegelian system to press for a full explanation and not allow 
Hegel’s fragmentary account to slip by. If the Hegelian standpoint is to assert 
that it can show the derivation of Nature, and thereby overcome an issue that 
presents a stubborn problem for Spinozism, then this is a juncture at which a full 
and detailed demonstration is key. 
As already discussed above, our examination must always turn to the 
particular logical development of the concepts at hand, rather than using the 
absolute method as an external plan forced on the content. Reference to the 
absolute method alone proves nothing. Unfortunately, this detail is precisely 
what is lacking in Hegel’s treatment of the emergence of the concept of Nature. 
This is not to say that Hegel himself made the logical error of thinking that the 
general indication he does give was sufficient. The reason why the account he 
gives of this part of the system (or at least that which has survived for us to 
examine) is so brief is beyond the scope of this work to speculate upon. Whatever 
the reason, however, it does now fall to us to work out what the precise detail of 
the dialectic consists in, and this is what we shall now attempt. In the course of 
interpreting Hegel’s somewhat fragmented remarks some of the major 
landmarks of a full account have already been anticipated, but these various 
strands now need to be pulled together. 
Despite the apparent obscurity and unhelpful brevity of much of Hegel’s 
account of the emergence of the concept of Nature from the absolute Idea, this in 
fact manifests the principle most pervasive to the Logic leading up to it and 
indeed Hegel’s philosophy as a whole; namely, that something, in being most 
purely and absolutely what it is, in fact thereby becomes the negative of itself. 
Hegel makes clear that a key part of what is distinctive about the absolute Idea is 
that simple immediate universality is present in it only as an abstract one-sided 
moment, sublated within its concrete unity of the universal and the particularity 
of Logic’s determinations.43 The absolute Idea is the intensively concrete, 
oppositional and dynamic system of interrelated particular determinations which 
constitute it, the unity of all the preceding determinations of Logic into one. 
However, in taking the form of this single Idea containing all determinations as 
part of itself, the absolute Idea possesses an immediate self-relation, and so 
 




contracts into simple being. The absolute Idea is not a totality of simple, universal 
identity, but one characterised by internal particularity, tension, negativity, 
opposition, transition and mediation. As noted above, the moment of otherness is 
key to making the absolute Idea the complete totality that it is. As a result, this 
collapse of the absolute Idea into simple being is in fact the negation of the 
absolute Idea, and, given the absolute Idea’s complete freedom and singularity, 
specifically the free self-negation of the absolute Idea. The truth of the 
culmination of the sphere of Logic in absolute Idea thus proves to be the free 
dissolution its own absolute universality, negating itself into the Idea as Nature.  
At this point it is vital to remember a key principle of Hegel’s conception 
of thought, the one which, as we saw above, he calls “the most important feature 
in rational cognition”44, namely, holding positive and negative determinations 
together as they arise. We must not conceive the advance of a concept as 
automatically destroying or simply leaving behind that which it negates and 
progresses from, but rather bringing the original determination forward into a 
new formulation and relationship with its negative.  
In light of this, we can see why the absolute Idea becoming the negative 
of itself does not result in the death of the Idea or the birth of a separated new 
domain of reality as material nature. Hegel calls Nature “the Idea in the form of 
otherness”45 because the formation of the concept of Nature does not involve the 
erasure of the Idea but the determinations of the Idea being brought into a new 
arrangement and structure. More specifically, even though the absolute Idea has 
become the negative of itself, it remains the one Idea and thus the one totality 
and one all-inclusive reality. It also remains the case that universality and 
particularity are determinations of this reality. However, the relationship 
between these determinations has changed dramatically. In the absolute Idea 
universality and particularity were held together in unity, but this Idea has now 
contracted into a simple universality, a one-sided determination lacking the 
moment of Anderssein. This moment of otherness or particularity has not 
arbitrarily vanished, however, but now stands apart as the opposing moment to 
simple universality. Universality and particularity therefore fall asunder, and this 
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is what Hegel is referring to when he claims that the absolute Idea ‘freely 
releases’ its particularity.  
To be as clear as possible about why it is these determinations come apart, 
if the Idea is the unity or immanent interconnectedness of its moments, then the 
negation of the Idea (that the Idea itself proves to be when it proves to be simple 
being) must consist in the negation of this interconnectedness.46 The notion of the 
Idea’s freely releasing its particularity “in its absolute self-assurance and inner 
poise”47 is significant in that it emphasises that this is the Idea’s necessary logical 
development, and that the Idea is Nature because of what it is and proves to be, 
rather than because it ‘fails’ in some sense to maintain itself as the absolute Idea. 
As just mentioned, this release does not initiate the emergence of a 
separate sphere of particularity ‘outside’ the Idea. The Idea is still the one reality 
and all universality and particularity is still its universality and particularity. The 
falling apart of universality and particularity and the externality of each from one 
another and also of the particulars from each other must thus be conceived 
alongside their being determinations of the one Idea. This is why Hegel calls 
Nature the Idea as “external to itself” or self-external.48 Self-externality is the only 
form particularity can logically take given that the unity of universal and 
particular in the absolute Idea has collapsed but the Idea remains all that there is. 
The Idea must therefore be external to itself, inwardly self-external, rather than 
something becoming external to it.  
It is important to clarify at this point what the particularity is that we are 
speaking of here. It might be tempting to answer that it is the set of particular 
logical determinations that composed the absolute Idea. However, there is good 
reason to reject this interpretation. The particular determinations developed 
through the course of Logic cannot stand in a relation of externality from each 
other and from universality because doing this would involve them ceasing to be 
the very determinations which they are. For example, if pure being ceased to 
spontaneously vanish into pure nothing and vice versa then pure being and 
nothing would not be what they are. More broadly, it has been the general result 
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of the Logic that the categories necessarily do not stand external to each other but 
transition into one another and come into relations of various kinds, ultimately 
developing into the universal absolute Idea. In other words, the course of the 
Logic shows that universality is intrinsically necessary to the particular logical 
determinations, and as a result this particularity cannot be the self-externality 
made necessary by the absolute Idea’s free dissolution.  
 So what then is this particularity? The answer is that this is not yet 
determined and will now become the subject matter of the Philosophy of Nature. 
We know the Idea to necessarily have particularity and difference within it. This, 
to reiterate the point once more, has not been lost through the Idea becoming the 
negative of itself. However, this particularity cannot be that which the Idea 
possessed as ‘internal’ to itself, in Logic, for we have advanced now into a new 
conceptual sphere, that of self-externality, Nature. This new sphere will have to 
develop and show for itself the nature of its particularity, and it is because of this 
particularity’s initially undetermined state (though not utterly indeterminate, 
since we do know that this particularity must have the character of self-
externality for example) that Hegel describes Space, the first category of Nature, 
as having only a “still quite abstract” form of asunderness and containing within 




7.5 – The Necessity of Nature 
 
Our consideration of Spinoza’s philosophy of extended Nature showed, among 
other things, that to Hegelian eyes his explanation of why Substance necessarily 
exists as Extension is very limited. In this chapter it has been shown in detail how 
a Hegelian standpoint can avoid this deficiency, explaining in detail the self-
determination of the absolute Idea as Nature. The immanent negativity of the 
Idea has been shown to play a crucial role in this fuller account of the necessity of 
Nature, in line with Hegel’s tracing the root of the problem of the genesis of 
determinacy in Spinoza’s thought back to his rejection of negativity, and 
 
49 Ibid. §254; Werke 9, p.41  
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negativity will maintain this importance in Hegel’s account of Nature’s further 
development.  
This of course as yet leaves Hegel with only the barest and most abstract 
form of Nature as self-externality, a far cry from even the most fundamental 
structure of Spinoza’s account of Extension, motion and rest, let alone the full 
picture of the mechanical world which this underpins. However, from the 
Hegelian standpoint, this derivation of the necessity of Nature as such represents 
a major advance over what the Spinozist standpoint is capable of under the 
interpretation set out above.  
It has been important to give as much of the full detail of this 
development as is practical within the context of this study, because the power of 
the Hegelian position, and its avoiding falling into the same problem of 
determinacy it sees in Spinozism, resides precisely in the detail in which it can 
show the development of the Absolute’s self-determination, following through 
the labour of the Idea’s sometimes tortuous self-movement.  
A further reason for taking pains over the subtleties of this derivation is 
that the detail of the way we interpret this hinge-point in Hegel’s system 
dramatically affects our understanding of everything to come in the Philosophy of 
Nature. Looking ahead to chapter nine, the precise way we understand the 
progression from absolute Idea to Nature has profound consequences for our 
conception of the first form of Nature, space. As discussed briefly in chapter six, 
Maker argues, contrary to the interpretation argued for here, that Nature is to be 
understood as radically other to thought. From this, he goes on to suggest that, in 
its initial form as the self-externality of space, Hegel is attempting to recognise 
Nature’s genuine otherness from Logic’s self-determination by formulating 
Nature as a sheer givenness. When we conceive this givenness without 
determinate reference to something to which it is given or for which it exists, 
Maker argues that we arrive at the concept of self-subsisting outsideness, or 
externality. Externality is that which is always ‘different from’, but without there 
being a determinate other from which it is different. Maker argues, further, that 
in the first form of Nature as externality we have achieved the conception of a 
101 
 
non-self-determining determinacy which is nonetheless determinate in and for 
itself and able to maintain stable differentiation.50  
However, as we shall see in detail in chapter nine, this stable 
differentiation which Maker identifies with space is in fact, as a consequence of 
the interpretation of the move to Nature argued for above, precisely the 
determination space lacks. Further, it is space’s lack of stable determinacy that 
drives on the dialectical progression which, from a Hegelian perspective, results 
in a fuller account of the necessity of Nature’s mechanical determinations, 
including motion and rest, and of its existing as finite bodies, than that possible 
for Spinoza. 
The way that we understand space has consequences in turn for every 
further determination as the dialectical effects ripple out, as we will see through 
the course of chapter nine and again in chapter eleven. In Maker’s interpretation, 
as Nature’s radical otherness to thought is developed through to fuller 
determinacy, it gains determinations which are increasingly different from the 
sheer externality with which it began. Just as logical self-determination was led 
to think its other, sheer externality is also led beyond itself. This other is neither 
logical self-determination nor externality, but the further development of what is 
determinate in externality. This turns out to consist in modes of gradually greater 
degrees of independent self-subsistence, including the emergence of individual 
things. In Maker’s reading, as Nature gains greater determinacy through its 
development, this manifests itself in things gaining greater individual self-
subsistence. The trajectory of the dialectic of Nature thus runs opposed to that of 
Logic, in the sense that the progression of Logic showed determinacies to be not 
at all independent of one another or self-subsistent, but rather inextricably 
interconnected, whereas this intrinsic interconnection is absent from Nature’s 
radical externality.51  
The interpretation argued for in this study, that Logic and Nature, rather 
than being radically other, are two ways in which the one Idea shows itself to 
exist, unfolds into a very different picture of Nature’s development. As we will 
see in detail in chapter eleven, although Maker is correct that Nature moves on 
 
50 Maker, W. ‘The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel Is Not an Idealist’ in Houlgate, S. 
(ed.) (1998). Hegel and the philosophy of nature. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp.9-13 
51 Ibid. pp.18-19 
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from its sheer externality and comes to exist as individual things, as Hegel’s 
physics progresses into an account of the chemical processes and organisms, 
those bodies which appeared at one stage to be self-subsistent and independent 
show their being to be intrinsically bound up with and relative to their place 
within processes and unities. Far from Nature being an alien other, the Idea 
remains the foundation and ‘inner’ being of Nature and this self-determining, 
ideal unity, though at first only implicit in Nature’s externality, becomes 
gradually more explicit as it develops itself as Nature. This process of qualitative 
metamorphosis will result in a view of the structure of the natural world which 
poses a strong Hegelian critique of the mechanical and quantitative account 
Spinoza offers.  
Before turning to Hegel’s account of the specific forms of Nature which 
develop from its initial self-externality, in the next chapter we will look in more 
detail at the structural consequences of the emergence of Nature’s existence. This 
is a development in the Hegelian system which involves a structural change in 







Chapter 8 – The Idea as Nature  
 
 
Hegel argues that Nature is a specific phase in the Idea’s self-development, an 
overarching process which I will term the ‘macro-dialectic’ of the Idea. The move 
from Logic into Nature does not represent the end of the dialectic of Logic and 
the beginning of a new one, but is the moment when it becomes apparent that the 
whole of Logic has been but the first phase of a greater dialectic, the next phase of 
which is Nature. Logic, Nature and Spirit are the different moments of this 
macro-dialectic, meaning different phases (in a logical rather than chronological 
sense) of the Idea’s process of articulating and concretizing itself, in which the 
concepts involved, their complexity and their interrelation change. Hegel 
suggests these three moments of the Idea can be understood as the universal (das 
Allgemeine), the particular (das Besondere) and the individual (das Einzelne). The 
course of philosophy shows the eternal process of the Idea releasing itself from 
its pure inward unity and universality in Logic, to its self-external particularity in 
Nature, and finally returning back into itself in Spirit, manifesting itself as a free 
individuality which is the union of the universal and particular.1 
Crucially, the Idea has this macro-level structure only because this is the 
way it develops immanently through the course of its micro-dialectical 
movements. These latter developments are not the contingent or superfluous 
way in which some pre-existing grand plan of the Idea gets fulfilled but are the 
sole constituents of this movement through Logic, Nature and Spirit. Indeed, 
though these divisions do correspond to major conceptual shifts, it is a mistake to 
interpret the division of philosophy into these spheres as indicating their 
exteriority from one another. In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel warns that we 
must be careful not to represent the division of philosophy as if its parts lie “side 
by side”, immobile and substantial in their independence.2 To take the image 
Hegel himself uses many times, in truth the three circles of Logic, Nature and 
 
1 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. §247; 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1970). Werke 9. Suhrkamp Verlag. p.24 
2 Hegel, G.W.F., Geraets, T.F., Suchting, W.A., & Harris, H.S. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of 
the Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences with the Zusätze. Indianapolis: Hackett. §18, Remark 
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Spirit are but links in the chain of the one circle of the Idea unfolding itself out in 
these different phases of its activity.3 
This macro-dialectical process has no analogue in Spinoza’s thought. For 
Spinoza, Extension is one of an infinity of attributes in which Substance expresses 
itself in parallel, each of which is (in a logical rather than chronological sense) 
simultaneous and eternal, and which all share in an identical order and 
connection of modes. Further, though Substance expresses itself in an infinity of 
finite modes which come to be and cease to be, the structure of Substance as such 
does not undergo development or change, and does not exist in any other 
manner than in its purely positive, infinite unity. 
In contrast, what it means for the Idea to be the Idea, or to be the Absolute 
that it is, changes through the course of its self-development, becoming richer 
and more complex. The self-determination of the Idea as Nature is not just the 
genesis of particular expressions of the Idea, that is, particular ways in which an 
undisturbed unity of the Idea exists. Rather, this self-determination alters the 
structure of the Idea itself as it freely dissolves the harmonious interconnection of 
its moments, sundering itself into self-externality. This dissolution results in a 
complex relationship between the universality of the Idea and its particularity as 
natural objects, in comparison with which the union argued for by Spinoza 
between the universality of Substance and its existence as extended modes 
represents, from a Hegelian perspective, an inadequate conception of the 
specificity of Nature’s existence. 
On the one hand, Nature is fundamentally structured by the Idea, but on 
the other hand Nature also falls away from complete conformity with the Idea, 
with important consequences. Looking first at Nature’s harmony with the Idea, 
we see a strong continuation in the Philosophy of Nature of the relationship 
between Idea and Nature given in the Science of Logic in the section on absolute 
Idea, where Nature is described as one of the two major modes, the other being 
Spirit, in which the existence of the Idea becomes manifest.4 Hegel reaffirms 
clearly in the Philosophy of Nature that “Nature is one of the ways in which the 
 
3 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. 
Introduction, Zusatz, p.2; Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, 
N.Y: Humanity Books. pp.825, 842 
4 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. p.825 
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Idea manifests itself, and is a necessary mode of the Idea.”5 Indeed, the Idea is 
not only “immanent in Nature as such”6, but “present in each grade or level of 
Nature itself.”7 Further, it is the essential and distinctive metaphysical 
characteristic of Nature to be “the Idea in the form of otherness” and thus to be 
“essentially related to a first.”8 The Idea is the absolute metaphysical ground of 
Nature, that is, everything in Nature (with certain caveats to be introduced 
shortly below) is not only conditioned by and in conformity with the rational 
conceptual structures of the Idea, but has its “affirmative element”9, or is what it 
is, in virtue of its being a manifestation of the Idea and having the Idea manifest 
its structure through it. 
To see in more detail what Hegel means by this claim, we can turn to a 
discussion we find in the introduction to the Philosophy of Nature concerning the 
theoretical approach to Nature and the relationship between concepts and 
particular natural objects. Hegel remarks that it may seem, contrary to his view, 
that the theoretical approach to Nature is self-defeating, for what is sought is 
knowledge of Nature, but in thinking Nature, as opposed to perceiving it, it is 
made into something different than it actually is. The thinking of things 
transforms them into universals, like ‘the Lion as such’ to take Hegel’s example, 
but Nature is populated entirely by singular things, and such universals do not 
actually exist. Thus it may seem that instead of capturing things as they are, 
thought actually gives them a subjective, human character, making them 
something produced by us, “for natural objects do not think, and are not 
representations or thoughts.”10  
In contrast, by deriving Nature as the Idea in externality, Hegel is in a 
position to argue that the universal aspect of things is not a subjective addition, 
but “the noumenon, the true, objective, actual nature of things themselves.”11 
Hegel compares his conception of the reality of universals to Plato’s Forms, in the 
sense that these do not exist far off in some other realm, but are present in 
 
5 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. §247, 
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particular things as their true substantiality and foundation.12 A passage from the 
first Zusatz to §24 of the Encyclopaedia Logic is helpful in bringing further clarity 
to this standpoint of “true idealism.”13 Hegel reasons here that, in one sense, if in 
speaking of a particular animal we say ‘it is an animal’, it can be replied that 
‘animal as such’ does not exist, and cannot be pointed out. This is because 
‘animal’ refers to the universal nature of all animals, and each existing singular 
animal is a much more determinate particular. However, the universal nature of 
animality not only pertains to every particular animal but in fact constitutes its 
essential nature. Elaborating, Hegel claims that to deprive a dog of animality 
would render it impossible to say what it is. Things have an “äuβerliches 
Dasein”, an external ‘thereness’ or determinacy, which comes to be and passes 
away, but they also have a “persisting, inner nature” which is not just a common 
property between things but provides things with the substantial essence which 
makes them the kind of thing that they are.14 
Concepts are not removed into another metaphysical zone from things 
but actually supply their essential being and internal necessity, as opposed to the 
external necessity which provides their contingent characteristics. The ‘lion as 
such’ does not exist, but the network of conceptual structures, from determinate 
being, to finitude, to the self-perpetuating unity of life, which provide the 
necessary structures of any lion’s existence, are very much real and present in 
every lion. Indeed, these in fact provide its genuine and enduring reality, as 
opposed to the fleeting contingencies of the number of its hairs, its height, and so 
on. ‘True idealism’, as Hegel conceives it, asserts that the singular things present 
to sensuous intuition “are only a show, an appearance (Schein)”15, not in the sense 
that they do not exist, but in the sense that they are but transient phenomena 
which owe their substantial reality to the conceptual structures of the Idea, and 
indeed are what they are only through their being a manifestation of the Idea. 
In line with the interpretation of Spinoza’s thought developed in chapters 
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necessity acts within and as Nature, both finite and infinite, and not on it.16 
Substance does not externally act on or structure the infinity of finite modes; 
rather, Substance necessarily expresses its own being as infinitely many modes in 
infinitely many attributes. Further, the expression of Substance in its modes is not 
a realization or manifestation, because Substance does not precede or lie behind 
its modes as their ‘true reality’ or metaphysical foundation. Rather, Substance is 
nothing other than the immanent act of expressing itself immediately in an 
infinity of modes.17 
 Under the reading of Hegel’s thought argued for here, the Idea is 
certainly not acting externally on Nature, since this is a mode of the Idea’s own 
being and necessary activity. However, in Nature the relationship between the 
universality of the Idea and its particular determinations is different to that 
found in Logic. Whereas it is characteristic of the Idea as Logic, particularly in the 
form of absolute Idea, that the Idea’s universality and particularity exist in 
immediate unity, the Idea as Nature, conversely, is characterised by its self-
externality, the sundering of this unity of universality and particularity.  
The particular objects of Nature are not an external other which the Idea 
now acts on, but one element of the self-externality of the Idea that Nature is. The 
internal negativity of the Idea, in contrast to the purely positive being of 
Substance, gives its existence as Nature a real self-externality and diremption. In 
addition to manifesting itself as space, this structural self-externality can be seen, 
for example, in the persistence of Nature’s stages, such as the mechanical, 
physical and organic, ‘side-by-side’ as they progress, in the sense that although 
Hegel claims that the mechanical and physical stages of Nature lead necessarily 
to the organic, he does not thereby claim that all of Nature is organic. We will 
discuss this in greater detail in chapter eleven. Nature’s structural self-externality 
also plays a key part in Hegel’s account of necessity and contingency, as we will 
see shortly. Further, Natural objects have an intrinsic negativity in the sense that, 
contrary to their appearance as independent and self-subsistent, they are the 
transitory manifestations of the Idea, the truly “affirmative element in Nature”18 
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which timelessly and universally “posits all particularity in existence.”19 As we 
will see in chapters nine and eleven, this negativity subjects finite bodies to 
perishability, but also forges the gradual path whereby these finite bodies show 
their reality to reside in their being moments of higher unities, such as systems of 
motion, chemical processes and organic bodies. 
At multiple points in the introduction to the Philosophy of Nature Hegel 
uses theological concepts and imagery to convey the passage from Logic to 
Nature. In §247 he poses the question of why Logic leads into Nature thus: “If 
God is all-sufficient and lacks nothing, why does He disclose Himself in a sheer 
Other of Himself?” Hegel answers that, on a maximally general level, it is the 
nature of the divine Idea as Logic to posit its other, Nature, outside itself and 
then bring this back into itself in becoming Spirit. Importantly, the Idea imparts 
its full content to this other, and “God, therefore, in determining Himself, 
remains equal to Himself.” Nature is not some fragment of the Idea, or a mere 
shadow or shallow reflection, but “is itself the whole Idea and must be posited as 
the divine totality.” Indeed, the Idea is described as having an “indivisible 
nature,” indicating that its status as the one totality does not fall apart through 
developing into Nature and Spirit.20 
However, Hegel claims in §247 that “Nature is the son of God, but not as 
the Son (der Sohn Gottes, aber nicht als der Sohn), but as abiding in otherness – 
the divine Idea as held fast for a moment outside the divine love.”21 Nature is 
certainly the son of God, or the Idea, and keeping in mind that in Hegel’s 
interpretation of the trinity this means that Nature is God in the form of his son, 
we can see that Nature is being affirmed as itself being the Idea in the form of its 
son, or its otherness. On the other hand, though, Nature is this ‘not as the Son, 
but as abiding in otherness.’ In Hegel’s conception, the significance of Christ as 
the Son of God is that God is not just the Father, the creator metaphysically 
separate from His creation, and is not just a singular physical individual, but has 
manifested through the body of Christ the union of the finite and infinite in God, 
and thus God’s concrete, fully actual infinity (as opposed to the abstract infinity 
 
19 Ibid. §249, Zusatz 
20 Ibid. §247, Zusatz 
21 Ibid.; Werke 9, p.25 
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of the Father which does not encompass the finite within His nature).22 Thus 
when Hegel identifies Nature as the ‘son’ which is not the ‘Son’ but abides in 
otherness, he is indicating Nature falls between the infinite of pure thought in 
Logic and the infinite in unity with particularity achieved in Spirit. Nature is just 
as much the Idea as Logic or Spirit, but “held fast for a moment outside the 
divine love,” meaning that it is a sphere of externality and particularity which 
has arisen as the negative to the abstract, inward totality of Logic but has yet to 
achieve the union of these moments in Spirit.  
This reading finds support from other passages in the introduction to the 
Philosophy of Nature, such as when Hegel claims that “In itself, in the Idea, Nature 
is divine: but as it is, the being of Nature does not accord with its Notion; rather 
is Nature the unresolved contradiction (unaufgelöste Widerspruch).”23 Nature is 
certainly not other to the Idea; indeed the Idea is the implicit inner foundation, 
the ‘in itself’, of Nature. However, Nature presents a rupture within the Idea 
itself, the emergence of a contradiction which cannot be resolved within the 
inward, abstract being of the Idea as Logic, and necessitates a new conceptual 
domain of self-externality. Hegel’s characterisation of Nature as the ‘unresolved 
contradiction’ here additionally lends support to the reading of the move from 
absolute Idea to Nature we have been proceeding with, since within this 
interpretation it is immediately clear why he should characterize Nature in this 
way: the reason why the concept of Nature arises at all is because the absolute 
Idea freely releases its universality and particularity, letting these fall apart rather 
than holding them in harmony together, and this unresolved contradiction, the 
terms of which stand in externality to one another, is precisely what constitutes 
the basic character of Nature as self-externality. 
Indeed, the Idea’s “self-degradation (der Abfall der Idee von sich selbst)”24 
and internal disparity as Nature is such that Hegel argues the structure of the 
disjunction of the Idea should not be seen just as a dyad, with the universal and 
the particular in opposition, but rather as a tetrad, the first term being the 
universal and the second term, the moment of difference, being a duality, for “in 
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Nature, the Other must exist explicitly as Other (das Andere für sich als Anderes 
existieren muß.”25 The otherness of Nature is not just that of particularity from 
universality, but also the otherness of particularity from itself, and thus the 
particularity of Nature exists explicitly as otherness in itself and not just in 
relation to the universal.  
When we recall Hegel’s description in the Science of Logic of the internal 
differences of the Idea as Logic as “not yet otherness”26 it becomes apparent just 
how far the structure of the Idea has progressed in the emergence of Nature. 
Whereas the mutual otherness of the absolute Idea’s determinations was sublated 
within the unity of this singular totality, in Nature, “the Idea in the form of 
otherness”27, the moments of otherness and unity have their positions inverted. 
In Nature, “the unity of the Notion is concealed”28, and “present only as 
something inward”29 as otherness in the form of self-externality becomes the 
dominant conceptual structure. To reiterate, the Idea remains the basis of the 
determinations of Nature. They are still its determinations. However, the 
structure of Nature is such that the truth of the absolute unity of the Idea is not 
made explicit in the way it manifests itself, rather having the place of an implicit 
truth which, as we shall see below, gradually gains actuality once again through 
the course of Nature’s development.30 
This specific structural character of the Idea as Nature is important to 
grasp in order to understand the development of Nature’s forms which we will 
be following in chapters nine and eleven. It also has more general consequences 
for Hegel’s account of the natural world, particularly regarding the issue of 
necessity and contingency. 
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Due to the self-externality of the Idea as Nature, Hegel writes that Nature’s 
determinations have “the show of an indifferent subsistence and isolation in regard 
to each other” and, as a result, “Nature exhibits no freedom in its existence, but 
only necessity and contingency.”31 Earlier we saw that Hegel argues that the 
absolute Idea’s transition to Nature is free in the sense that the absolute Idea is 
completely self-determining. The absolute Idea stands at the end of Logic as an 
all-inclusive totality, and so there can be nothing determining its transition other 
than its own immanent necessity. However, in the self-externality of Nature, the 
unity of the Idea is now only an implicit foundation, sunk into the background. 
The particular determinations of Nature in turn are no longer explicitly united as 
the manifestations of a single totality but take on the appearance of independent 
self-subsistence.32 It is because of this appearance of independence that Hegel 
ascribes necessity, and not freedom, to Nature, describing necessity as the 
“merely external … relation of mutually independent existences,”33 or “the 
inseparability of different terms which yet appear as indifferent towards each 
other.”34 The determinations of Nature do not exhibit freedom because these 
particulars are mutually subject to the external necessity of one another’s action. 
By ‘contingency’ Hegel does not mean random chance but another aspect 
of this external necessity.35 Though Nature’s forms are rationally determined by 
the inner necessity of the Idea, they also display “indifferent contingency and 
indeterminable irregularity.” Hegel characterizes this as “the impotence of 
Nature”, remarking that “it preserves the determinations of the Notion only 
abstractly, and leaves their detailed specification to external determination.”36 
This sets limits to the philosophy of Nature, making it impossible to deduce the 
detail of every product of Nature, since although every natural object is 
conditioned and determined in various ways by the necessary structures of the 
Idea, nonetheless “these traces do not exhaust its nature.”37 However, this does 
not present a barrier to the philosophical study of Nature. Unlike in the case of 
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empirical science, philosophy has no need to explain every detail of finite Nature, 
since the rational structure developed in philosophy has validity in its own right 
and yields the general forms and structures of Nature, not particular facts.38 To 
use Hegel’s example, philosophy shows organic life to be a necessary 
manifestation of Nature, but the fact that philosophy cannot determine a priori 
how many species of parrot exist poses no challenge to this.39 
In this defence of the project of a philosophy of Nature against the 
misplaced critique that it cannot determine every particular fact, Hegel finds 
agreement with Spinoza’s position, discussed above, that we come to understand 
Nature through its concrete universal structures, the ‘fixed and eternal things’, 
and not our confused and limited perceptions of finite things, our inability to 
trace the infinite causal chains of which presents no issue to philosophy. 
However, Hegel’s acknowledgement of contingency in Nature would seem to 
put him into conflict with Spinoza, who makes it very clear that “in nature there 
is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of 
the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.”40 As Spinoza 
explains, this is because Substance’s modes follow necessarily from its nature and 
Substance is the cause of both the existence of its modes and of their being 
determined in particular ways in causal chains. If a mode has not been 
determined by Substance, it is impossible for it to determine itself, and 
conversely it is impossible for a mode, having been determined by Substance, to 
render itself undetermined.41 Contingency is therefore a confused idea caused by 
our failure to understand the substantial reality of the modes and the necessity of 
their interaction.  
However, in relating this to Hegel’s position on contingency we need to 
make a distinction between the fact of a thing’s being determined and what it is 
determined by. Insofar as the question is whether everything in Nature is 
determined, Hegel agrees with Spinoza. Hegel does not claim there is 
contingency in Nature in the sense that there exist events or objects which are 
random or otherwise undetermined sheer given facts. Regardless of whether we 
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ever discover what causes a particular thing to exist in the way it does, it 
certainly has an external cause among other things. The sense in which Hegel 
affirms the existence of contingency is rather that, due to the structure of the self-
externality of the Idea as Nature, the Idea does not fully determine the existence 
of finite things. Everything in Nature is certainly conditioned by and has its 
essential reality in the Idea, as discussed above, but although a lion is not what it 
is without the structure of organic life determined by the Idea, nonetheless the 
Idea does not determine how many teeth the lion has. The number of the lion’s 
teeth is contingent, not in the sense that it has no cause, but in the sense that this 
is not determined by the Idea. Importantly, this contingency is not due to a 
limitation of philosophical knowledge, but a structure intrinsic to the way 
natural things exist and the ‘impotence’ of Nature to instantiate the Idea, as 
Hegel puts it. Although Nature and all natural things are manifestations of the 
Idea and nothing else, the structure of self-externality present in Nature means 
that its particulars have a self-subsistence which, although lessening as Nature 
develops, prevents them from being unified in the same way as the categories of 
Logic were with the absolute Idea. In contrast, the modes of Substance are 
enveloped within its complete and unfractured necessity, with no externality or 
negativity appearing at any point.  
Bringing this discussion more explicitly into relation with the central 
argument of this study, in this chapter we have seen that Hegel’s conception of 
Nature as the Idea in self-externality, the outcome of his more adequate 
derivation of the existence of Nature, affords him, from a Hegelian perspective, a 
more subtle conception of the specificity of Nature’s existence than Spinoza 
provides. More precisely, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature suggests that Spinozism 
lacks a satisfactory conception of the structural relationship between, in 
Spinoza’s terms, the universality of Substance and its particularity as extended 
modes.  
Spinoza certainly distinguishes between the immanent causality of 
Substance and its infinite modes and the transitive causality of the finite modes – 
a distinction that looks somewhat like that between ‘universality’ and 
‘particularity’ in Nature as Hegel conceives it. However, Spinoza conceives the 
order and connection of finite modal Nature as totally determined by the 
singular causal necessity of Substance, the transitive causality among the finite 
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modes being, as Macherey puts it, the totally necessary expression and 
realization of the infinite in the finite.42 In contrast, Hegel argues that, because the 
Idea as Nature no longer exhibits the harmonisation of universal and particular 
definitive of the absolute Idea, it is intrinsic to the structure of Nature that 
particularity, though conditioned by the universal, can exist in ways not 
determined by it and in this sense contingent. Spinoza’s banishing of contingency 
from Nature reveals, from a Hegelian perspective, an inadequate understanding 
of the constitution of the natural world and the relation of the universality of the 
Absolute and its existence as particular natural things.  
We will now proceed to follow the dialectic of the Idea’s sundered 
universality and particularity as it works itself through in Hegel’s account of 
mechanics, and thereby develop a Hegelian critique of what he takes to be the 
explanatory deficiencies of Spinoza’s account of extended Substance’s necessary 




42 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. pp.157-158 
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Chapter 9 - Hegel’s Dialectical Mechanics 
 
 
In chapter four it was pointed out that, from a Hegelian standpoint, the 
interpretation of Spinoza set out there cannot adequately explain, firstly, why 
Extension necessarily exists as motion and rest, and secondly, why extended 
Substance must necessarily express itself as finite bodies. Going beyond merely 
pointing out these limitations, this chapter will give a detailed interpretation of 
Hegel’s dialectical account of mechanics, showing that the absolute idealist 
position can avoid the deficiencies it finds in Spinozism through Hegel’s 
immanent development of the structures of Nature.  
 
 
9.1 - Space 
 
The challenge posed by a dialectical account of Nature is that the concept of 
Nature must be shown to necessitate, through its own immanent development, 
such things as space, time, motion and matter. The philosophical account of 
Nature Hegel is attempting does not operate by first taking a phenomenon of 
nature identified by empirical investigation, such as space, and then considering 
how this might be explained theoretically. Instead, the philosophical 
investigation of Nature only ever has the necessary and immanent content of the 
Idea as Nature for its object.  
In order to understand Hegel’s account of space, the first determination of 
Nature’s self-externality, and indeed any of the categories that follow, it is vital to 
appreciate the level of abstraction which is still demanded. Though we are now 
in the sphere of Nature, this does not mean that we are dealing yet with anything 
remotely resembling the natural world we are habitually familiar with. The 
‘space’ with which the dialectic of Nature begins will, as we shall see, turn out to 
be in a highly abstract form, which might be called absolute space, but this will 
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ultimately show itself to be superseded by the fuller, more adequate concept of 
relative space, that is, the space of material bodies in time.1 
This brings to the fore the further general point that we should not jump 
to the conclusion that Hegel’s account of any particular category, upon its first 
appearance, is necessarily intended to exhibit the full truth of this determination. 
Rather, determinations becomes more concrete and specified through their being 
placed in interrelationship with the growing set of Nature’s categories. As a 
result, when Hegel first brings forward a term such as space, we should not fall 
into the trap of immediately importing into the category those features we 
usually regard as belonging to space. The full nature of existing space as we 
usually understand it is something which will emerge through its relationship to 
other categories, such as time, and if we take this to be the space Hegel begins his 
account of Nature with, we will be unable to understand his reasoning at all. 
Having described space, along with time, as “self-externality in its 
complete abstraction” in his brief anticipatory summary of the first categories of 
Nature in §253 of the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel gives his first detailed account of 
space in §254. Firstly, he claims space is “the abstract universality of Nature’s self-
externality, self-externality’s mediationless indifference.” To see why Hegel 
characterises this self-externality specifically as being in a state of abstract 
universality, we need to remember the conceptual context of this category. In its 
self-externality the Idea is a universal which is no longer the harmonious 
interconnection of its particular moments, as it was at the end of Logic, but in a 
state of asunderness. Though the Idea remains the one all-inclusive reality, its 
moments now stand external to one another, and so the task at the outset of this 
new phase of conceptual development is to identify the most minimal 
determination made necessary by this conceptual structure. This is the ‘abstract 
universality of self-externality’, because although the Idea has the specific 
structure of self-externality this has yet to receive any further determination. It 
thus stands in a minimal and abstract state. We are not yet at the point where this 
self-externality proves to be, for example, the externality of particular physical 
objects from one another. Indeed, as yet the Idea as Nature has not proved itself 
to have concretely identifiable particulars at all.  
 




Hegel’s characterisation of the abstract universality of self-externality as 
‘self-externality’s mediationless indifference’ can be understood as indicating 
precisely this relationship of the moments of the Idea which yields its abstract 
self-externality. These determinations stand, at this point, without any explicit 
mediation or connection between them, that is, in a relation of sheer indifference. 
Hegel goes on to give further specification to this abstract self-externality in §254, 
describing it as a “wholly ideal side-by-sideness because it is self-externality”. In 
characterizing this abstract self-externality as ‘ideal side-by-sideness’, Hegel is 
indicating that this is not the externality of separate things from each other (there 
being no such separate objects at this point) which could constitute a real or 
concrete side-by-sideness, but the externality of a single thing, the Idea, from 
itself. This ideal side-by-sideness is constituted by the indifference and lack of 
mediation between the determinations of the Idea, yet their being at the same 
time determinations of a single entity.  
In the same section, Hegel also describes the category of space as 
“absolutely continuous, because this asunderness is still quite abstract, and 
contains no specific difference within itself.” Abstract self-externality has a 
moment of ideal separation and discreteness, but also a moment of absolute 
continuity, and this is because, to reiterate the point once more, the 
determinations of the Idea are in a state of bare abstraction, to the point where 
they lack ‘specific difference’, as Hegel puts it, between each other. Indeed, in the 
addition to §254 Hegel claims that “the unity of these two moments, discreteness 
and continuity, is the objectively determined Notion of space.”2  
In §255, Hegel brings the notion of difference within space into the 
foreground, writing “Space, as in itself the Notion as such, contains within itself 
the differences of the Notion.”3 The issue of difference within space dominates the 
rest of Hegel’s explication of this concept, and so it is worth making clear why 
Hegel takes spatial difference to be both necessary and highly problematic. It is 
useful in this regard to understand the sense in which space and its self-
externality are driven by a logic of self-negation. Space, abstract self-externality, 
is the self-negation of the Idea, or the Idea as the negative of itself. The content of 
space is, indeed, generated by its self-negation, in the sense that it internally 
 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. §255 
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negates its unity into a self-external plurality. Further, the being of each of the 
‘Heres’ of space, or the spaces that it is self-externalised into, simply consists in 
their not being the other spaces. The abstractness of space is such that there is no 
more determinate content that its differences can have. Negation, and specifically 
self-negation, is thus intrinsic to the concept of space.  
As Hegel points out, within the abstract self-externality of absolute space 
we have been explicating, we can already see a certain form of difference, though 
this is “superficial” and “completely empty.”4 The determination of self-
externality is fundamental to space, giving it a necessary internal plurality, but 
space thus far lacks any determinate internal difference or distinction, rendering 
it a perfect continuity. Hegel suggests we can see this empty difference within the 
philosophical concept of space reflected in our empirical concept of space, in the 
three spatial dimensions, “which are merely diverse and possess no determination 
whatever.”5 Hegel specifies in the remark to §255 that the inability to distinguish 
height, length and breadth stems precisely from the empty difference of abstract 
self-externality, which yields this diversity of dimensions but cannot supply any 
determinate difference within its abstract continuity to actually differentiate 
them. In Hegel’s words, “these three dimensions only ought to be different, but … 
they are not yet differences.”6 Of course, if we posit a material body in space, 
such as the planet Earth, it is possible to construct definitions for the dimensions, 
characterizing height, for example, as in the direction of the centre of the Earth 
and then placing breadth and length as each perpendicular to this pole. As Hegel 
is quick to point out, though, this does not inform us about the nature of space 
itself, in abstraction from bodies, and does nothing to remove the indifference of 
its dimensions therein.7 
Immediately following this discussion of the indifference of space’s 
dimensions, though, Hegel claims “the difference of space is, however, 
essentially a determinate, qualitative difference.”8 This assertion is driven by the 
internal contradiction within the concept of space posed by the empty difference 
thus far found in it. Specifically, in the absence of determinate difference within 
 
4 Ibid. §255, Remark 
5 Ibid. §255 
6 Ibid. §255, Remark 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. §256 
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space, its self-negation ceases to have any content since there are no real 
differences to be marked off. Space thus threatens to collapse into a wholly 
homogenous self-identical point. However, space is necessarily self-external, as it 
is the Idea as the negative of itself. Thus, the coherency of the concept of space 
requires, as Hegel phrases it, a ‘determinate, qualitative difference.’ Space’s self-
negation cannot be limited to an empty indifference, but must extend to a 
concrete, determinate self-negation of some kind. Another way of expressing this 
would be to point out that, as already discussed above, space is the unity of 
discreteness and continuity. However, in the absence of any determinate 
difference within it, the moment of discreteness in space falls away, since there is 
no genuine multiplicity of spaces within it to be discrete from each other at all. 
Thus, the concept of space requires determinate difference for its coherency. 
Turning, then, to the question of what this determinate difference within 
space must be, Hegel argues that it must first take the form of the negation of 
space, namely the point. Since space is an unbounded self-external continuity, the 
simplest determinate negation of this is an exclusive, self-contained point.  
However, Hegel is quick to indicate that, in the case of such a point, “the 
negation is the negation of space, i.e. it is itself spatial.”9 This claim may seem 
paradoxical at first, but Hegel is actually making a fairly simple observation. If 
the point were not itself spatial, then it would not be the negation of space 
required. That is, it would not pose a determinate difference within space, but 
would simply be other to space, another kind of being altogether. In this case, the 
existence of any point would be irrelevant to the question of how determinate 
negation exists in space. However, it is the nature of the point to be the negation 
of space, and it is must therefore in fact be a spatial point. 
Hegel goes on to argue, though, that this result consists in the self-
sublation of the point. Through its own logic, the point must be spatial, and 
therefore extend itself in space. The point thus falls into precisely the indifferent 
self-externality which it was supposed to be the negation of. This self-external, 
extended point is the line. Importantly, the line has the status of the negation of 
the negation (the first negation of space being the point, which then negates itself 





negation leads it into a further movement, namely becoming the plane. This is 
due to the specific logical structure of the negation of the negation. This is not 
just a further negation, but a self-reflexive movement which restores the original 
affirmative character of space, or in Hegel’s words, “the restoration of the spatial 
totality which now contains the negative moment within itself, an enclosing 
surface which separates off a single whole space.”10  
 A further step which is not made fully explicit in the Philosophy of Nature 
but which is made more clearly in Hegel’s lectures on this topic is the move from 
the two-dimensional space of the plane to three-dimensional space. In his 
lectures on the philosophy of nature in the winter semester of 1825/26, he 
phrases the development of the third dimension thus: the plane is negation of the 
negation, and so the sublation of limit in space, giving a total space wherein 
‘volume’ arises (“ein Volumen enstanden ist”).11 He goes on to specify that there 
are three determinations to be taken account of here: negation, negation of the 
negation, and negation relating itself to itself. This third determination, the self-
relation of negation, is “the third dimension, this third limit is at the same time 
the sublation of limit (die dritte Bestimmung, die dritte Dimension, diese dritte 
Grenze ist zugleich die Aufhebung der Grenze).”12 In being the negation of the 
negation, the whole space contains negation completely within itself, and so 
becomes the volume of universal space. 
 Houlgate suggests we should understand Hegel’s line of thought here, 
and in other places in his lectures where he makes similar statements, through 
carefully distinguishing the different forms of negation present at each stage. The 
point was the simple negation of space, and the line the self-sublation of this 
point. However, the line, insofar as it is just a line or boundary in space, does not 
exhibit its double negativity explicitly, but remains a simple negation. In 
becoming explicitly the negation of the negation which it is, then, the line will 
have to negate itself, relating itself to itself in becoming a plane, that is, an 
enclosing surface. Houlgate points out that the plane is in this way qualitatively 
different from the line, in that it is a bounded affirmative space and not just a 
boundary in space. Further, because of this qualitative difference, the plane 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Hegel, G. W. F. (2010) G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen. Electronic Edition. Volume 17. Eds. Bal, 
Maramasse, Pasch, Viewig. InteLex Corp. p.82, line 83 
12 Ibid. p.82, lines 86-88 
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cannot be conceived as a plurality of lines but as the negation of the line. Coming 
now to the move from the plane to the three-dimensional body, in Houlgate’s 
reading this does not involve another qualitative change, as the shift from the 
line to the plane did, but rather the removal of the restriction placed on the plane 
in virtue of its being the negation of the line. The third negation of space is not 
the negation of the plane (which is the second negation, the negation of the 
negation), but rather space shedding the negative character it still has in the form 
of the plane and thereby becoming fully affirmative.13 This interpretation fits well 
with Hegel’s key claim, quoted above, that the third negation, bringing forward 
the third dimension, is the third limit which in fact sublates limit, i.e. negates the 
negative character of space as the line, and in so doing restores full positivity to 
space, which is now a total, unbounded space. 
 Tracing the logic of negativity in space in this way has afforded a 
philosophical account of the existence of the spatial dimensions, something not 
found in Spinoza’s philosophy. However, the most significant result of this 
examination for our purposes is not the derivation of the spatial dimensions as 
such, but the fact that space has proven unable to address its internal 
contradiction, since the development of negativity within it has only produced 
the indifferent and indistinguishable subsistence of its dimensions, and not the 
genuine self-negation which the coherency of space requires. As Winfield puts it, 
the spatial limits of point, line and plane continuously become external to 
themselves, transgressing the boundary separating them from what they 
demarcate. If the points, lines and planes cannot hold themselves apart, space’s 
externality collapses, but space’s continuity leads these boundaries necessarily to 
transgress themselves.14  
Space requires a negative moment of difference within itself in order to 
maintain its character as space. If no difference can be located, logically space 
collapses into a single non-extensional point, as it will not be possible to justify in 
what sense any part of space is different from and thereby has another spatial 
location from any other. However, the bare and abstract concept of space 
currently before us cannot provide this negation, or more precisely the negations 
 
13 Houlgate, S. (2005). An introduction to Hegel: Freedom, truth, and history. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
pp.124-126 
14 Winfield, R.D. ‘Space, Time, and Matter: Conceiving Nature Without Foundations’ in Houlgate, 
S. (ed.) (1998). Hegel and the philosophy of nature. Albany: State University of New York Press. p.58 
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within it have the ‘defect’ of indifference or mutual subsistence with each other. 
One can posit an infinity of points, lines, planes and three-dimensional 
geometrical constructs in space, and not one will give a real limit in space nor 
preclude any of the other infinite posited divisions, for none generate or 
correspond to any real difference within space itself. No negation internal to 
space can resolve its contradiction of externality and continuity, forcing the 
transition to the more radical negativity of time.  
 
 
9.2 - Time 
 
In space we have seen negativity locked in indifferent subsistence, and so unable 
to attain to the self-negation which space must be. As Hegel puts it, “space is this 
contradiction, to be infected with negation, but in such wise that this negation 
falls apart into indifferent subsistence.”15 We have seen space’s negativity unfold 
into the diversity of spatial dimensions. However, as Hegel is pointing out here, 
the contradiction within space remains, in that it has, as abstract self-externality, 
the essential character of self-negation, but its negativity, when worked through, 
falls short of this. This is because although space’s dimensions, along with the 
various ‘spaces’ within it, can be said to be different from each other, and are 
produced, as we have just seen, by space negating itself, they ‘fall apart into 
indifferent subsistence’ in that each negation of space, each particular ‘Here’ or 
dimension, is completely indifferent, mutually subsisting and exchangeable (in 
the sense that every ‘Here’ or dimension can just as well be any other, as all are 
identical). Thus, although space is essentially self-negating, none of the 
determinations arising from its negativity concretely exclude any other, and so 
they remain indifferent and in perfect continuity. Hegel comments that in space 
even the limit has the form of subsistence, that is, that which is supposed to 
negate and exclude, setting itself apart as concretely different, does no such 
thing, lying adjacent to and undistinguished from its other.16 
 





In short, as Hegel helpfully summarises later in §260, “space is within 
itself the contradiction of indifferent asunderness and differenceless continuity”. 
He further adds here that space is therefore “the pure negativity of itself, and the 
transition, first of all, into time.”17 We find a very similar formulation in the 
addition to §257, where it is suggested that since space is “this inner negation of 
itself, the self-sublating of its moments is its truth.”18 But why should the 
contradiction within space lead to its outright negation or sublation of itself? 
Space, to reiterate once more, is the abstract universality of self-externality, the 
first form of the Idea as the negative of itself. Space is fundamentally self-
negating, as self-negation is both that which gives rise to space at all and that 
which drives the logic of its internal otherness or self-externality. However, 
having worked through the dialectic of space’s self-negation in the unfolding of 
its dimensions, it has turned out that space is not truly self-negating at all, but 
rather that negation is “paralysed” within it and “does not therefore yet receive 
its due.”19 In order to be the self-negation that it is, space must therefore negate 
its spatiality as such, sublating its own structure entirely. We see here the most 
familiar pattern in Hegel’s system emerging once more: in being most purely 
what it is, something must in fact become what it is not. Space must become 
explicitly self-negating in order to be what it is, but this is precisely what it has 
proven unable to be. Thus, space must negate itself, but not in the limited and 
ultimately paralysed way thus far seen. Instead, space must become pure self-
negation, and so cease to be space at all, transitioning to time.  
In time, negativity or difference is “posited for itself”, having “stepped 
out of space.”20 Whereas negation in space was always attached to an other, time 
is “self-existent difference, is what is negative in itself … the negation of the 
negation, the self-relating negation.”21 We may recall the characterisation of the 
plane earlier as the negation of the negation in the form of a bounded, self-
relating space. However, Hegel argues that though it is correct to call the plane 
the negation of the negation, “in its truth it is distinct from space.”22 That is, 
although we do find negation of the negation in the plane, this negativity is 
 
17 Ibid. §260 







stifled in its spatial context, and ‘in its truth’, or made actual in a way 
corresponding to the necessity of the Idea, negativity steps beyond space as 
negativity in its own right: time. Indeed, “in time … the point has actuality.”23 
The lack of the point, an exclusive, determinate, qualitative difference, was that 
which drove the dialectic of space forward, and this negation which could only 
ever be the ‘should be’ of space is now the reality of time.  
It is important to make explicit at this point that Hegel is arguing that the 
dialectic of Nature has led us to the standpoint that “the truth of space is time, 
and thus space becomes time,” and further, “the transition to time is not made 
subjectively by us, but made by space itself.”24 This transition does not amount to 
space being left behind in some sense as time emerges as a new, separate form of 
being, no longer shackled by spatiality. Rather, space has sublated itself and 
“time is precisely the existence of this perpetual self-sublation.”25 Space has 
turned out to make time necessary, this being the truth of space’s self-negation. 
Giving more detail on the nature of time as self-sublation in §258, Hegel 
writes that time is “that being which, inasmuch as it is, is not, and inasmuch as it 
is not, is: it is Becoming directly intuited.” He goes on to specify that “this means 
that differences, which admittedly are purely momentary, i.e. directly self-
sublating, are determined as external, i.e. as external to themselves.”26 In calling 
time ‘Becoming directly intuited’, Hegel is of course comparing time to the third 
category of the Logic, the vanishing movement of being into nothing and vice 
versa, coming to be and ceasing to be. Hegel does not intend to suggest that the 
two categories are identical, but that time is the closest thing to the absolutely 
abstract becoming of the Logic which can actually be ‘intuited’ by us, that is, 
concretely experienced. But why exactly does time take the form of becoming? 
Why does the contradiction of space not simply result in its negation into sheer 
nothingness? This is because space’s negation has the specific determination of 
self-negation, and so when this negativity ‘steps forward’ out of space to assert 
itself in its own right, it does so specifically as self-negation, retaining this 
determination. As a result, time has the structure of an abstract coming to be and 





26 Ibid. §258 
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but time again immediately ceases to be this ceasing to be, negating this negation 
to constitute itself as being once more. As Hegel phrases it in the Science of Logic, 
“time is an absolute coming-out-of-self, a generating of the one (a point in time, 
the now) and immediately the annihilation of it, and again the continuous 
annihilation of this passing away.”27 
Hegel makes explicit in the Philosophy of Nature that the dimensions of 
time are to be understood as the various moments of this process of becoming. 
Indeed, past, present and future provide for us, in our ‘intuition’ or experience of 
Nature, with a sense of the totality of the concept of time, laying out for us the 
logical phases of time’s continual self-negation.28 Hegel suggests that each 
dimension, not just the totality, exists as a movement of becoming, but each 
dimension is distinguished in that it posits the movement of coming-to-be and 
passing away in a different determination. Taking the past first, in this dimension 
being is the starting point, in that the past has been formerly actual, but non-
being has now been added to it. This is the movement from being to nothing. The 
reverse is true in the case of the future, where non-being is the first determination 
and being is later. This is the movement from nothing to being. The present is the 
unity of past and future. On the one hand, the present has being only because the 
past is no longer. The being of the past is precisely the negation of the present, 
and so the being of the present is the non-being of the past. On the other hand, 
the being of the present has non-being as a determination, and this non-being of 
the present is the future. The future has being only insofar as the present has 
non-being, that is, insofar as the present negates itself, becoming the past and 
being replaced by the future.29 Importantly, though, in Nature only the present 
exists. The past is the non-being which the present negates itself into and the 
future is the non-being which is not yet at all. It is not until we arrive at the 
sphere of Spirit that the past and future gain something of the concrete reality 
enjoyed by the present, in the form of memory, fear and hope, for example.30 As 
Houlgate points out, time is thus very different from space in that it is restricted 
to a one-dimensional existence, albeit a single dimension which continually 
 
27 Hegel, G.W.F., & Miller, A.V. (1998). Hegel's Science of Logic. Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books. 
p.189 
28 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. §259, 
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29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. §259, Remark 
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negates itself.31 The past and future do not gain positive reality of their own in 
Nature, but are limited to the non-being of the present.  
An important point to appreciate, in order to understand this abstract 
concept of time and why, as we shall see, it ultimately sublates itself, is that 
time’s negativity is, at this point, not to be understood as its difference from 
anything else or the alteration between two states of something else, but as an 
abstract self-relation consisting in its own self-negation. In Hegel’s words, it is 
simply “the negativity abstractly relating self to self.”32 Indeed, similarly to the 
abstract conception of space which preceded it, time is, at this point, “an out-and-
out abstract, ideal being.”33 At this stage of the development of Nature there are 
not any particular things, let alone particular differences or changes among these 
things, with which time might be populated. Just as we were dealing before with 
absolute space, not the relative space of material things, we are now considering 
what is necessarily an absolute time.  
This is helpful in making sense of Hegel’s claim, already noted above, 
that the differences of time are “directly self-sublating, are determined as external, 
i.e. as external to themselves.”34 Time is ‘directly self-sublating’ in the sense that 
any difference, in being established, is immediately negated, as time is simply 
sheer restless self-differentiation, constantly negating itself and so becoming 
other to itself. Further, the differences can be understood as ‘external to 
themselves’ or having self-externality in the sense that they are constantly 
becoming other to themselves, negating what they are and becoming what they 
are not, while yet remaining in the same structure of self-relating negation. This 
is equally true of each of the dimensions of time as it is of the whole. As we saw 
above, past, present and future are not static beings, but are each themselves a 
movement of becoming. As Hegel phrases it, this is “pure being-within-self as 
sheer coming-out-of-self.”35 Time, in being what it is, becomes what it is not, that 
is, differentiates itself from itself, but in so doing it is only being the sheer self-
differentiation that it is. We find a similar description of time in the Science of 
 
31 Houlgate, S. (2005). An introduction to Hegel: Freedom, truth, and history. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
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Logic, where Hegel states that “this spontaneous generating of non-being is 
equally a simple self-sameness and self-identity.”36  
This comment in the Science of Logic, pointing to a structure of both self-
identity and self-differentiation, leads us on to consider the contradiction within 
time which leads to its self-sublation back into space. It is Hegel’s claim that, 
despite time being pure self-negation, it is in fact ultimately driven back into the 
indifferent positivity and self-subsistence of space, and this is because it does not 
resolve the root issue which led to space’s transition into time in the first place, 
namely the lack of determinate difference. Time’s logical structure of continual 
self-negation, negating its own being and then negating its own ceasing-to-be, 
makes time necessarily continuous and unending in the sense of its being a 
continuous succession of momentary presents or ‘nows’. However, Hegel claims 
that this same structure of self-negation makes time continuous in the stronger 
sense that “the true Present … is eternity.”37 That is, the true present does not 
come to be and pass away but is an enduring presence that simply is. Why is 
this? Hegel states in his remark to §258 that in the abstract negative self-relation 
which time is, “there is as yet no real difference.”38 Making this thought fully 
explicit, we can see that, since time’s self-negation is a completely abstract self-
relation with no determinate content, the negation of the being of each moment 
and the negation of this negation into the being of the next moment are empty 
negations. They mark out no determinate difference between any moment and 
any other. The present is an enduring, uninterrupted being in that not only is 
there no ‘gap’ between any of the moments, but no moment can sustain itself as 
exclusive of, or set itself apart as determinately different from, any other.  
As Hegel makes explicit in §260, time has thus sublated itself in showing 
itself to be, for all its negativity, only the “immediate collapse into indifference, 
into undifferentiated asunderness or space, because its opposed moments which 
are held together in unity, immediately sublate themselves.”39 The result of the 
logic of time, when carried through, is the collapse of its abstract negativity into 
an eternally abiding affirmative being in which all moments are absolutely 
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continuous and indistinguishable. Time has logically proved itself to be timeless, 
undifferentiated asunderness, or the affirmative subsistence of a difference which 
is equally no difference, and this is nothing other than space. Space and time 
have thus shown themselves each to necessitate the other, in that the abstract 
positive self-externality of space and the abstract negative self-externality of time 
each logically mutate into the other without resolution.  
 
 
9.3 - Place, Motion and Matter 
 
We have seen that the abstract positivity of space and the abstract negativity of 
time are unable to sustain themselves, each logically slipping away into the other. 
However, the dialectic of Nature does not end in this fruitless dance of opposites, 
but necessitates a new category: place, the unity of space and time. In attempting 
to understand this category and why it becomes necessary at this stage, we may 
begin with the notion of unity. Why is it that space and time do not simply 
continue vanishing into each other, but unify to form place? In the Philosophy of 
Nature we only find explicit argument for this in the addition to §260. Here Hegel 
suggests that this unity, rather than being a new structure for space and time 
appearing only now, has actually been at their core all along, but is only now 
becoming explicit. Indeed, their apparent perpetual vanishing, each falling away 
as the other is posited, is only what results when we attempt to conceive them 
separately. In truth, space and time each require the other to be what they are. 
The question of why space and time must unify thus depends for its answer on 
the question of why space and time each require the other for their being.  
The first move towards this comes in §260, where Hegel writes that, as a 
result of the unity of space and time, “the negative determination in space, the 
exclusive point, no longer only implicitly [or in itself] conforms to the Notion, but 
is posited and concrete within itself, through the total negativity which is time; the 
point, as thus concrete, is Place.”40 The point was the negative moment of 
qualitative difference which was necessary for space, but which it could not bring 
forward to actuality, generating the internal contradiction within space and the 
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transition to time. This is what Hegel is referring to by the point ‘implicitly’ 
conforming to the Notion. It is clearly necessary to making space coherent, but 
nonetheless cannot be made actual, or ‘explicit’, in space. However, “through the 
total negativity of time”, the point, an exclusive space, is now concrete, and this is 
a place. Significantly, in §261 Hegel claims place is “spatial, and therefore 
indifferent, singularity; and it is this only as a spatial Now.”41 
 Houlgate suggests that what Hegel has in mind here is that the unity of 
space and time is not just an external combination of these categories, as in a 
simple addition of a fourth dimension to the three spatial dimensions. Rather, 
Hegel is arguing that space and time must each, without losing their own 
structure, adopt the logical determinations of the other. Specifically, time must 
‘spatialize’ itself, giving its dimensions positive subsistence outside one another, 
and space must ‘temporalize’ itself, allowing it to become explicitly self-
negating.42  
Looking at time’s taking up of space’s determinations first, we may recall 
that the structure of time as self-relating negativity had the result that its self-
differentiation in fact collapsed back into the indifference of space, and so time 
sublated itself. However, time makes its negativity actual in the form of place by 
articulating the temporal dimensions in space, and so giving each a separate 
existence. In the addition to §261, Hegel comments that “there are three different 
places: the present place, the place about to be occupied, and the place which has 
just been vacated; the vanishing of the dimensions of time is paralysed.”43 
Houlgate suggests that we can read this quite literally, as arguing that when the 
moments of time are bound up with specific places, or spaces in time, then this 
prevents the abstract negativity of time from falling into undistinguished 
indifference, since it can be specified that the past was over there, the present is 
here, and the future will be over there.44 This interpretation chimes well with 
Hegel’s claim that “the negative of space is time, and the positive, i.e. the being of 
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the differences of time, is space.”45 Space is that being in which negativity is 
‘paralysed’, a plurality which positively abides with itself, and this positive being 
provides a medium in which time articulates and gives actuality to its 
differences.  
Similarly, space overcomes the lack of determinate negation within it, 
which, as we saw, proved to undermine its logic and force its transition into time, 
by articulating spatiality in the pure self-negation of time, and so giving it 
qualitative negation and differentiation. By being a “spatial Now … place is 
immediately indifferent towards itself as this place, is external to itself, the 
negation of itself, and is another place.”46 Through the intervention of temporality, 
a given place is negated in time, becoming a different one. However, the outright 
negation of a given place in time would break the union of space and time which 
place is. Time requires the endurance of place through the negation of time, 
otherwise time will be without a subsisting spatial structure through which to 
articulate its differences. What is required, then, for the union of space and time 
in place to be possible, is a way in which place can cease to be the place that it is 
while also enduring as the place that it is. The solution to this is that an enduring 
place “uncouples” itself, in Houlgate’s words47, from its initial place and 
relocates itself to a new place. It ceases to be ‘here’ and is now ‘there’, while being 
one and the same place. This change of an enduring place’s location over time is 
motion.  
Motion is not the merging of space and time into a single category, but 
the manifestation of their necessary and intrinsic interrelation, “a process in 
which time posits itself spatially as place, but in which place, too, as indifferent 
spatiality, is immediately posited as temporal.”48 Indeed, “it is in Motion that 
Space and Time first acquire actuality”, and this is because “it is Time which has 
a real existence through Space, or Space which is first truly differentiated by 
Time.”49 That is, the interrelation of space and time in motion allows each to 
resolve its own defect through the logic of the other. Time gains ‘real existence’ 
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through its relation with space because its self-negation is no longer limited to a 
purely abstract form but can be given concrete content as the negation of space. 
Space in turn is ‘truly differentiated’ in its relation with time since it is no longer 
limited to an indifferent positive subsistence of its determinations, but now 
temporal differentiation allows a place to be distinguished from other places. 
Further, the combination of space’s positivity and time’s negativity in 
place is such that this immediately takes the form of motion. Place, as temporal 
space or spatialized time, both subsists positively, due to its spatial element, and 
negates itself, due to its temporal element. This combination of subsistence and 
negation is motion, that is, the negation of a place as that place there and then, and 
its transition to this place here and now while subsisting as the same place 
throughout this negation. Hegel’s claim is that motion is not a contingent state 
that place may happen to be determined to, but that motion is intrinsic to place 
as such. The internal logic of the unity of space-time demands that it necessarily 
exists as motion. 
The logic of motion in turn immediately makes the further category of 
matter necessary in order to complete the conceptual structure so far laid out. We 
find a very simple formulation of this move in the addition to §261: “since there 
is motion, something moves; but this something which persists is matter.”50 Place 
endures through movement, which is its relocation in space over time, and 
matter is simply this persisting self-identity of place through its motion. 
Importantly, Hegel is not suggesting any independence between the concepts of 
matter and motion. There is neither matter without motion nor motion without 
matter, and this is because, at this point in the development of the Idea as Nature, 
matter and motion are the same relationship of space and time, considered in its 
two necessary determinations: motion is the process of space and time’s 
transitioning into one another and matter is the “peaceful identity” or existent 
unity of the two.51 However, matter does have the particular significance of being 
the first ‘concrete’ reality in Nature, in the sense that whereas thus far the 
dialectic of Nature has yielded only abstract, ideal forms of being, matter is the 
reality which space in its abstraction could not be: a positively existing space 






point, as we saw above, could not provide real negation and exclusion, but 
matter, as the unity of space with time’s negativity, can provide the first real limit 
in space. Thus, what is often thought of as the ‘filling’ of space and time, that 
which has material reality and poses resistance in comparison with these abstract 
entities, consists simply in the unity of space and time.52 
The above exegesis has demonstrated that Hegel’s philosophy of Nature 
can provide a detailed and immanent development of the most fundamental 
determinations of mechanics from the structure of Nature as self-externality, this 
itself being an immanent result of the conclusion of Logic as demonstrated in 
chapter seven. Hegel’s account of mechanics has shown that the structure of 
motion, which from a Hegelian perspective is not given adequate derivation by 
Spinoza, can be derived as a necessary result of the relationship of space and 
time. In contrast with Spinoza’s conception of motion and rest as following 
immediately from Extension, Hegel argues that motion requires an intervening 
derivation of time from space. Space and time are then shown to exist only in 
their explicit unity with each other, which is matter in motion. Thus, motion and 
matter are derived together as the two sides of the unity of space and time. As a 
result, the necessary existence of, in Spinoza’s terms, finite modes of Extension 
has also been arrived at, though the nature of matter and its differentiation into 
bodies is, at this point in the dialectic, very minimal, consisting only in the 
persisting identity of place through motion which also provides a limit that 
excludes other spaces. This furthers the central argument of this study by 
demonstrating in concrete detail that the Hegelian standpoint can not only point 
out the deficiencies, from Hegel’s point of view, of Spinoza’s ability to explain 
the necessity of motion and finite modes, but also carry out the fuller critique of 
supplying a systematic explanation of these itself. 
However, Hegel’s account of mechanics does not end here. Through his 
account of gravity, Hegel shows that the concepts of space, time, motion and 
matter achieve a more concrete union in a system of the free motion of multiple 
bodies. This brings more detail to Hegel’s account of the necessity of motion and 
of finite bodies. Additionally, this will set up our turn in the next chapter to the 





occupy the remainder of this study, concerning the divergence of Hegel’s account 
of the broader structure of the natural world from the purely mechanical picture 
constructed by Spinoza. 
 
 
9.4 - Gravity 
 
Hegel argues that matter at this stage is in the tension of two moments: attraction 
and repulsion. Matter’s repulsion comes from its negative self-externality, which 
now separates it into distinct and exclusive parts, as opposed to the wholly 
abstract multiplicity of ‘Heres’ we saw in the initial concept of space. Matter’s 
attraction comes from the fact that though these parts repel each other, they 
remain but many identical ‘ones’, and this empty difference gives matter a 
lingering moment of singular identity and continuity. 
The moment of repulsion alongside it means that this identity cannot be 
material, but only ideal, taking the form of a centre. This ideal singularity formed 
by the tension of matter’s attraction and repulsion is what Hegel calls ‘gravity’. 
Gravity’s unity must remain a mere ‘ought’, never concretely realized as a 
material singularity, because the satisfaction of this unity would require matter to 
collapse into a single point, but repulsion is no less essential to matter, and 
indeed gravity, than attraction. Gravity is called a ‘negative’ and ‘ideal’ unity 
because it is not a positive, simple identity of matter’s parts as actually one and 
the same or coinciding in a single point, but a singularity that preserves, and 
indeed only exists through, the negativity of its members – their not being each 
other.53  
It is not until we reach the sphere of physics that matter itself will begin to 
develop individuality, its parts gaining determinate, qualitative differentiation. 
At the present stage, still in the sphere of mechanics, materiality exists only as a 
self-external continuity, and so the singularity of gravity, though determined as 
rationally necessary, is ‘outside’ of this materiality. That is, although gravity is 
the substantiality of matter, the unity of its two contradictory moments, the 
centre of gravity falls outside matter in the sense that it is not any material point. 
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If the centre of gravity is conceived as a material point or body, then this will 
itself be mutually attracted and repelled by other material points, thus yielding a 
new centre of gravity co-determined by these points and distinct from any of 
them. Though the centre of gravity is not material, it is still matter and nothing 
else which posits this centre.54 
Being thus far without any qualitative differentiation, matter possesses 
only quantitative differences, but can nonetheless be particularized into 
quantitatively different masses. At this point, the concept of a ‘body’ is simply a 
superficial way of determining these masses as singular wholes.55 We say 
‘superficial’ because matter’s parts do not themselves posit their interconnection 
in particular masses, but rather they can be conceived as such only on the basis of 
their relative closeness of position over time. The parts themselves are mutually 
indifferent and merely exclusive of one another. As Stone puts it, material bodies 
at this stage distinguish themselves only “by negating a differentiated quantity of 
the surrounding units of externality.”56 
Hegel can be understood here to put more flesh on his explanation of the 
necessity of a multiplicity of bodies in Nature by tying this to the tension of 
attraction and repulsion that constitutes matter. The nature of compound bodies 
is still more basic at this point than in Spinoza’s account, consisting only in the 
contingent spatial association of a certain quantitative mass of matter, not bound 
together through anything akin to a single ratio of motion and rest. However, 
from a Hegelian perspective, the dialectical view of Nature has nonetheless 
already yielded a much more satisfying account of the necessity of a multiplicity 
of material bodies, showing this to go hand in hand with the dialectic of 
attraction and repulsion constitutive of matter. A full discussion of attraction and 
repulsion and their significance for the constitution of matter would require a 
comparison of Hegel’s view with that of Kant, but this will have to be left to 
future work. 
Continuing with the dialectic of gravity, at this stage bodies are 
essentially spatial and temporal, but Hegel argues that although they are in space 
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and in time they are indifferent to this spatio-temporal form.57 Matter cannot of 
course be conceived except as spatial and temporal, but at this stage any 
particular body is indifferent to which space it occupies at which time, in the 
sense that this does not qualitatively affect its nature at all. This indifference to 
space and time means that bodies are equally indifferent to their relation, motion. 
Bodies are therefore inert, being indifferent and external to both motion and 
rest.58 Matter is the immediate, abstract unity of space and time, but their 
developed unity, motion, is not immanent in matter.59 Hegel points out that this 
is the conception of bodies familiar to us from traditional mechanics, which takes 
as axiomatic that bodies are determined to motion or rest only through external 
causes, motion and rest being only states of bodies.60 
Hegel calls the motion of the inert body, imparted to it by external 
impetus, ‘thrust.’ This motion is contingent, since of course no inert body sets 
itself necessarily in motion.61 The contingent, externally communicated motion of 
thrust passes over into rest in the centre of gravity common to and posited by the 
bodies. Because the centre is outside matter, this rest can only be a striving to 
reach it and a pressure of the bodies on each other which seek it in common. 
When a body is separated from its centre of gravity by a relatively empty space, 
this striving becomes the motion of falling, “the essential motion” which the 
merely contingent motion of thrust passes over into.62 
It is at this point that gravity begins to take on its role “as the mover, as 
movement pure and simple.”63 Gravitational matter is, as stated at the outset, the 
union of attraction and repulsion. The shared centre of gravity and its position 
are posited by the gravity of individual bodies due to their intrinsic moment of 
attraction, and so the motion of falling to this centre and the direction of this 
motion for any particular body are immanently determined by matter itself. 
Falling is free and self-generated motion, as opposed to the externally 
conditioned and contingent motion of thrust, because it is generated immanently 
by the necessity of the nature of matter itself as gravity.64 
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However, falling must be qualified as only relatively free motion. This is 
because falling is still partly conditioned, in that the separation of any particular 
body from its centre of gravity is not posited by gravity itself, but is an externally 
posited, contingent circumstance.65 Matter’s separation from its centre of gravity 
is not yet the body’s own act, and thus the motion of falling is a middle or 
transitionary point in the dialectic of mechanics, lying between the purely 
external and contingent motion of inert matter and free motion.66 
In the motion of falling, gravity is posited one-sidedly as the attraction or 
identity of matter, but its other essential moment of repulsion must also be 
included. The diremption of the matter from its centre and into a plurality of 
differentiated bodies must be understood as gravity’s own act, that is, as equally 
essential to its nature and not an arbitrary circumstance.67 This repulsion does not 
take the form of merely pushing matter apart into a multiplicity of immobile 
bodies, as this would be to fall into an equally one-sided conception of gravity as 
repulsion alone. Rather, gravity’s moments of attraction and repulsion are now 
held together, both freely generated by gravity itself, and the tension of their 
contradiction sustained and manifested in absolutely free motion. Gravity thus 
shows itself to be necessarily realised in a system of the free motion of multiple 
bodies.68 Hegel goes on to give further detail on this system of free motion in his 
account of the solar system.69 However, for the specific purposes of this study it 
is not necessary to enter into this complex and conceptually challenging part of 
the Philosophy of Nature, and our exegesis of Hegel’s mechanics can end here. 
The preceding investigation of Hegel’s mechanics makes clear that 
although he and Spinoza agree that motion is intrinsic to the nature of matter, 
this claim amounts to different things for each. In the case of Spinoza, though 
motion is intrinsic to matter, no particular set of finite modes, considered in 
themselves, can determine themselves to motion. Considered in themselves, 
finite modes are inert, that is, only determined to motion or rest externally: “a 
body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another 
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body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that 
again by another, and so on, to infinity.”70  
Substance freely determines itself in infinitely many modes under 
infinitely many attributes, and so freely determines itself to exist as Extension, 
from which motion and rest follows as an immediate infinite mode. The infinitely 
many finite modes which follow from Substance as extended are thus 
intrinsically dynamic, in the sense that motion and rest is fundamental to their 
existence as modes of Extension. However, though motion is thus intrinsic to 
their nature, the finite modes of Extension cannot determine themselves to 
motion.  
Hegel argues that matter is intrinsically dynamic in what is, from a 
Hegelian viewpoint, a stronger sense which includes the Spinozist claim about 
matter’s intrinsic dynamism but goes further. The self-development of matter in 
Hegel’s mechanics manifests itself as a system of gravity in which matter freely 
generates motion as the expression of the tension of its moments of attraction and 
repulsion. Matter is thus intrinsically dynamic, not just in the Spinozist sense that 
motion and rest is essential to its conceivability and existence, but in the further 
sense that matter freely generates motion of its own accord through its necessary 
formation of gravitational systems. To understand the cause of the motion of a 
body, we have no need to refer to the Idea or to an infinite chain of causes. 
Rather, it is intrinsic to the nature of matter as self-external that it exhibit the 
tension of multiplicity and identity inherent in this structure, and matter does 
this in the free motion of systems of multiple bodies.  
Thus far this study has focused on the question of the development of 
material Nature and its fundamental determinations from the Absolute. In doing 
so it has elaborated a Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s position which points to the 
dialectic worked through in the conclusion to the Science of Logic and the opening 
of the Philosophy of Nature as providing an account which avoids the major 
explanatory deficiencies, from a Hegelian perspective, of Spinoza’s theory of 
extended Nature with regard to this question. We will now move on to consider 
a second major Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s view of extended Nature, 
concerning the broader structure of the natural world.   
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The preceding examination of Hegel and Spinoza’s accounts of mechanics 
has shown them to diverge in ways which, in comparison with what we will see 
below in Hegel’s account of physics and organics, are relatively subtle. However, 
already in mechanics we see the seeds of Hegel’s move to go beyond the 
conceptual bounds of the Spinozist picture. The concept of gravity, and 
particularly the centre of gravity, represents a key development in the dialectic of 
Nature, because in jointly positing a centre of gravity outside themselves, 
Nature’s bodies are no longer an infinitude of indifferent, self-subsistent ‘ones’, 
but of their own accord begin to sublate their self-externality. Though the centre 
of gravity is a relatively abstract unity of bodies, since as discussed above it is 
necessarily non-material and beyond any particular body, nonetheless this is the 
first emergence of the unity of the Idea in Nature, a totality existing in and 
through the diversity of its members. The rest of the self-development of Nature 
manifests itself as the gradual overcoming of its self-externality as its bodies take 
on more complex and comprehensive forms of unity, culminating in the Idea’s 
concrete self-realization in the organism. This dialectic forms a system of 
qualitatively distinct stages which, the Hegelian standpoint will claim, 
progressively sublate the mechanical and quantitative framework of Spinoza’s 
thought altogether. Before moving to discuss Hegel’s physics, however, it will be 
useful to give further detail to the discussion of extended modes in chapter four 
in order to make clear the Spinozist case for a purely mechanical and quantitative 












Chapter 10 - Spinoza on Nature’s Uniformity 
 
 
The uniformity of the laws governing Nature is one of Spinoza’s clearest theses, 
stemming directly from his core commitment to substance monism, and repeated 
across his works in a wide range of contexts. We find perhaps the most emphatic 
statement of his position in the preface to the third part of the Ethics: 
 
“Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are 
everywhere one and the same, i.e., the laws and rules of nature, according 
to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are 
always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature 
of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, viz., through the 
universal laws and rules of nature.”1  
 
Newlands argues that this passage represents the clearest expression of what he 
terms Spinoza’s ‘explanatory naturalism.’ This consists in the two key claims 
Spinoza makes about explanation in this passage. First, Spinoza affirms his 
commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason by claiming that everything can 
be explained through the laws of Nature. Secondly, though, Spinoza goes further 
in making a claim about the scope of proper explanations. As Newlands puts it, 
“Spinoza claims that the explanantia —'the laws and rules of Nature’—are 
changeless and universal in the sense that they always apply across all domains 
of explananda.”2 Explanatory principles do not admit exceptions, whether in the 
form of individual cases or certain classes of things, as is evidenced also by 
Spinoza’s criticism in the same preface of those who conceive of human beings as 
a “dominion within a dominion.”3 Although, as Newlands points out, Spinoza 
leaves room for “differences in complexity and degrees among the explananda”4, 
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nonetheless Newlands argues that, in Spinoza’s view, each of the most basic 
explanatory principles applies constantly and universally.5 
To give only a selection from the many corroborating examples found in 
the rest of Spinoza’s writing, in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect we 
find the laws of the infinite modes spoken of as “fixed and eternal things … 
according to which all singular things come to be, and are ordered,” or universals 
which are “the proximate causes of all things.”6 Further, in the Theological-Political 
Treatise we find talk of “the fixed and immutable order of nature, or the 
connection of natural things” which is determined by “the universal laws of 
nature, according to which all things happen and are determined”7, and, more 
specifically, reference to “the things most universal and common to the whole of 
nature: motion and rest, and their laws and rules, which nature always observes, 
and through which it continually acts.”8 
It is true that Spinoza does sometimes use the concept of law in a way 
which might give us pause in affirming this absolute uniformity. For instance, he 
refers to ‘human nature’ and its laws at various points in his writing, and with 
particular frequency in the Theological-Political Treatise. However, in the same text 
he states quite clearly that “God directs nature as its universal laws require, not 
as the particular laws of human nature require.”9 Again, in the context of the 
“eternal order of nature … man is only a small part. It is only by the necessity of 
this order that all individuals are determined to exist and have effects in a 
definite way.”10 
When we consider, further, Spinoza’s reference to “the laws of the nature 
of the blood” in the course of his analogy of the worm in the blood in letter 32 to 
Oldenburg11, it becomes most plausible to interpret Spinoza’s talk of the ‘law’ of 
a particular kind of thing as referring to their regular patterns of activity. These 
patterns are owed to their being conditioned by completely universal laws of 
Nature, and so Spinoza is referring to the way the universal laws of Nature 
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operate in the case of this specific kind of thing, rather than a particular set of 
laws. In sum, Spinoza claims quite clearly that every part of corporeal Nature is 
bound not only to some laws, but to the same laws.  
We saw in chapter four that Spinoza argues that every corporeal body can 
be understood through a particular ratio of motion and rest among the bodies of 
which it is composed. Although we’ve yet to look at Hegel’s competing theory in 
any detail, it will be helpful to orient ourselves at this point through setting up a 
broad comparison to be gradually given more detail. Whereas Spinoza holds that 
all bodies, from singular atoms to rocks and animals, are bound by the same laws 
of motion and rest and vary only in quantitative complexity, Hegel will attempt to 
demonstrate the development of qualitatively distinct stages of Nature, such as 
the mechanical, chemical and organic, functioning through irreducibly different 
principles.  
Before proceeding to Hegel’s account of Nature’s qualitative distinctions, 
in the interest of presenting a robust reading of Spinoza’s position it will be 
useful to consider whether, in addition to his already outlined general position 
on corporeal bodies, we can find resources within Spinoza’s work to form any 
more specific arguments against the introduction of qualitative distinctions of the 
kind Hegel wishes to draw. Although in his correspondence Spinoza is well-
known to have taken interest in topics which we would place in the domain of 
chemistry, due to the state of natural science at the time of his writing he did not 
possess the conception of a distinction between the domains of physics and 
chemistry comparable to that which we or Hegel might draw upon. Further, his 
remarks on these topics are speculative and could not fairly be deployed 
alongside his more developed thought without major qualification. However, in 
the Ethics Spinoza does give some consideration to the nature of living and non-
living bodies. As we will see in the next chapter, the category of the organic has 
great importance in Hegel’s account of the stages of Nature, and so establishing 








In part two of the Ethics, in transitioning from the physical interlude back to his 
consideration of the human mind, Spinoza lays down a series of postulates 
relating this general theory to the human body in particular, of which three are of 
particular interest to us: 
 
I: “The human body is composed of a great many individuals of different 
natures, each of which is highly composite.”12 
 
IV: “The human body, to be preserved, requires a great many other bodies, by 
which it is, as it were, continually regenerated.”13 
 
VI: “The human body can move and dispose external bodies in a great many 
ways.”14  
 
Quite in line with what we would expect, given the universality Spinoza claims 
for his general theory of finite bodies, the human body is simply subsumed into 
this framework as a compound body fundamentally no different from any other. 
Later on, in the demonstration of EIVp39, Spinoza reiterates the point made in 
postulate IV above, that the human body requires a great many other bodies to 
preserve itself, and, referring us back to his general definition of a compound 
body, tells us that the form of the human body consists in the communication of 
a certain fixed proportion of motion and rest among its parts. The preservation of 
the human body thus consists simply in the maintenance of this same proportion 
of motion and rest, and conversely, if the human body’s parts acquire a different 
proportion of motion and rest to one another, this will change the form of the 
human body, or in other words, destroy it.15 Indeed, Spinoza emphasises in the 
scholium immediately following these remarks that he ties the life and death of 
the human body to its possession of the particular ratio of motion and rest that 
constitutes its nature, and not to any other quality of the body. Spinoza is very 
clear that it is not necessary for the body to be reduced to a corpse, completely 
 
12 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EIIpostI, p.462 
13 Ibid. EIIpostIV, p.462 
14 Ibid. EIIpostV1, p.462 
15 Ibid. EIVp39d, pp.568-569 
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without motion or activity, for it to be ‘dead’ in his understanding. Despite 
continuing to exhibit activity, such as circulation, “the human body can 
nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely different from its own” and 
thereby ‘die’.16  
 Assuming that we may interpret these remarks on the human body as 
indicative of Spinoza’s view of organic bodies in general, which he gives us no 
obvious reason to doubt, we can see that Spinoza views living things as 
compound bodies following the same principles as compound bodies in general. 
Further, the ‘life’ and ‘death’ of such bodies is understood as their retaining or 
losing the ratio of motion and rest that constitutes their nature, thus making the 
conditions of the destruction or preservation of living things fundamentally no 
different than for anything else. It might be suggested that Spinoza could 
nonetheless recognize quantitative differences of degree in the complexity of 
organic and inorganic bodies, organic bodies being relatively more complex. 
However, if we recall his conception of an infinite scale of compound bodies of 
growing complexity, ending in the totality of corporeal Nature as a single body, 
it is doubtful Spinoza would recognize even this form of distinction between the 
organic and inorganic. Organic bodies can perhaps be said to be among the 
relatively more complex bodies found in Nature, but they themselves are but 
parts of the far grander structure of the system of corporeal Nature as a whole, in 
comparison with which any organism is a mere atom.   
Though Spinoza gives no explicit statement on the distinction, or lack 
thereof, between living and non-living Nature, we have seen that there are good 
reasons to attribute to him the position that organisms are complex but 
unexceptional examples of compound bodies, requiring no special explanation 
deviating from the principles for understanding finite bodies generally. In 
response to this position we might justly object that Spinoza, insofar as he has a 
theory of the organic which we should take seriously, cannot dispense with 
living matter so swiftly. What is distinctive about the nature of organisms comes 
not just from their particular corporeal arrangement, but from their self-
preserving activity, something not found in the inorganic. A bird is not just 
structured differently from a rock but acts to preserve itself in ways 
 
16 Ibid. EIVp39s, p.569 
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inconceivable for a rock. However, through his concept of the Conatus, Spinoza 
can address this objection while maintaining the organic to be without qualitative 
distinction from the rest of corporeal Nature, explaining the striving to self-
preservation as a completely universal and necessary feature of all things in no 
way particular to the organic. 
Spinoza begins establishing the Conatus in proposition four of the third 
part of the Ethics, which states that “no thing can be destroyed except through an 
external cause,”17 since “the definition of any thing affirms, and does not deny, 
the thing’s essence, or it posits the thing’s essence, and does not take it away.”18 
Thus, insofar as we attend only to the thing itself, excluding external causes, we 
shall find no reason that takes away or destroys it. To deny this would require 
asserting that the very essence of a thing can contain a cause which takes away its 
existence, in which case the thing cannot exist, since its existence will be taken 
away just as soon as it is posited. Hence, in the case of any thing that does or can 
possibly exist, its essence cannot contain anything which takes away its 
existence.19 
Following on from this, Spinoza proposes that “things are of a contrary 
nature, i.e., cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.”20 
This follows straightforwardly from the previous proposition, since if two 
contrary things, so conceived, could be in the same subject, then that subject 
would contain, considered in itself, a cause for its own destruction.21 Indeed, 
Viljanen suggests that “a subject with contradictory properties would, in fact, 
amount to the repugnant situation in which there would be something irrational 
and incomprehensible in the way reality itself is built.”22 Macherey emphasises 
that Spinoza is claiming here that contraries exclude each other insofar as they 
cannot coexist in constituting the same being or ‘subject’.23 Applying this to 
extended Nature, to be in the same subject means to coexist in a unified pattern 
of motion and rest.24 Similarly, Carriero reads Spinoza’s use of ‘essence’ in 
 
17 Ibid. EIIIp4, p.498 
18 Ibid. EIIIp4d, p.498 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. EIIIp5, p.498 
21 Ibid. EIIIp5d, p.498 
22 Viljanen, V. (2011) Spinoza's Geometry of Power. Cambridge University Press. p.96 
23 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. p.170 
24 Ibid. pp.174-175 
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relation to the Conatus as concerning the causal structure of the thing in 
question.25  
The central pillar of Spinoza’s theory of the Conatus comes in proposition 
six: “each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its 
being.”26 This is because all singular things are but modes, “things that express, 
in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts.”27 
Since no thing, considered in itself, contains anything that takes its existence 
away, and indeed all things are opposed to that which takes away their existence, 
all things, as far as their power enables them, necessarily strive to persevere in 
existence. Helpfully for understanding what Spinoza has in mind here, he goes 
on in the following proposition to make clear that this striving necessary to all 
things “is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”28 That is, the striving of 
each thing to preserve itself in existence should not be understood as some 
particular activity or disposition alongside and in addition to the other features 
of a thing. Rather, this striving is the very being, the very affirmation of a thing’s 
power of existing and acting that makes it the thing that it is. This striving is the 
expression of the share in the power of God that any thing has as a mode of 
Nature’s existence.  
This way of interpreting the Conatus is supported by Spinoza’s 
identification of this striving with “that very power by which the thing exists” in 
the demonstration of proposition eight.29 Further, in Metaphysical Thoughts, 
Spinoza argues that those who “distinguish between the thing itself and the 
striving that is in each thing to preserve its being” are sorely deluded, for 
“though the thing and its striving to preserve its being are distinguished by 
reason, or rather verbally (which deceives these people very greatly), they are not 
in any way really distinct.”30 In his interpretation of the Conatus, Carriero draws 
on this passage in placing strong emphasis on the binding together of the striving 
to persevere in existence with the very being of a thing. Carriero argues that it is 
simply part of what it is to be a real thing that it acts so as to promote its being, in 
 
25 Carriero, J. (2017). ‘Conatus’. In Melamed, Y. (Ed.), Spinoza's Ethics: A Critical Guide. Cambridge 
University Press. p.143, footnote 3 
26 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EIIIp6, p.498 
27 Ibid. EIIIp6d, p.499 
28 Ibid. EIIIp7, p.499 
29 Ibid. EIIIp8d, p.499 
30 Ibid. Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts. p.314 
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that this drive is “a concomitant, if you will, of its unity and integrity.”31 Indeed, 
Carriero suggests that this tendency “in a certain sense, is the individual,” since 
there is no subject prior to or separate from this tendency, but the drive of things 
toward self-preservation is “an artifact of their stability as real individuals.”32  
The interpretation of Spinoza’s conception of this striving as being 
completely universal to all things is corroborated by statements outside the 
Ethics, such as his remark in the Political Treatise that “each thing, as far as it can, 
strives to preserve its being.”33 Spinoza also states in the Theological-Political 
Treatise that “the supreme law of nature is that each thing strives to persevere in 
its state, as far as it can by its own power, and does this, not on account of 
anything else, but only of itself,” and emphasises the universality of this law by 
stating that he does not “recognize here any difference between men and other 
individuals in nature.”34 Indeed, Rutherford argues that the universality of the 
Conatus, the ‘supreme law of nature’, to all beings is important for Spinoza’s 
argument for his conception of natural right in the Theological-Political Treatise.35 
Spinoza’s specification here that each thing’s Conatus strives only on 
account of itself and not other things chimes with the point made by Macherey 
that the Conatus of modes, as fundamentally expressions of Substance’s power, 
are not opposing forces in a negative struggle with one another, but absolutely 
positive and purely causal affirmations of their existence.36  
As well as excluding opposition or negativity, Macherey stresses that the 
Conatus is free of teleology, excluding all reference to ends or temporality in 
general, and leading modes “nowhere except to what they are.”37 Indeed, 
Spinoza argues in the Ethics that this striving “involves no finite time, but an 
indefinite time.”38 This follows quite simply from the fact that, if the striving of 
any thing to preserve its existence involved a limited time, then it would follow 
 
31 Carriero, J. (2017). ‘Conatus’. In Melamed, Y. (Ed.), Spinoza's Ethics: A Critical Guide. Cambridge 
University Press. p.150 
32 Ibid. pp.150-151 
33 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume II. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. Political Treatise. Ch.II, p.509 
34 Ibid. Theological-Political Treatise. Ch.XVI, pp.282-283 
35 Rutherford, D. (2010) ‘Spinoza’s conception of law: metaphysics and ethics’. In Spinoza's 
Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide. (Eds. Melamed, Y. and Rosenthal, M.) Cambridge 
University Press. p.149 
36 Macherey, P. (2011). Hegel or Spinoza. University of Minnesota Press. p.200 
37 Ibid. 
38 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EIIIp8, p.499 
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from the essence of the thing itself that it would have to cease to exist after a 
certain duration. But, as we established above, no thing can contain in itself a 
cause for its own destruction, and so all things will necessarily continue to exist 
indefinitely unless destroyed by an external cause.39 This yields the further 
position that Spinoza regards death as an external contingency for life, not as 
necessary for life considered in itself. This is a claim that will be contested by 
Hegel’s account of organic life in the next chapter.  
Bringing this discussion back to the question of the status of organic 
things in Spinoza’s philosophy and the role of qualitative and quantitative 
determinacy, we have established that Spinoza does not hold there to be any 
qualitative feature special to living things which explains their characteristic 
activity. Quite the contrary, absolutely all things necessarily possess a 
qualitatively identical Conatus toward self-preservation. Garrett suggests that by 
breaking down the metaphysical distinction between living and non-living 
things in this way, Spinoza shows himself to be a mechanist through and 
through, in biology just as much as physics, conceiving “human beings, along 
with animals and plants, as existing at different points on a scale with inorganic 
things, rather than as parts of a ‘dominion within a dominion’40 possessed of a 
metaphysically special kind of causal force.”41  
However, even if we grant that all things strive to persevere in existence 
in this sense, we might still ask whether this can really be satisfactory as an 
explanation of the activity we see in organisms. That is, Spinoza’s account of self-
preservation as a general necessary condition for anything’s existence might be 
seen as merely formal or superficial. Even given the universality of some 
principle of self-preservation, can a bird’s striving for self-preservation plausibly 
be understood as no different to that of a rock? In response to this concern, 
Spinoza can reply that although the organism does not differ insofar as it strives 
to preserve itself, it does differ very much in the manner of its striving, both in 
terms of the ways in which it expresses its Conatus and the power it has to 
express it. The far greater complexity of a bird affords it many more ways in 
which it can interact with other bodies, and along with this a far greater power to 
 
39 Ibid. EIIIp8d, p.499 
40 Ibid. EIII Preface, p.491 
41 Garrett, D. (2012). ‘A Reply on Spinoza’s Behalf’. In Spinoza and German Idealism. Eds. Förster, E. 
and Melamed, Y. Cambridge University Press. p.251 
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enforce its Conatus against destruction by external causes. However, once again, 
this differentiation remains quantitative and establishes no distinction in kind 
between ‘living’ and ‘non-living’ things.  
Connecting what we have said so far with Spinoza’s theory of confused 
ideas and false universals lends further strength to the assessment that, in his 
view, any hard distinction between living and non-living bodies is illusory, as 
well as giving us an account of why we are commonly drawn to make this false 
distinction. In the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza gives a brief account of the 
causes of what he calls transcendental and universal concepts. Transcendental 
terms, such as ‘being’, ‘thing’, and ‘something’, arise from the mind’s ability to 
form only a limited number of distinct images at once, beyond which these 
images become confused with one other. The mind will at that point imagine 
these images confusedly, without distinction, and conceive them as being 
grouped together under one term, such as ‘Being’ or ‘Thing’. Universal terms, 
such as ‘man’, ‘horse’ and ‘dog’ have a similar origin. So many images are 
formed at once that they surpass the power of the imagination, and at that point 
the mind can no longer retain the slight differences between individual images, 
or their number, and only distinctly imagines what they all agree in, “insofar as 
they affect the body.”42 That is, the perceived common property of the images 
will be what has, overall, affected the body most forcefully, since all the images 
have affected it in this way. Universal terms, as a result, are not formed in the 
same way by all, since they are constituted in each individual by what has 
affected the body most frequently and the mind recollects most easily. Universal 
terms thus reflect the disposition of the body much more than they do the real 
natures of things, revealing, Spinoza suggests, the folly and false controversies of 
those “who have wished to explain natural things by mere images of things.”43 
Spinoza does not explicitly identify the concept of the organic as a 
confused idea of this kind, but from what we have seen so far, it would be very 
natural for him to do so, suggesting, as he has been interpreted here, that upon 
examination, ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’ are not terms that can be said to 
correspond to a real distinction in the nature of things. Further, it is not difficult 
 
42 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 




to see how we might offer a plausible explanation of why we should form such 
false concepts, in line with the account Spinoza offers in the case of other general 
terms. We are much more disposed to think of those finite bodies with which we 
are in regular contact, as opposed to the overall macro-structure of Nature in 
which they are situated. Among these bodies we find some, including our own, 
which are capable of interacting with other bodies and being affected by them in 
a great many more ways than other bodies, as well as having a far greater 
structural complexity. Indeed, the disparity in complexity and activity appears so 
great that we take these bodies to be of a distinct kind, namely ‘living’, though 
this concept’s lack of basis in a real distinction in the things themselves means 
that its criteria will necessarily remain either vague or arbitrary.  
In this chapter we have built on the discussion of the modal system in 
chapter four to bring out the ‘uniformity’ of Spinoza’s mechanical conception of 
extended Nature more explicitly. This is manifest, firstly, in extended Nature’s 
being structured by a single set of fundamental principles, the laws of motion, 
and secondly, in extended Nature’s variety of modal expressions being 
constituted by quantitative differences in the complexity of patterns of motion and 
rest alone, not qualitatively different forms of Nature. Spinoza’s theory of the 
Conatus has also been brought into the picture to help to make sense of the 
resulting breakdown of the distinction between ‘living’ and ‘non-living’ things, 
universalising the drive to self-preservation and placing the ‘organic’ and 
‘inorganic’ on a quantitative scale of complexity and power. In the next chapter, 
we will take up Hegel’s account of the dialectic of Nature from where we left it at 
the conclusion of mechanics, now focusing our attention on Hegel’s strongly 
contrasting account of Nature as immanently driven through a series of 
qualitatively differentiated stages, and making explicit the critique of Spinoza’s 







Chapter 11 - Metamorphosis in Hegel’s Nature 
 
 
Earlier we took up the following passage as a particularly clear statement of 
Spinoza’s position on Nature’s uniformity: 
 
“Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are 
everywhere one and the same, i.e., the laws and rules of nature, according 
to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are 
always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature 
of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, viz., through the 
universal laws and rules of nature.”1  
 
Returning to this quotation, we can now draw special attention to the notion of 
things changing from one form to another which is brought up here. The 
insistence that every change of form is governed by one and the same set of laws, 
in combination with his general model of explanation of finite corporeal Nature 
through an analysis of kinetic relationships, indicates that Spinoza understands 
every difference of form to be a matter of relative quantitative complexity. This 
situates Spinoza in stark opposition to the metamorphosis of Nature through 
qualitatively distinct spheres which Hegel argues for. 
Hegel describes Nature as a “system of stages,”2 each arising from its 
predecessor and providing the basis for its successor, but rejects both ‘evolution’ 
and ‘emanation’, taken in separation, as models for this progression. By 
‘evolution’, Hegel refers to a process beginning with the most immediate and 
simple categories of Nature, such as the abstract space we examined earlier, and 
following their development of gradually greater complexity, ending in the full 
actuality of the Idea as Nature. By ‘emanation’, on the other hand, Hegel refers to 
a process beginning from this full actuality, which then emanates gradually less 
fully realized, more basic forms of existence from itself.  
 
1 Spinoza, B. (2016). The collected works of Spinoza: Volume I. Edited and Translated by Curley, E. 
Princeton University Press. EIII Preface, p.492 
2 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. §249 
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In Hegel’s conception, the structures of evolution and emanation, 
seeming to flow in opposite directions, exist together in a process he calls 
‘metamorphosis.’ As in emanation, there is a single Idea, present from the 
beginning and existent in every stage and particular thing of Nature, which are 
all the diverse manifestations of it. But, as in evolution, the process begins with 
the most basic forms of Nature, following matter’s raising itself from its 
externality into a progressively more adequate manifestation of the Idea. Hegel 
draws an analogy with the metamorphosis of an insect from pupa, to caterpillar, 
and then butterfly, all of which are understood as the progressing forms of one 
and the same individual. The different stages develop from the most basic to the 
most complex, but the end result is also already contained in the beginning, the 
whole progression being the unfolding of a single principle. This analogy is 
particularly appropriate because of Hegel’s emphasising that while it is 
important to hold in view the identity of the various forms of Nature as 
manifestations of the Idea, it is equally important to preserve their genuine 
differentiation. Hegel remarks in particular that when we conceive change only 
quantitatively, it is this differentiation which is pushed into the background. 
When we seek to understand the series of things, forms or stages found in 
Nature, we look for a law of the series, a single basic principle which, in the 
process of reiterating itself, engenders new differences. However, we must be 
cautious not to conceive the progression of this series as only a successive 
addition of elements, each similarly determined and holding the same relation to 
the others. It will be a key claim of Hegel’s that the Idea does not generate its 
determinations in a quantitatively graded series, but advances by leaps as it 
produces qualitatively differentiated forms. The butterfly does not represent only 
a quantitative progression over the pupa, but is a qualitatively different being.3 
However, unlike the individual transformation of the insect, the 
metamorphosis of the Idea as Nature does not take place in time. This will be a 
very important point to keep in mind as we proceed. Just as above, in his 
explication of space, time, motion and matter, Hegel was not claiming, for 
example, that at some chronological point there existed an abstract absolute 
space without time, he must not be interpreted below to be claiming that at some 
 
3 Ibid. §§249, Zusatz; 252, Zusatz 
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chronological point there existed magnetism without electricity, or, more 
broadly, a universe governed solely by mechanics without any chemical or 
organic bodies. It may turn out that empirical investigation reveals there to have 
been a chronological process of the separation of fundamental forces, or that life 
did not exist in the universe until a certain time. However, these empirical 
findings are not relevant to the subject matter of Hegel’s analysis and may be 
accepted by him without issue. Hegel’s claim concerns, instead, the rational 
necessity of Nature’s forms and stages, which yields them all eternally and ‘at 
once.’4 
Another significant point of divergence from the insect analogy comes in 
the fact that the dialectical progression of Nature does not nullify or leave behind 
previous stages as it steps forward. Hegel will attempt to show that each 
successive stage embodies the previous stages, in the sense of taking up those 
structures into a higher, more comprehensive unity, but at the same time, in line 
with the broader structural externality characteristic of Nature, each stage 
persists in existence ‘side-by-side’ with the others. The mechanical and physical 
spheres of Nature show themselves to lead necessarily to the organic, but this 
does not mean that every natural thing is organic. Rather, organic beings exist in 
relation with inorganic Nature, self-determining but also necessarily in sympathy 
with the environment from which they draw their sustenance.5 This is a point 
which will become clearer as we progress, but is worth having in view from the 
start.  
Whereas we have so far largely considered concepts which Hegel and 
Spinoza share (though they may differ as to the specifics of their content and 
interrelation), as Hegel proceeds to elaborate on physical, chemical and organic 
nature, the array of categories through which Nature is to be conceived grows far 
beyond that employed by Spinoza. Hegel’s being able to draw on almost two 
centuries’ additional advance in the natural sciences no doubt has much 
significance here. However, it would be unconvincing to argue for the 
superiority of Hegel’s philosophy of Nature simply on the basis of its including a 
concept, such as electricity, which Spinoza lacks, or on the basis of its greater 
range and specificity of concepts more broadly. It would remain open to 
 
4 Ibid. §249 
5 Ibid. §§252, Zusatz; 270, Zusatz 
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responds, from a Spinozist standpoint, that this wealth of determinations simply 
corresponds to an explication of the ever-increasing complexity of relations of 
motion and rest among the finite modes of Extension, and thus provides no 
evidence of qualitative metamorphosis. A broader set of concepts provides no 
critique of Spinoza whatsoever if all can be reduced legitimately to motion and 
rest. The purpose, therefore, of carrying out a condensed examination of the 
course of Hegel’s dialectical account of Nature, is rather to bring out the 
qualitative shifts in Nature’s existence which necessitate Hegel’s employment of 
this array of concepts and force us, in his view, beyond the quantitative analysis 
offered by Spinoza.  
 
 
11.1 - Physics 
 
As we saw in chapter nine, Hegel argues that the dialectic of mechanics is the 
process of Nature’s self-externality working through the contradictions 
generated by its equally essential moments of difference and identity, present in 
it specifically as its indifferent continuity and sundered externality. At the 
conclusion of mechanics, the being of matter as gravity, when fully actualised as 
a system of free motion, holds matter’s identity and difference together. Gravity 
is not merely the identity of matter in a centre, with the externality of matter 
outside it, but manifests both of matter’s moments equally, repelling matter into 
a multiplicity of bodies and manifesting the dialectic of matter’s attraction and 
repulsion as free motion. 
Up to this point, bodies have only existed as bundles of points in motion, 
and gravity has determined only the spatial inter-relationships of these points. 
Matter’s form, its self-identity, is tied up wholly with its centre of gravity, a point 
of unity which, though posited and determined by matter’s externality, 
nonetheless lies ‘outside’ any material point. Gravitational matter’s unity is thus 
“only a unity of the place it seeks, not a concrete One, a self.”6 However, Hegel 
argues that, in manifesting itself as a system of free motion, matter sublates this 
separation of its moments of identity and difference into the abstract self-identity 
 
6 Ibid. §271, Zusatz 
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of an ideal centre and its equally abstract externality as mere points. Matter’s 
identity in the centre of gravity is now nothing without its differentiation into a 
plurality of bodies, in the sense that if gravity does not produce and maintain 
both moments then its self-externality will collapse into abstract homogeneity 
and in that case will cease to be the being of self-external matter at all. This has 
the consequence that matter’s particularity in a plurality of bodies must be 
determinate in its own right. Determinacy does not belong only to a singular 
ideal self, the system of gravity as one ‘body’, but rather to “each determinate 
existence,” giving us “qualified matter – the sphere of Physics.”7 
Material bodies are no longer anonymous points owing their determinacy 
wholly to an external, ideal centre, but have qualitative determinacy of their own. 
Hegel specifies that unlike the quantitative, external determination which has 
pervaded matter’s merely mechanical existence, these are properly qualitative 
determinations of matter itself, the removal of which would destroy its being, 
and without which matter is nothing.8 What this individuality of matter consists 
in will have to be shown in the course of its dialectic; at this point it can be stated 
only that, though matter certainly still exists in relation to gravity and is subject 
to mechanical interaction with other bodies, the ‘inner’ identity and individuality 
of the material body now begins to determine its own spatiality in contest with 
the dominion of gravity. The consummation of the concept of gravity has thus 
resulted in the beginning of matter’s liberation from it, a process which will 
dominate much of the rest of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. 
 
 
11.2 - Density and Cohesion 
 
Hegel argues that the most basic and immediate way in which a particular body 
can be understood to have a determinacy of its own is through its spatiality, and 
specifically its having ‘specific gravity’, or density. Having a particular density, a 
specific relation of its mass to its volume, though giving only a quantitative 
specification, means that matter is no longer a uniform filling of space. Rather, 
the body thereby has a determinacy of its own which it does not possess only in 
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virtue of its relation to a centre of gravity and can be understood independently 
of it.9 
In the sphere of mechanics, bodies are differentiated only by position, 
velocity and mass. The last of these is measured simply by the amount of space a 
body fills, a greater number of parts corresponding to a larger space occupied. 
Thus, bodies as mechanical are all just the same, merely clumps of mass 
governed by gravity. However, the new determination of density gives a 
specificity to the body’s external spatiality that sets it apart from other bodies, by 
giving equal volumes different weights, or equal weights different volumes. This 
immanent relation of weight to volume constitutes an independent, self-
subsistent determination of the body, in the sense that the relation of the body’s 
weight to its volume is a self-relation which does not depend on any other body. 
The body’s density gives it a selfhood of its own, and of a kind previously 
inaccessible to matter, having been wholly determined by its abstract centre of 
gravity and the action of other bodies.  
Density represents the first major step in fleshing out the transition from 
quantitative to qualitative determination signalled at the outset of the physical 
sphere. The determination of matter can no longer be given simply in terms of a 
quantification of the positions, velocities and number of homogenous units. 
Indeed, the ‘body’ is no longer a pseudo-arbitrary grouping of indifferent points 
by their relative position. This is because we now have the individuality of the 
body as a real, material unity, manifest concretely in its particular density, a self-
determined relation of its parts. Though density can be expressed quantitatively, 
the quantitative begins to give way here to the qualitative in a determination 
specific to the body and pervading its every part, giving it an inner self-relation 
absent from the body as mechanical.10 
Density is described by Hegel as a ‘simple’ determination of matter, 
referring to the fact that though this pervades each of the body’s parts, it is 
present as a single relation of weight to volume which is indifferent to the mass 
of the body. As Hegel reminds us, though, matter is essentially self-external and 
sundered into a plurality of parts. As a result, density, as the determination of a 
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physical body, must necessarily also determine a specific mode of the spatial 
interrelation of its parts, which Hegel terms ‘cohesion.’11 
While density can be understood to present another ‘centrality’ opposed 
to the centre of gravity, in the sense that it is a singular determination which 
pervades the body’s parts but is also indifferent to the mass of the body and its 
particular arrangement, cohesion advances on this to determine the body’s 
plurality in a specific way. The coherence of a number of parts is not just their 
possession of the same specific gravity or a certain relation of position, but a real 
relationship and contact with each other.12 
In its cohesion the body posits a mode of spatial relation among its parts 
distinct from that determined by gravity and mechanical interaction with other 
bodies. Gravity’s determination of matter’s spatiality through attraction and 
repulsion is indifferent to its unity in particular bodies, rather acting on matter as 
a set of indifferent units. Further, in the sphere of mechanics, ‘bodies’, really at 
that stage just groupings of indifferent units contingently sharing proximity over 
time, responded to their contact with one another in relations of pressure and 
thrust purely as quantitative masses. However, as cohesive, physical bodies 
maintain themselves in unity in particular ways and to specific degrees 
characteristic of their specific qualitative nature as individual bodies. A body’s 
cohesion is a particular self-relation among its parts not reducible to their simply 
having spatial proximity determined externally by gravitational attraction or 
their having been contingently thrust together by mechanical impact. This 
physical contact and coherency of a body’s parts is manifest, at this early stage, 
only in its resistance to the mechanical effect of other masses upon it.13 
Though cohesion represents a unity of the individual body in opposition 
to the universal unity of gravity, cohesion is nonetheless still a conditioned 
individuality, manifest only through the action of other bodies as a mode of 
resistance. Hegel describes the cohesive body as having only an ‘inner’ Shape, in 
contrast with the free individuality of Shape which will come later.14 The most 
natural way of interpreting this notion of ‘inner’ shape is that Hegel is pointing 
out that although the cohesive body resists the negation of its spatiality by the 
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mechanical imposition of other bodies, cohesion does not determine the totality 
of the arrangement of the body’s spatiality throughout its dimensions and 
surfaces. It is still a conditioned individuality manifest in resistance and not yet a 
formative principle actively determining the body’s spatiality of its own accord.  
 
 
11.3 - Elasticity, Sound and Heat 
 
When one cohesive mass impacts another, the affected body suffers a negation of 
its material being as occupying a particular space. The struck body then offers 
resistance, reciprocally negating this imposition of another body into its space 
and repelling it. Thus, the cohesive body simultaneously gives way and 
maintains its character in response to the violence of another body. Since the 
body is a whole of mutually external parts, when the whole is impacted by and 
gives way to an external pressure, its parts impact and give way to each other. 
However, the parts, being self-subsistent, reinstate themselves in the face of this 
negation of their place. The body is no longer an impermeable homogenous mass 
but yields to external pressure through an inward oscillation of yielding to the 
negation of its place and negating this negation in reinstating itself. Indeed, the 
repelling body does not reinstate itself simply as a mass. Rather, the cohesive 
body reinstates itself precisely as cohesive, that is, it reasserts or re-establishes the 
particular internal spatial self-relation that constitutes its nature. Hegel calls this 
simultaneous yielding and self-preservation of the body’s form in the face of 
outer violence ‘elasticity.’15 
Elasticity is described by Hegel as “cohesion displaying itself in 
motion,”16 and it does this in a double negation: the negation of the mutual 
externality of the material parts and the negation of this as re-establishing their 
asunderness as a cohesive plurality, each negation evoking the other. The being 
of the elastic body is thus a single identity alternating between two mutually 
sublating determinations, giving the inner oscillation of the body, or ‘sound.’17 
The physical body’s identity, having thus far been submerged in matter’s 
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externality in the categories of density and cohesion, now “achieves independent 
existence and mechanically soul-like manifestation” in the negation of this 
asunderness.18 Hegel calls sound “subjectivity in process of liberation,”19 in the 
sense that the body is beginning to explicitly develop a ‘self’ which is determined 
neither by a centre of gravity outside it, nor by the particular arrangement of its 
parts at one moment. Rather, in the sound produced by the body’s oscillation, a 
single identity is made manifest which pervades the body’s parts and positions 
and sustains its nature through the negation and reinstatement of its density and 
cohesion.  
This oscillation must be distinguished from external change of place, or 
alteration of a body’s spatial relation to other bodies, which is movement in the 
ordinary sense. Oscillation does, of course, involve this ordinary sense of 
movement, but the body’s vibration reveals, unlike ordinary movement, that its 
being is not bound up with a particular spatial position or arrangement.20 The 
dialectic of physics has thus brought us to the point where the physical body 
sublates its determination as a multiplicity of mutually external and subsistent 
parts, showing its specific nature instead to lie in a singular, inner identity, now 
manifesting itself in the oscillation of sound.21 This identity can be called an 
‘ideal,’ negative unity, in the sense that it is not synonymous with any particular 
spatial determination of the body, but manifests itself as the continual negation 
of this self-external spatiality in its oscillation.  
However, sound sublates the asunderness of the cohesive body’s parts 
only in an abstract, partial way.22 Sound is the alternation of materiality between 
asunderness and its negation, and so restores the sundered spatial arrangement 
of cohesion just as it negates it, this being the nature of its oscillating double 
negation. Sound thus cannot give the full sublation of matter’s externality, 
because it always necessarily reaffirms this just as much as it negates it.  
Though sound cannot achieve the full sublation of matter’s externality 
itself, it does nonetheless indicate the necessity of this sublation, since matter’s 
being is no longer identified with its spatial externality, and this falls to the 
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further category of ‘heat.’ Hegel describes heat as “the negation of materiality set 
free”, a negation which no longer reflexively evokes the very asunderness it 
negates, as in sound, but consumes it, reducing it to continuous ‘fluidity.’23 Heat, 
however, as the determinate negation of matter’s cohesion, remains conditioned 
by this determination, that is, bound up in its reference to the very externality it 
negates. Although matter’s ideality negates its externality, this negation by heat 
as destruction of matter’s asunderness cannot rid itself wholly of externality. To 
simply wipe away self-externality would be to take away spatiality and, indeed, 
all the structures of Nature (the Idea in its self-externality) developed thus far, 
including matter itself. Matter’s ideality, though no longer only an implicit 
moment submerged in externality, has not yet attained to a free self-relation, but 
remains bound in relation to its externality.24 Matter’s ideality and externality 
are, however, now in a qualitatively different form of relation to that seen thus 
far, which Hegel names ‘Shape’.  
Physics begins with a conception of Nature still comfortably accounted 
for by Spinoza’s quantitative mechanical model. However, the progression 
through to Shape sees a transition from the purely quantitative determination of 
matter in mechanics through the position and velocity of homogenous points to 
the emergence of an ‘inner’ qualitative being of the body not reducible to the 
quantitative determinations of its external spatiality and motion. To highlight 
some of the key moments in this development, we have seen that as density 
matter takes the first step in this progression, gaining a singular individuality 
through this determination which pervades the externality of its parts and gives 
it an inner self-relation. Further on, as sound, the body expresses a ‘self’ which 
sublates the mutual externality of its parts and their particular arrangement at 
any moment, sustaining itself through the variations of density and cohesion. 
Though matter’s ideality cannot sublate its externality altogether, even as the 
fluidity of heat, this growing assertion of matter’s inner identity over against its 
externality sets the stage for Shape. This next stage of Nature will see the body’s 
inner ideality begin to act as an immanent formative principle, determining its 
external spatiality for itself throughout its dimensions and surfaces, rather than 
the body’s identity manifesting itself only through resistance to external 
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mechanical force. The individual body will thus increasingly assert its qualitative 
being and internal power of determination over against its external mechanical 
determination by gravity and transitive chains of causality. 
 
 
11.4 - Shape 
 
In the structure of Shape, matter’s externality no longer stands as self-subsistent 
and independent in the face of its negative ideality. Matter’s ideality now takes 
up the position of a new inner ‘centrality’ which, unlike gravity, does not have 
the multiplicity of material parts outside it, but immanently determines this 
plurality. This manifests itself as an active principle of organization, requiring no 
outer stimulus, which sublates matter’s external, spatial determinations into its 
own structure, freely developing these for itself as a total formative principle.25  
Shape is, of course, the forming and determining of nothing else but 
matter, which so far has only spatial determinations. Therefore, Shape at first can 
only be a determining of spatial relations. Recalling our earlier discussion of 
space as found at the beginning of the dialectic of Nature, we can see that the 
most basic form of spatial determination is the point. Thus, Shape must 
minimally be a determination of points. However, as merely a determining of 
points, Shape falls into the same tension which drove the first dialectic of space 
on to more developed spatial determinations. Namely, on the one hand, Shape 
takes on a punctiform principle, owing to the differentiation of each point from 
every other, but on the other hand, due to the homogeneity of these points, Shape 
succumbs to a lack of any determinate internal or external differentiation, 
expanding without limit both intensively and extensively.26 
Shape, being the determination of matter’s externality for itself, cannot 
remain in indeterminacy, and so must introduce differentiation into its spatiality. 
The most minimal conception of determinacy within a punctiform space is the 
line, a determinate relation of points in which they are its opposed extremes. As 
moments of a line, points lack subsistent existence and derive their determinacy 
from their opposed relation, in which the line as such stands as an indifferent 
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middle term. Hegel calls this first form of Shape ‘magnetism,’ by which he refers 
to Shape’s determining the body’s spatiality linearly in two dimensions. Shape 
manifests itself here as a central form which posits the body’s determinations as 
its differences, or ‘poles,’ standing in opposition but unified in that each is 
determined only by its opposition to the other. The different determinations of 
matter as Shape thus have no self-subsistence or identity apart from their unity in 
Shape.27 Though space is still relied on to provide determinate differentiation, the 
externality of space no longer dominates. Hegel remarks that here we can see the 
Idea’s conceptual structure beginning to emerge more explicitly in the sphere of 
Nature, conceived as a oneness which sustains itself in its diremption as the 
pervasive universal and substance of its differences.28 
Shape goes on to determine spatiality in all dimensions as ‘crystal’, freely 
shaping the body in every direction. As crystal, Shape forms and limits the body 
both inwardly and outwardly, showing itself not only in an internal coherence of 
the body’s parts, but bounding its surface from other bodies too, delineating the 
body’s determinate limit without this having to be revealed in the action of other 
bodies upon it.29 The crystalline body stands as a totality unifying its 
differentiated determinations as its properties or predicates, these having no 
existence independent from their substrate. The body is not split apart from 
within into its determinations but endures as a single totality of these internal 
distinctions.  
In thus housing these particular determinations, the body as such, as a 
totality, can now bear determination. Further, this holding together of particular 
determinations as properties of a single totality allows the differentiation and 
process of this totality vis-à-vis other whole individual bodies.30 This represents a 
significant step in that while particular differences provide a relatively abstract, 
merely internal differentiation within a single body, the differentiation between 
bodies as totalities forges the path on to physical differentiation and processes 
among bodies far more complex than mechanical impact or elastic resistance. 
In Shape we find the first emergence of an inner formative principle of 
precisely the kind which was ruled out in Macherey’s interpretation of Spinoza’s 
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theory of extended bodies discussed in chapter four. There we saw that 
Macherey argues that we should understand bodies in Spinozism as 
circumstantial assemblages of parts brought together by the pressure of external 
causes and unified only insofar as they form a stable pattern of motion and rest, 
each part maintaining its subsistence as a body in its own right throughout. In 
other words, we must understand the union and formation of bodies along 
strictly mechanistic lines, without any notion of an internal formative principle 
which determines the body’s structure. Against this self-subsistent indifference 
of the constitutive elements of Spinozist bodies towards their union, the 
determinations of the shaped body, for Hegel, are dependent on the central 
formative principle of the body’s ‘Shape’ for their being. Indeed, the body is now 
in a position to take on qualitative determinacy as a whole, taking the form of a 
single being that possesses a multiplicity of determinations rather than a 
collection of determinations contingently conjoined. Schliesser suggests that the 
homogeneity of matter follows from Spinoza’s Substance monism31, and this 
would certainly fit with the quantitative interpretation of differentiation within 
his philosophy of extended Nature argued for in this study. Hegel’s account of 
electricity and the chemical process will challenge this position through an 
elaboration of the qualitative differentiation of, and process between, bodies. 
 
 
11.5 - Electricity and the Chemical Process 
 
At first the total bodies preserve their independent identity in the face of their 
relation as totalities, yielding the structure Hegel calls ‘electricity.’ Hegel 
describes this relation as ‘superficial’ in comparison with the ‘real’ and deeper 
relation these bodies will subsequently find in the chemical process.32 The 
electrical relation takes the form of a tension in which bodies maintain their 
independence and identity as totalities while positing their difference from one 
another. This opposition does not involve an interaction or process of the 
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particular determinations of the bodies, but rather is only a relation of the bodies 
as totalities, which are related only as different.33 
In the electrical relation there are not resources to give this tension a 
direct resolution, the bodies remaining independent and unaltered by one 
another. However, the way that the total bodies in this relation are conceived 
proves inadequate, because it one-sidedly configures them as purely 
independent and self-subsistent wholes. This renders these total bodies abstract 
‘presuppositions,’ in the sense that although they possess an internal principle of 
formation, which produces their various determinations, nonetheless they do not 
show themselves as formed, that is, as not just arbitrarily posited in existence but 
the result of a concrete, material process. The various forms of body examined 
previously in the course of mechanics and physics have not shown themselves as 
formed in this sense either. However, it is here that this inadequacy becomes 
explicit and demands resolution. This is because, unlike these previous 
conceptions of the body, the electrical body poses explicitly as a self-subsistent 
whole, freely determining its properties for itself from its internal principle of 
formation. Shape has shown itself to be the ideal principle forming each of the 
physical body’s determinations for itself, but the existence of these shaped bodies 
as such must also be accounted for by Shape, that is, by the self-determination of 
physical matter. This physical formation of bodies is the chemical process.34 
The chemical process takes the form of an overarching macro-process, of 
which the bodies previously considered as independent totalities are but 
moments. This overall process is driven forward cyclically by the alternation of 
its two sides. On the one hand, the chemical process posits the identity of 
chemical bodies as all but moments of this singular process. Each body owes its 
being to its position within the macro-process and so does not stand in self-
subsistent independence. On the other hand, although chemical bodies are not 
self-subsistent, neither are they subsumed as the determinations of a single body, 
as the poles of magnetism or surfaces of the crystalline body were. This would be 
to collapse the chemical process back to the process of formation of an individual 
shaped body. Rather, the chemical process is the genesis of whole, differentiated 
bodies, and so just as this process reveals the identity of bodies as its dependent 
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moments, it also asserts their differentiation or ‘dissociation.’ The relation of 
chemical bodies is thus the identity of non-identical wholes, and the chemical 
relation is a process precisely because of this contradictory structure.35 As 
Burbidge describes it, in the chemical process “differentiated objects combine 
into something undifferentiated; an identity is differentiated into its moments.” 
While these moments are independent, differentiated bodies, “they are yet 
identified within a total individuality as directly related to each other,” and the 
contradiction of their identity and difference drives the process in which these 
two terms cycle “from identity to difference and from difference to identity.”36  
Crucially, this is a process not just of the relative motion of bodies, 
placing them together or driving them apart. Chemical bodies do not interact 
merely through friction or external impact, as in mechanical interaction. Rather, 
the whole corporeality of the body enters into and is subject to the chemical 
process, which exposes every property of the body to alteration. Every 
determination, and indeed the very existence and being of the body, is shown to 
be relative and transient. The development over the course of physics by which 
physical bodies have gained more determinacy and specificity has thus also 
made their finitude and dependence more explicit.37 As Stone points out, in the 
chemical process bodies no longer have determinations ‘superimposed’ onto 
them by a principle of Shape arranging them spatially. Rather, qualitative 
determinations are now ‘infused’ “into the very way in which the units of matter 
exist, so that these units no longer retain any purely quantitative aspect.”38  
The specific chemical nature of a body is determined by the particular 
processes through which it occupies various positions in the overall circle of 
processes, or in other words, its series of possible reactions. In one process, a 
body will take on the position of a condition, and then in another process a 
product, and the examination of a body’s set of possible processes is the only 
basis for a classification of chemical bodies.39 The description of what a body is 
can now only be given through an enumeration of its full cycle of alterations and 
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interactions. There is no single state in which a body’s true individuality can be 
given, as its nature is displayed equally in each of its full set of states.40 
Hegel specifies that “the totality of the reactions exists only as a sum, not 
as an infinite return-into-self.”41 That is, there is no essential being of, for 
example, iron, which alternately takes on the determinations of solidity, liquidity, 
hardness, softness, orange or grey coloration, and so on. There is no absolute 
nature of iron that variously takes on these accidents and preserves itself 
unchanged throughout in an ‘infinite return-into-self’, as Hegel puts it. Rather, 
iron is merely the sum of these states, and so its being is utterly relative to the 
chemical processes it undergoes. The ‘it’ here is not a stable identity, but a being 
which expresses itself only in its various chemical reactions with other bodies. 
What posed as an independent, self-subsistent Shape in the form of the electrical 
body shows itself now to be intrinsically relative and unable to stand enduring 
before the process which it owes its genesis to.  
Looking to the broader progression of Nature, the chemical process, much 
more clearly than any previous stage, shows Nature’s raising itself to the 
structure of the Idea, that is, a oneness which sustains itself in its diremption as 
the pervasive universal and substance of its differences. While the inner necessity 
of the Idea has lain at the heart of Nature all along, the sundered self-externality 
of this domain, perpetuated from the most abstract category of space and on into 
the merely external interactions of material bodies in mechanics, has deprived 
the Idea of a concrete manifestation, i.e. an existence which reflects its conceptual 
structure. The chemical process has now begun to give the Idea this existence 
because it strips immediacy away from material bodies. These are no longer 
indifferent bodies interacting only externally through collision, but all bodies 
now acquire their nature only through their relations, the chemical process 
altering not only their relative motions and positions but their essential 
determinations. Bodies, and the processes which define, generate and destroy 
them, are shown to be moments of a single total chemical process, and not self-
subsistent, mutually external or independent.  
This restless process of enduring self-contradiction is the first appearance 
in Nature of the infinite subjectivity that will later receive actuality in organic life. 
 




Indeed, Hegel describes the chemical process as an ‘analogue’ of life which 
would already be organic if the cycle of reactions could perpetuate itself 
spontaneously. As we shall see further on below, no member or part of a living 
body can endure or exist in independence, but only in the unity of the organism 
as a whole. Looking back over the course of the development of Nature, we can 
see that in the mechanical sphere each body retained its independent identity in 
the face of changing spatio-temporal relations with other bodies. However, in the 
chemical process and then even more so the vital process, the being of each body 
shows itself to be tied up with the unity it is a member of.42  
The nature of matter in the chemical process stands in strong contrast to 
its mechanical existence and Spinoza’s insistence on the enduring subsistence of 
bodies even when they are parts of larger unities. Bodies are no longer only 
externally related in mechanical interactions of collision and comparatively 
superficial unities of physical contact and arrangement. Rather, from the 
Hegelian standpoint elaborated here, the chemical process both gives each body 
its very nature, that is, gives each body the essential determinations that make it 
the qualitative kind of body it is, and subjects each body to a radical relativity, the 
body’s every determination, along with its very existence, being but a moment of 
this overarching process. 
On the one hand, Hegel readily acknowledges the closeness of chemistry 
and life, telling us that “the chemical process is, in fact, in general terms, Life,” 
since the immediate individual chemical bodies are both produced and 
destroyed in the course of the chemical process.43 However, the chemical process 
can manifest the Idea’s structure only to a limited degree, due to its being unable 
to extricate itself from finitude. Though we can see the continually self-kindling 
activity of life in the chemical process viewed as a total cycle of states, individual 
chemical bodies nonetheless show themselves to have a finitude which means 
they stop short of life. They do not compose a self-reproducing organism but 
only a series of processes, and so to the extent that the Idea shows itself more 
clearly in chemistry than in previous shapes of Nature, it nonetheless is 
“everywhere infected with division.”44 
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In the chemical process the combination and dissociation of bodies is an 
activity external to them, in the sense that this cannot be initiated spontaneously 
by the bodies themselves but only through external impetus. Having been 
combined, the process of combination is over and another external possibility of 
dissociation is now open, though similarly the neutral product of combination 
cannot of itself initiate its dissociation into differentiated bodies. The total process 
thus has the character of being fragmented into distinct processes, each 
incomplete and finite in that it is the transition from one one-sided product 
(whether this is a unified combination or a dissociated variety of bodies) to 
another, and unable of its own resources to immanently initiate the next process. 
Each particular process simply ends in its product, leading Hegel to characterize 
the chemical process as a whole as a discontinuous “series of broken processes,”45 
or a “circle of particular processes” which ‘fall apart’ from one another, each 
immediate and distinct from the others.46  
Though each moment in the process does presuppose another as its 
antecedent, it is merely made extinct in its product or result. Rather than each 
particular process manifesting itself as but a moment of a single total process 
through which this totality immanently continues itself, these processes take on 
the appearance of isolated and distinct events, none of which can from its own 
resources continue itself on into the next.47 The products of dissociation fall apart 
into mutual indifference, and conversely the neutral body produced by a 
combinatory reaction represents the extinguishing of the activity that birthed it, 
unable to spontaneously rekindle this process.48 As Burbidge puts it, “a chemical 
process takes place only when an alien agent assembles them (bodies) in an 
appropriate way.”49  
Hegel makes quite explicit that should the chemical process 
spontaneously renew its activity we would already have life, characterized as 
“the circular return of the process,”50 or “a chemical process made perpetual.”51 
 
45 Ibid. §329, Zusatz 
46 Ibid. §335, Zusatz 
47 Ibid. §329 
48 Ibid. §335, Zusatz 
49 Burbidge, J. (1996). Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry Combine in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. 
University of Toronto Press. p.179 
50 Hegel, G.W.F., Miller, A.V. (2004). Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford University Press. §331, 
Zusatz 
51 Ibid. §335, Zusatz 
168 
 
But no matter how close chemistry may come to manifesting a living process, this 
shortcoming keeps it firmly distinct from life. Although each chemical process 
exists only in the context of its position in the total process, at no point can this 
unity be brought past being an implicit background condition and into concrete 
existence as a singular, explicitly unified process. The chemical process remains 
locked in finitude because its differences are implicitly identical but not yet in 
reality. As Hegel puts it, “life is present in principle in the chemical process; but 
inner necessity is not yet existent unity.”52 
In the chemical process we have on the one hand identity (combination) 
and then difference (dissociation), but the implicit reality of the chemical process 
as a unity of these, an identical totality of differences returning into itself, cannot 
be given existence, as each body and process falls apart from the others. The 
bodies in the chemical process do go some way to sublating their finite one-
sidedness, in the sense that in the course of the particular processes they undergo 
they do not stay in simple opposition or combination with one another, and do 
not hold fast to a single chemical nature, but take on a variety of relationships 
and determinations. However, this sublation can only ever be relative, since the 
chemical process can only ever consist in bodies exchanging their one-sided 
determinations for other equally one-sided determinations. Metals may become 
oxidised, acids may be neutralised, but this is only ever a change from one 
particularity to another, never concretely bringing the unity of the process, which 
is beyond the one-sidedness of any particular body or process, into existence. The 
chemical process gives us a plethora of fragmented pieces but can never present 
to us their existent unity.53 Rather than the moments of the total chemical process 
being immanently driven forward through their own internal necessity, they fall 
apart into externality, unable to make explicit the infinitude of the process 
implicit in them.  
The transition from the chemical process into life, put simply, occurs 
through the latter’s making fully explicit the unity left implicit in the former. The 
progress of Shape through magnetism, electricity and chemistry has been, in a 
general sense, a dialectic of the relationship of matter and its organising form. In 
chemistry this dialectic reaches the point where form, showing itself as an 
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overarching macro-process, maintains its unity while driving itself to internal 
differentiation, articulating itself materially in a process of multiple bodies. This 
development, however, has brought every particular property of the body, as 
well as the body itself, into relativity, generated and destroyed in the cycle of the 
chemical process. Conceived at the level of its transient particular moments, this 
process is locked in a procession of finitude. However, conceived at the level of 
the macro-process articulated through these moments, this negation of matter’s 
external, independent self-subsistence leaves enduring only its negative ideality, 
now no longer only an implicit inner foundation, but an explicit existence for 
which material externality is a fully alterable medium. 
Elucidating this point of transition, Ferrini points out that, as we have 
seen, the chemical process both produces individual bodies and negates their 
immediacy, challenging any attempt to determine their ‘proper’ or stable nature 
by subjecting their every property to relativity.54 However, in this process in 
which the chemical body’s properties prove to be relative, Ferrini suggests that 
chemical matter in fact also reveals the stability of an ‘ideal form’ of the chemical 
substance as a point of unity. That is, the possibility of stably identifying any 
chemical body throughout the course of its reactions and the mutability of its 
every property presupposes something persisting in relation to which these 
changes can be determined.55 The chemical body necessarily ceases to be defined 
by any one of its procession of changing properties, but is identified with this 
ideal form of which its properties are momentary appearances. Ferrini argues 
that the transition to the organic is made when this implicit ideal form of the 
body becomes explicit as a self-determining active unity.56 
 
 
11.6 - Organics 
 
In the transition to the organic, the ideality first reached in the absolute Idea 
emerges as no longer only the immanent foundation of Nature veiled behind its 
self-externality. In life the Idea ceases to be submerged in its material externality, 
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but forms a union with it in which it preserves itself in its ideality, no longer 
collapsing back into finitude.57 Hegel understands the organism to be “the Idea 
as reality,”58 and it realises itself as such through three major processes, the first 
of which is the organism’s internal process of formation. 
 What has thus far in the dialectic of Nature been the dominant 
determination of matter, its self-externality as a multiplicity of bodies, can now 
be understood as but one moment of a process whereby an infinite form, the 
organism, determines itself to particularity, manifest in its multiple parts, or 
organs, but equally negates the independence of these particular bodies, 
‘returning’ to itself as a self-related negative unity.59 By an infinite form in 
negative unity, we mean a concrete universal which develops particularity from 
itself, allowing the particular a genuine individuality and differentiation, while 
also maintaining its harmony and unity with the universal. In its continual 
internal process of formation and self-reproduction, the organic body articulates 
itself in a real internal differentiation, perpetually ‘releasing’ itself into the 
particularity of its members. However, life continually sublates this momentary 
self-subsistence, subsuming its moments back into unity.60 
Relating this structure back to chemistry, though the organism internally 
differentiates itself into a multiplicity of parts or organs, these retain the 
transience they were shown to have in the chemical process, and are ‘subdued’ 
by the living body as its ideal moments and ‘means’. Unlike in the chemical 
process, however, the moments of the organism do not fall back into 
disconnected finitude and no longer have self-subsistence in the face of the 
whole, which freely both divides itself into them and negates them in asserting 
its unity once more.61 It is thus easy to see why Hegel characterizes life as “the 
triumphant individuality”62 since we see here that individuality brings 
externality to heel as the means of its own affirmation, granting it the appearance 
of external self-subsistence only insofar as this serves as a moment in the dialectic 
of the self-production of the organism’s undivided unity. Indeed, Hegel goes so 
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far as to describe the activity of life as “Absolute Idealism”, since “it becomes an 
other which, however, is always sublated.”63 
However, it is important not to understand this sublation of manifold 
determinations in a one-sided way. To sublate something is not to simply negate 
it, but to take it up into a higher unity. Thus, life’s activity of sublating its 
particularity should not be understood as indicating that the differentiation of 
the organic body’s parts, or even the particularity of Nature as such, is in some 
way wiped-away or revealed to be illusory. Indeed, quite to the contrary, Hegel 
remarks that “everything organic is an immanent differentiation which preserves 
the manifoldness in the unity.”64 It does this in a way, though, which manifests a 
different relationship of form and matter to any seen thus far in Nature.  
At earlier stages, particularly the early manifestations of Shape, such as 
‘crystal’, form was manifest in a regularity of the body as a whole, constituted by 
the ensemble of its parts taken together. It was a central organising principle 
articulating itself through its uniform organisation of the body’s subsistent parts. 
In contrast, Hegel characterizes the organism as a “perfectly fluid pervasion of all 
its parts”, which “have a substantial, whole life of their own.”65 That is, rather 
than each part only being understood through the whole, in the sense of being 
determined by a central formative principle distinct from any part, in the organic 
sphere each part of the body is the whole. The organism is neither a centrality 
distinct from its parts nor identified with any particular one or set of them, but 
equally and freely determines itself as each of its moments.66 As Althusser 
describes this structure, what is made actual in the organism “is a living totality 
in which each part subsists only in virtue of the whole, and the whole, in its turn, 
only in virtue of the parts.”67 Whereas the presence of Shape as an organising 
principle, a centrality beyond any of the points it is the centre of, still had a 
lingering echo of the gravitational relation, the living body overcomes the logic of 
gravity altogether.  
Holding together these moments of self-differentiation and sublation in 
the process of formation, it becomes clearer in what sense Hegel regards organic 
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life as bringing the Idea explicitly into natural existence. In life we find an 
inwardly restless unity completely unthreatened by its internal differentiation, 
since it is itself the very process of developing this opposition, determining or 
‘releasing’ itself to self-externality and resolving itself into the whole once more. 
The organism is neither a simplistic, homogenous universality nor a fractured 
heap of particulars, but rather the process of these moments in tension and the 
negative unity which abides throughout. The universal, which was implicit in the 
chemical process and is now actual in the organism, is not a simple ‘all’, but a 
concrete, active negativity; a One which inwardly diversifies itself into a genuine 
multiplicity, but equally pervades and unifies every determination as its own.68 
In thus bringing the negative universality of the chemical process into fuller 
actuality, from a Hegelian perspective the organic goes yet further in sublating 
the Spinozist conception of the body’s structure. That is, the parts of the organic 
body can no longer be understood as self-subsistent bodies in their own right 
only circumstantially associated, but are both produced by the self-differentiation 
of the body and also sublated back into its negative unity, these being the two 
moments of the body’s non-mechanical process of self-formation. 
Burbidge emphasises that the living organism distinguishes itself, not into 
discrete parts, but members, each of which is both a means for realizing the unity 
of the organism and constitutive of the end to be realized. 69 The thought of life 
thus involves both identifying and distinguishing in a single dynamic, a process 
that “would break itself up into particular moments that are complements, even 
opposites, of each other, and would at the same time reconstitute itself by 
reincorporating this particularity into its own unity.”70  
In sharp contrast to Spinoza’s understanding of organic bodies as having 
no special philosophical significance over against the inorganic, Hegel views life 
as functioning according to qualitatively different principles. As we shall see 
below, this is not a matter of the organic making a sudden break with the rest of 
Nature, capriciously flying free from the laws of motion and chemical 
relationships that hold elsewhere. Quite the contrary, the living body exists in 
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constant contact and struggle with its inorganic environment. Rather, as Hegel 
expresses it in the introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, in the organic “there 
emerges a higher necessity than ... in lifeless things.”71 That is, a self-
determination no longer wholly slave to external causality, and a self-subsistent 
unity distinct from the centre of gravity or the formative principle of Shape.  
In life we at last meet with the counter to the externality which, though 
gradually lessening in its dominance, has stubbornly remained throughout the 
course of Nature’s development. However, the necessity of the organic as an 
outcome of the dialectic of Nature does not extinguish the existence of non-
organic Nature. The externality which is the universal determination of the 
sphere of Nature means that not only are preceding categories carried forward as 
they are sublated into higher unities, as was the case in the sphere of Logic as 
well, but additionally they persist in material existence ‘side-by-side’ with the 
categories that develop from them. Consequently, the organic body is involved in 
a second process, that with external Nature. 
This process with external Nature can be understood as an expansion of 
the internal process. In a number of places Hegel draws attention to the 
destructive and oppositional aspect of this first process just discussed, pointing 
out that in dividing itself into a multiplicity of particular parts, the organism 
“converts itself into its non-organic nature,” that is, sunders itself into the 
fractured externality characteristic of non-organic matter.72 Though the organism 
sublates this self-generated externality in turn, reinstating its undivided unity, 
what is significant here regarding the organism’s process with external Nature is 
that already in the cycle of the organism’s internal process of formation there is 
the central dynamic of an opposition between the organism’s universality and 
the externality of its body as an object which it must sublate.73 Whereas in the 
organism’s first, self-related process it contains its other within itself as a moment 
which it both produces and sublates, in its second process the organism 
encounters an other which has not resulted from its own internal activity, but 
confronts it in external, non-organic Nature.74 Its inorganic environment stands 
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over against the organism as not only self-subsistent and independent of it, but a 
presupposed external condition and material upon which it finds itself 
dependent.75 
 In the face of this dependence on and determination by external Nature, 
the organism does not, however, revert to the logic of the chemical body, which 
found itself intrinsically vulnerable to alteration by external causes, its every 
determination subject to change, and therefore its nature cast into the relativity of 
being but one stage or part of an overall process. The reason life does not suffer 
the same fate is that, as we saw above in the organism’s internal process, the 
organism already has its other within itself, both enduring and resolving the 
contradiction which the inorganic cannot withstand. The organism’s being is not 
tied up with its particular determinations, vulnerable to both internal and 
external alteration, but with a negative universality, the alteration of the 
particularities of which is part of its own continual process of self-production.76 
Instead of being destroyed in the encounter with its negative, the organism 
preserves itself against inorganic Nature, sublating this externality by 
assimilating it into itself.77 
In the chemical process the independence of the two sides confronting 
each other was sublated, each reduced to relativity. But the living being “proves 
itself to be what overgrasps its other, which cannot resist its power”, and so in its 
process with its inorganic other “the living being only comes together with 
itself.”78 Indeed, Hegel comments that it is characteristic of life that “it always 
inhibits the reality of the other and transforms it into its own self.”79 Interpreters 
such as Pinkard have given the organism’s relationship with inorganic Nature a 
less violently negative shading, casting the organism’s environment as an 
exteriority to its inward unity which it requires in order to set limits against 
which its own existence can be demarcated and determined.80 However, in 
inorganic Nature the organism does not find only a counterpart against which it 
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may measure itself, but is confronted by a necessary dependence from which it 
cannot extricate itself. This presents a ‘defect’ in the self-subsistence of the 
organism which it must continually negate81 through “the annihilation of the 
Other.”82 
Earlier we saw that Spinoza affirms that things strive for self-preservation 
but denies that this is a feature particular to the organic. Rather, this striving, or 
Conatus, is necessary and universal to all things. Organic bodies may be more 
capable of exerting their Conatus over against most inanimate bodies, but Spinoza 
suggests this is a distinction of degree, owing to the relative complexity of living 
things, and not indicative of a qualitative distinction between the organic and 
inorganic. 
In contrast, Hegel makes explicit in his introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mind that “this self-preservation is the privilege of the living thing.”83 Spinoza 
might object at this point that surely there is an element of self-preservation in 
the elasticity discussed near the outset of physics, in the sense that this is a 
certain cohesion of material parts that resists destruction by external force, 
reinstating its identity over against the momentary negation of its spatiality. 
However, from the Hegelian perspective, in the organism an explicit self emerges 
that is qualitatively different from the forms of identity found at earlier stages of 
Nature. The organism does not manifest its identity only in reaction against the 
action of its other (as in elasticity), nor only in its relative relation to its other (as 
in the chemical process), but itself produces and contains its other within itself 
and, through this process, actively and continually forms itself.  
Indeed, Hegel suggests the organism’s containing and enduring 
contradiction within itself constitutes the first emergence in Nature of the 
subjectivity which will come into its own more fully in the sphere of Mind or 
Spirit. The development of this subjectivity, infinite because it is not limited by its 
other but contains it sublated within itself, represents a radical qualitative 
advancement in the development of Nature over against its merely finite 
inorganic formations. In the form of sensation, the organism’s “finding of self in 
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self,”84 its omnipresence in its every member, allows a bodily self-feeling which 
wholly sublates spatial asunderness. This is not omnipresence as an infinitely 
multiple spatial presence in every point of the body, which would of course 
remain subject to spatial asunderness. “The self is ideal, is not poured out and 
immersed in materiality,”85 but rather a singular, undivided self-feeling owed to 
the omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members.86  
Hahn has also noted the connection between Spinoza’s Conatus and 
Hegel’s conception of organic self-preservation, suggesting that Hegel’s theory of 
the organism’s activity and the dialectical progression of Nature in general 
represent a ‘translation’ of the blind striving of the Conatus into a rational drive to 
self-preservation and self-determination.87 In reading Hegel’s conception of self -
preservation as a specification or further development of the Conatus, however, 
Hahn overlooks the key differences in these positions. Whereas for Spinoza the 
body’s self-preservation is its power to affirmatively maintain the particular ratio 
of motion and rest that constitutes its nature, Hegel emphasises negativity as the 
principal condition and driver of self-preservation. Although Spinoza holds the 
body’s power to be finite, and thus it may be overcome and the body destroyed 
by external causes, nonetheless the body’s self-preservation involves no internal 
or external opposition or negation. The body’s self-preservation is not a 
preservation intrinsically and explicitly against some external power, let alone 
against an internal particularity that must be continually sublated, but is simply 
an expression of its positive power of existence, a power universal and intrinsic 
to all things.  
In contrast, Hegel argues that organisms preserve themselves not just by 
being and striving to be what they are – and not just, as in elasticity, by resisting 
the pressure of external bodies – but by binding together into a negative unity the 
different, and in some ways conflicting, aspects of their own identity. The 
organism’s process of formation is one of continual internal negation, both 
negating its unity through its self-differentiation into organs and negating the 
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subsistence of these parts in their sublation back into this organic unity. The 
organism’s internal negativity thus preserves its being against the cessation of the 
process which constitutes its life, sustaining its activity in a way the chemical 
process could not. This sustaining of the organism through its internal negativity 
also allows its preservation against destruction by external Nature. As was 
discussed above, whereas the independence of bodies in the chemical process 
was sublated through their encounter and reaction with each other, leaving only 
the overarching process itself as implicitly enduring, the organic body is itself 
explicitly this negative unity in process, producing and sublating its particular 
determinations. The encounter with its other in external Nature does not destroy 
the organism, for the organism is itself a continual process of producing and 
sublating its other within its own self. Rather, the organism’s internal negativity 
allows its self-preservation through the sublation of this external other. 
Thus, the negative internal dynamic of contradiction which is never 
permitted to arise in Spinoza’s system, because a body must always either 
maintain its ratio of motion and rest or lose it upon contact with another body, 
preserving itself or being destroyed in binary fashion, is precisely what makes 
self-preservation possible for Hegel. From a Hegelian perspective, Spinoza’s 
subsumption of the organic within his positive and mechanistic view of Nature 
prevents him from giving an adequate account of the qualitative specificity of the 
organic, both in terms of its general distinction from inorganic Nature and more 
specifically with regard to its explicitly negative internal structure and 
relationship with its inorganic environment.  
So far we have understood the organism as the concrete universal of its 
organs, both actively producing itself as these multiple parts and sublating them 
back into unity. In the third process of the organic, Hegel turns to consider that 
the organism as a whole, thus understood, has in fact only been conceived 
abstractly. The organism has been but a posited immediacy in the sense that, as a 
singular material existence, it does not yet show itself as the product of a concrete 
process.88 In response to this, it might be tempting to suggest that external, 
inorganic Nature can be put forward as producing the organism and thereby fill 
in this gap. However, this would be to revert to the structure of chemistry 
 




already sublated by the organic. The universal in Nature can no longer be 
understood to manifest itself in a fractured series of external, contingent 
processes, but as an existent unity. The singular organism cannot therefore be 
coherently conceived as the contingent product of inorganic Nature, but must 
itself be sublated within a further organic universality, which Hegel terms its 
‘genus,’ of which the organism is but a particular manifestation and product.89 
The organism, conceived apart from its universality in the genus, is but an 
abstraction, for just the same reason as the organ conceived apart from its 
organism.  
Much like in the case of the individual organism’s process of formation, 
the genus-process involves a self-mediation in which the genus undergoes 
diremption into individuals and then sublates this difference, establishing its 
concrete unity.90 The genus-process has three forms, the first two of which fail to 
give the genus existence as a concrete universality and fall back into the 
singularity of individual organisms and species. Firstly, in the sex-relation 
individual organisms reproduce themselves as another individual of the same 
genus, and the genus sublates this singularity through the continual negation of 
the organisms as they propagate and replace themselves.91 However, this process 
can only get as far as a “spurious infinite progress”92 in which the genus brings 
forth further singular organisms. The genus never achieves its existent unity in 
this series, but only implicitly, or in principle. To borrow one of Hegel’s 
examples, the development of a plant results in a seed like that from which the 
plant itself began. However, the seed produced is, of course, not identical with 
the one that ultimately produced it, and so although the universality of the genus 
is implicit in this “self-contradiction-into-one of the beginning with the end,” 
nonetheless this process does not reach the point of manifesting an explicit, 
existent universal, but only a series of individuals.93 
Secondly, the genus particularizes itself by dividing itself into species, 
which act as mutually opposed individuals, preserving themselves through the 
negation of each other just as the individual organism preserves itself in the 
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negation of inorganic Nature.94 However, just as in the propagation of individual 
organisms, the universal remains only implicit in this proliferation of species, 
each of which remains inextricably determinate, finite and particular, as well as 
subject to the contingent influence of external Nature, both organic and 
inorganic.95  
As borne out in the first two forms of the genus-process, the externality 
which is the fundamental determination of the natural sphere means the 
organism remains inextricably opposed to universality and thus cannot give 
existence to a reality corresponding to the genus.96 In the third form of the genus-
process, the genus realizes itself through the death of the organism. Though the 
organism may contingently perish from a myriad of causes, the intrinsic 
necessity of its demise, its “original disease and the inborn germ of death,” comes 
from the disparity between its one-sided finitude and the universality of the 
genus in which its actuality lies.97 
The realization of the genus requires the death of the individual organism 
because the organism belongs to the genus (and indeed the unity of the genus is 
the organism’s reality in the same sense that the unity of the organism is the 
reality of its organs) but the organism, being an individual, is intrinsically unable 
to instantiate its genus as universal. The genus exists as the negation of the 
individual because it cannot realize its existence as a universal while spread 
across an infinity of external individuals. The genus must go from being an 
implicit unity to an explicit, existent universal98, but the universality of the genus, 
in becoming explicit, at the same time makes the singularity of the individual 
organism explicitly finite and incompatible with the unity of the genus.99 
Hegel characterizes the life of the individual organism as consisting in its 
“being self-related in its self-distinguishing.” However, in the realization of the 
genus, which requires the identity of the organism with it, the individual 
organism “is thereby degraded to being no longer immediately for itself, but only 
through negation of its immediacy.”100 That is, the singular, self-related 
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individuality of the organism which constitutes its life is incompatible with the 
realization of its identity with the universal, in which the organism is explicitly 
the manifestation of this universal.  
The objects of finite, inorganic nature may contingently be destroyed, but 
a stone, though turned to dust, does not die. The organism dies and its death is 
wholly immanent to it because, unlike the stone which is destroyed by its 
contradiction, the organism exists through its process with its contradiction. 
Hegel stresses that the genus does not destroy the individual externally as a 
foreign power over it, but rather the individual organism is subject to the internal 
disharmony of its individuality and its belonging to the genus as its universal 
which is at the same time, in its realization, the organism’s dissolution as 
individual.101 
The necessity of the organism’s death exhibits the inverse side of the logic 
of natural finitude we discussed above in relation to self-preservation. Whereas 
for Spinoza things preserve themselves through their positive power of existence 
and can only be destroyed by external causes, for Hegel the finite is internally 
and intrinsically vulnerable in its very nature, and in the case of the organism 
death is not a mere accidental cessation of being, but the destined realization of 
its logic. Though viewing the living organism as “the supreme mode of the 
Notion’s existence in Nature,”102 Hegel at the same time contends that the living 
creature is condemned to death by the immanent necessity of its own nature. 
This is a conclusion unthinkable within Spinoza’s system, since it is 
central to the concept of the Conatus that no thing may contain its own negation. 
As Carriero points out, the Conatus doctrine clearly commits Spinoza to 
understanding the death of organic bodies as something that happens to them 
and not part of their own active process.103 However, the example of life 
highlights the general pattern exhibited throughout our examination of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature, from space to the organism, that the internal negativity 
which is absurd to Spinoza is to Hegel the immanent driving force of all things. 
From the Hegelian standpoint, this negative dialectic has both accounted for the 
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content available to Spinoza’s thought and gone beyond its conceptual scope. In 
the case of life, negativity both provides the organism with the self-preservation 
Spinoza conceives through the Conatus but also drives the organism to a self-
necessitated death which is not only intrinsic to life, but in fact the movement of 
its self-realization.  
Though Hegel pays little to no attention to it in his surviving 
commentaries, the Conatus crystallizes a core divergence between his thought 
and Spinoza’s. As Macherey expresses particularly well, for Hegel, “not only can 
contraries exist easily in the same subject, but it is this same unity of contraries 
that constitutes the nature of the subject, as such, insofar as it is the living and 
autonomous process of its own development.”104 From a Hegelian perspective, 
Spinoza’s expulsion of internal negativity from both individual things and 
Nature as such renders him unable to think through their immanent dialectic, 
restricting Spinoza’s view of Nature to the absolutely positive causality of 
Substance.105  
Looking back to chapters seven to nine, it was argued there that Hegel 
can demonstrate the necessity of Nature’s existence and the determinations of 
mechanics through the development of the Idea’s immanent negativity. From a 
Hegelian standpoint, this puts strong pressure on the deficiencies of Spinoza’s 
ability to account for the necessity of Substance’s existence as Extension, motion 
and rest, and finite bodies. 
In this chapter we have shown that the further progression of this 
immanent negativity leads to an account of material Nature which both includes 
the determinations of Spinoza’s philosophy of extended Nature, but also goes on 
to demonstrate that the logic of matter drives it beyond the mechanistic 
standpoint Spinoza occupies. It was argued in chapters four and ten that Spinoza 
takes a ‘uniform’ view of extended Nature, arguing for a strictly mechanical 
model which explains the diversity of its formations purely through quantitative 
variation in the complexity of the patterns of motion and rest which constitute all 
bodies. Taking life as one example, insofar as Spinoza recognizes this as a distinct 
philosophical category, the organic can only be distinguished from the inorganic 
 




by quantitative differences in the ratio of motion and rest found in organic bodies 
and has no qualitatively distinct structures or processes.  
In contrast, it has been argued that Hegel shows that the Idea as Nature 
continually develops qualitative differentiation through its immanent negativity, 
repeatedly sublating its growing richness of content into more developed unities. 
Further, this dialectic does not merely develop new determinations as if adding 
them to a growing list. Rather, each permutation both demands a reconfiguration 
of its antecedent categories and, particularly in the sphere of Nature, itself exists 
in relationship with these. From a Hegelian standpoint, the affirmation of the role 
of negativity and the tension of internal contradiction in Nature enables us to 
recognise not only the qualitative distinction of the organic from the inorganic, 
but also more specifically the organism’s particular internal structure, its relation 
to inorganic Nature, and the necessity of its death. 
Summed up very briefly, the preceding discussion of the key dialectical 
movements in the Philosophy of Nature implicitly contains the critique that 
Spinoza’s mechanistic conception of extended Nature is insufficient to account 
for the qualitatively differentiated stages and forms brought about by Nature’s 
necessary self-development. The mechanical structures discussed by Spinoza are, 
from the Hegelian standpoint, undoubtedly real and indispensable to any 
coherent account of material Nature. Further, at no stage does the development 
of Nature Hegel argues for leave behind motion and rest. However, though 
motion and rest is necessary to it, Hegel’s Nature is not reducible to motion and 
rest, and Nature’s mechanical existence constitutes but the first of its stages of 
self-development. Indeed, the very logic of mechanics leads it to its necessary 
sublation within the more developed structures that follow. This, at least, is the 
Hegelian view as it has been understood here. A Spinozist response must be left 






Chapter 12 – Conclusion 
 
 
As was argued in the introduction, if someone wishes to side with the 
philosophy of the Idea over Substance, this cannot be based solely on Hegel’s 
direct remarks in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and elsewhere, which 
can provide only a broad indication of the central themes of a full Hegelian 
critique of Spinozism. Rather, from a Hegelian perspective, the demonstration 
that the Absolute is Idea can only consist in the Idea’s concretely showing itself to 
be the Absolute, and therefore showing itself to be the One that is Logic, Nature 
and Spirit. The resources for the full Hegelian critique of Spinoza’s philosophy, 
which Hegel himself only sketched in his direct remarks, thus lie in the 
developed Hegelian system including Nature and Spirit. Such a critique would 
also have to engage with the full range of Spinoza’s thought and recognise where 
Hegel fails to do justice to the latter. Through its limited exploration of Hegel and 
Spinoza’s philosophies of Nature, this study has sought to take the first step in 
this expansion of the current scholarship.  
This study has not attempted a comprehensive comparison of Hegel and 
Spinoza’s philosophies of Nature, nor a defence of the detail of Hegel’s explicit 
remarks on Spinoza. Rather, this study has simply sought to show that the 
exploration of Hegel and Spinoza’s philosophies of Nature —that is, of extended 
Nature in Spinoza’s sense—yields a more compelling critique of Spinoza’s 
thought than either Hegel himself or commentators have recognised. More 
specifically, this study has aimed to show that Hegel’s philosophy of Nature, 
through its demonstration that the Idea immanently develops the richness of 
content of the natural world from itself in a way not possible for Substance, 
provides resources for a fruitful and compelling critique – at least from a 
Hegelian point of view – of Spinoza’s account of extended Nature. In this way, it 
has been possible to acknowledge the shortcomings of Hegel’s reading of 
Spinoza, as pointed out by Macherey and Melamed among others, while still 
arguing forcefully for the absolute idealist position.  
The originality of this study’s approach does not consist, therefore, in its 
identification of the already well-known importance of the issues of determinacy 
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and negativity to Hegel’s critique of Spinoza. Rather, what is original is its focus 
on material Nature. This is an aspect of the Hegel-Spinoza relationship thus far 
neglected by scholarship, but which has been argued in this study to present a 
promising new avenue for the Hegelian response to Spinoza and more recent 
Spinozist commentators. 
This study has argued that, in the context of the philosophy of Nature, the 
Hegelian critique of Spinoza takes at least two major interrelated forms. The first 
of these centres on the issue of deriving the existence of material Nature as such 
and its fundamental determinations from the Absolute. As was argued in 
chapters three to five, despite the work led by Macherey and Melamed to clarify 
Spinoza’s position, Hegelian questions regarding the development of 
determinacy within Substance’s absolute unity remain pressing. Specifically, it is 
difficult for Spinozism to provide a satisfying explanation, firstly, as to why 
Substance should necessarily exist in the attribute of Extension, or in other 
words, why material Nature should necessarily exist, as well as, secondly, why 
infinite Substance must necessarily express itself as an infinity of finite modes, 
and thirdly, why Extension must necessarily exist as motion and rest. 
This study then endeavoured to show that Hegel is not limited to merely 
pointing out these deficiencies in Spinoza’s philosophy but can overcome them 
within his own system. An interpretation of the conclusion of Hegel’s Science of 
Logic was constructed in chapter seven which demonstrates that the immanent 
negativity of the Idea drives it to exist necessarily as Nature, which is derived by 
Hegel as the self-externality of the Idea. In chapter eight it was shown that this 
free release of the Idea into self-externality as Nature brings about a structural 
reconfiguration in the Idea in a manner which has no analogue in Spinoza’s 
conception of Substance as Extension. The sundered relationship of universality 
and particularity found in Nature distinguishes this phase of the Idea’s self-
development from its existence as Logic, with important consequences for the 
structure of the natural world. Building on this, in chapter nine it was shown 
that, by following through the negativity of the Idea, Hegel’s dialectical account 
of mechanics can provide a continuous and immanent development from the 
abstract self-externality which commences the sphere of Nature, namely space, 
through to time, matter, motion, and the concrete union of these in gravitational 
systems of free motion. 
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The second major divide explored in this study concerns the broader 
picture of material Nature which these philosophers construct. In chapters four 
and ten an interpretation of Spinoza was argued for which reads him as taking a 
strictly mechanical view of extended modes, according to which every formation 
of material Nature is explained through quantitative variation in the complexity 
of patterns of motion and rest. Though conceptually simple, this account of 
extended Nature has an explanatory power which leaves no question that Hegel 
was mistaken simply to dismiss this aspect of Spinoza’s thought. 
 However, in chapter eleven it was demonstrated that, although Hegel 
neglects Spinoza’s account of material Nature in his direct commentaries, his 
Philosophy of Nature provides a strong critique of any purely mechanical 
conception of the natural world, arguing that, for Hegel, Nature necessarily 
develops through qualitatively different stages. The existence of Nature as a 
system of motion and rest constitutes but the first of the major phases of its 
development, and the very logic of this mechanical conception of the natural 
world drives it to sublate itself within the more developed and qualitatively 
distinct structures of physical, chemical and organic Nature. The dialectical 
negativity of Nature’s necessary self-development thus leads it beyond the 
conceptual scope of Spinoza’s mechanistic picture dominated by quantitative 
determinacy. This, at least, is how the matter looks to Hegelian eyes. 
Some limitations to what it has been possible to show in this study should 
be borne in mind in drawing conclusions from the preceding investigation and 
considering the avenues for future research opened up. Firstly, as was indicated 
in the introduction, this study as a whole has had a Hegelian perspective and 
focus, giving considerably more space to the consideration of Hegel’s philosophy 
of Nature and the way this puts pressure on Spinoza’s view of the natural world. 
Though care has been taken to present a reasonable interpretation of Spinoza’s 
position, and one which resists Hegel’s misreading of certain aspects of his 
thought, it is not suggested here that this study presents the last word on any of 
the issues discussed. Indeed, a natural avenue for expansion on the approach 
taken by this study would be a consideration of what Spinozist rejoinder might 
be possible to the more developed Hegelian critique constructed in this work. 
This might, for example, investigate whether there are resources within Spinoza’s 
thought, overlooked in the preceding discussion, with which to provide a more 
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satisfying account of the necessity of Substance’s existence as Extension, finite 
modes, and motion.  
In order to keep the aims of this study manageable within the space 
available it was also chosen to limit the discussion of Spinoza’s thought to the 
attribute of Extension. Although, as was argued in chapter four, this focus on 
Extension does not introduce incoherency into Spinoza’s system, nonetheless this 
choice does give a Hegelian shading to the notion of Nature explored in this 
study. The investigation of Spinoza’s conception of Thought as an attribute 
parallel to Extension, both of which are equally an expression of Nature in the 
broader Spinozist sense, and the comparison of this with Hegel’s account of 
material Nature’s self-transformation into the selfhood and subjectivity of Spirit, 
represents a logical direction for the project begun by this study. 
As well as the broad issue of the relation of mind and Nature as such, the 
relation of fully self-conscious minds to Nature implicates questions of ecology 
and Nature’s moral status or lack of it, issues of growing interest in Spinoza 
scholarship1 which might productively be brought into dialogue with Hegel’s 
account of Nature’s relation to Spirit. 
These questions (and more) all need to be investigated in detail if we are 
to come to a comprehensive understanding of the relation between Hegel and 
Spinoza. This, however, is work for the future. 
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